Rethinking deterrence

Deterrence was once meant to prevent war. Today, it is designed to make war manageable.

When the United States attacks Iranian-connected targets, but does not attack Iranian territory, when Iran retaliates using its proxies, but not its missiles flying its flags, when neither side says anything, but both sides act in a manner calculated as cautiously as their words, we are informed that deterrence is holding. And it is — but not as we think. What we are witnessing is not the success of classical deterrence, but a quiet redefinition.

The Iran-US relationship is symbolic of this change. The drone attacks, cyber attacks, targeted assassinations and sanctions are used as an unending pressure campaign as opposed to a move towards resolution. Each move is calculated to be painful yet absorbable, visible yet deniable. Revenge will be meted out, even anticipated, but in moderation. This is deterrence by calibration, not fear.

A parallel reasoning takes place elsewhere. Russia and NATO are in an intense, restrained war in Ukraine. The high-tech ammunition is infused, but there are also systems that are left out or stalled. There are red lines, but they are soft and they are not imposed on people openly but are silently fine-tuned. This is deterrence which does not mean to stop violence, but to stop face-to-face conflict, despite the battlefield being on fire.

Israel and Hezbollah strike each other with ritualistic predictability in the Middle East as both parties push the limits without descending into an actual war. In the Red Sea, ship attacks do not provoke a decisive military response, and disrupt global trade. Even on the Taiwan side of the strait, deterrence is not dependent on the prospect of success as much as the art of military drills, naval routes and ambiguous strategies.

Modern military technology is what enables this new deterrence. Precision guiding munitions enable states to castigate without the provocation of mass killings. Drones do offer reach but without exposure. Cyber tools do not leave images of destruction that cause escalation. The surveillance technologies provide round-the-clock visibility which decreases such a notion as surprise but adds pressure. These are not arms to bring wars to a close; they are instruments of coercion that outlive their use.

Credibility has also changed with technology. In the Cold War, it implied a readiness to get out of control. Today, it relies in showing restraint. Overreaction signals recklessness. The most credible actor is the one that can strike, pause, and strike again; all without losing control of the narrative or the escalation ladder.

But there is a terrible danger to this evolution. Where deterrence is effective in controlling conflict, it eliminates the motives to solve it. Violence gets normalised, routinised and politically manageable. The tension between countries exists not due to the lack of solutions, but due to the strategic interests associated with instability.

Red lines that were central to the deterrence theory are now intentionally blurred. It is no longer a policy failure but policy. Yet ambiguity invites miscalculation. When everybody is working in the grey zone, one incorrect signal of misreading, or a failed algorithm, can cause the system to escalate more quickly than diplomacy can react.

The greatest danger of contemporary deterrence is entrenchment, not collapse. A world of controlled aggression may easily end up in a state of constant turmoil - neither peace nor war. Deterrence, which was a barrier to destruction, has become a model of continued conflict.

We continue to speak Cold War language about a post-Cold War reality. Until we accept that deterrence is redefined, not as prevention, but as management, we will keep confusing long-term tension with security, and contained conflict with peace.