No more limits...

With the expiration of the New START treaty on 5 Feb 2026, the world has officially crossed a threshold that in reality was passed a few years ago when Russia suspended data exchanges and on-site inspections - a compliance architecture mandated under the treaty. Since then, the treaty has existed more as a symbolic ceiling than an actual pillar of arms control. Signed in 2010, the treaty was the last standing bilateral agreement between the US and Russia limiting the deployed ballistic missiles and bombers at 700 each, strategic missile launchers at 800 each, and the number of nuclear warheads to 1,550 each. Besides putting numerical limits, the treaty for over a decade also provided safeguards against uncertainty and risks of miscalculation.

From SALT to START to New START, the arms control has always been more about managing rivalry than building trust. For instance, even during the periods of escalated hostility, the two sides managed to maintain some kind of negotiated restraint. With the collapse of arms control frameworks like Open Skies Treaty (OST), Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) treaty and now New START, the great power competition appears to be replacing managed deterrence which was believed to be the foundational pillar of strategic stability.

Framing it as a mere causality of US-Russia tensions would be quite simplistic; the deep structural driver lies elsewhere i.e. China. The waning US eagerness to renew or replace the New START has less to do with Russia and more to do with US apprehensions about China's expanding nuclear arsenal operating outside any arms control framework. The US believes that extending bilateral arms control with Russia, while China continues to build without any constraints, creates strategic asymmetry and does not take into account the realities of a multipolar nuclear landscape. Therefore, the New START became strategically outdated well before its expiration.

The question now remains whether the US will bring changes in its force posture to threaten China, forcing it into negotiating a trilateral arms control framework. Realistically, any drastic expansion is unlikely in the near future. However, as highlighted by the Congressional Commission on the US Strategic Posture, the US needs to address the increasing number of targets in China as its force expands. In this context, the US is likely to opt for a reconfiguration of its existing capacity by a modest upload of warheads on its existing missiles and putting missiles back into the tubes on its ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs). But increasing the number of warheads doesn't ensure that China and Russia will not do the same in response. So, the essential problem, how much more will be enough, remains unaddressed and therein lies the risk of reciprocal arms race.

The prospects of a comprehensive trilateral treaty among the US, China and Russia are dim as China at several instances has rejected being a part of any trilateral arms control framework arguing that its arsenal is not on a par with that of the US and Russia to be constrained under any treaty. With no more limits on the US and Russia, which together possess 90% of world's total nuclear arsenal, the global nuclear order will witness a gradual normalisation of unconstrained nuclear growth. In such a scenario, informal political commitments, unilateral moratoriums and effective crisis communication channels may substitute for legally binding treaties in a hope that the very logic of deterrence may still discourage the states from reckless expansions.

With regard to the broader implications, the erosion of arms control agreements will not only reshape the US-Russia strategic balance but will act as a strong signal to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) as well, which may increase the perceived value of nuclear weapons in international politics. INF and New START were often viewed as evidence that the nuclear weapon states are, to some extent, fulfilling their commitment — to pursue disarmament in good faith — under Article-VI of the NPT. The dilution of this perception among NNWS may weaken the global stigma against expansion and may compel them to consider acquiring nuclear weapons as the only rational solution vis-à-vis their insecurities.