When jurisdiction travels further than law

The recent cross-border capture of a sitting head of state raises hard questions about enforcement jurisdiction, immunity and the use of force under international law.

Legal analysis requires a discipline different from political debate. It is not about declaring winners or assigning blame. It is about examining the legal structure that governs state conduct.

What are the limits of lawful power? And what happens when those limits are tested?

The present controversy turns on three settled pillars of international law: enforcement jurisdiction, use of force, and immunity. These are not technical abstractions. They mark the legal boundaries within which states are expected to operate, even when political pressure pushes outward.

The legal questions discussed here arise from the extraterritorial capture and transfer of a sitting head of state pursuant to a foreign criminal indictment. International law rarely operates in absolutes. It functions through nuance, exception and precedent, and must therefore be approached with restraint rather than certainty.

The general rule on enforcement jurisdiction is well established. A state may not enforce its laws on the territory of another sovereign state. This principle lies at the core of territorial sovereignty and international order. For states like ours that depend on law rather than leverage, this rule is not a technicality but a safeguard. Limited exceptions exist, most notably the consent of the territorial state or authorisation by UNSC. Neither exists on record.

Much reliance has been placed on a domestic indictment issued by a foreign court. Its legal effect must be kept in perspective. An indictment is not a finding of guilt, but an authorisation to commence trial. Under international law, a domestic indictment does not, by itself, generate a right of extraterritorial enforcement. The legal risk lies not in the charge itself, but in treating an indictment as a substitute for jurisdiction.

Immunity further complicates the analysis. Under customary international law, a serving head of state enjoys personal immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign domestic courts. This immunity applies only while the individual remains in office. It does not extend to international criminal tribunals operating under treaty frameworks or UNSC mandates. The decisive legal issue is therefore temporal: whether such immunity existed at the time of capture.

The use of force dimension cannot be ignored. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter imposes a broad prohibition on the use of force, subject only to recognised exceptions such as self-defence or UNSC authorisation. While expansionist theories have emerged, the orthodox position maintains a high threshold. Self-defence requires an armed attack. Criminal activity, including drug trafficking, does not ordinarily meet that standard unless directly linked to organised armed force.

Another distinction is critical. Domestic legality does not determine international legality. International law does not permit a state to rely on its internal law to excuse an internationally wrongful act. Conduct that may be lawful domestically can still engage international responsibility. That divergence is not accidental; it is how international law disciplines power exercised through national systems.

For states like Pakistan, these questions are not academic. Pakistan has historically relied on international law to protect territorial sovereignty and resist extraterritorial enforcement. If unilateral enforcement and flexible jurisdictional theories become normalised, smaller and developing states are the first to lose the protection of legal symmetry. Pakistan's reliance on international law has never rested in power, but in principle.

This discussion is not a defence of any individual. It is an inquiry into a deeper question: do the foundational rules of international law still restrain power when it matters most?

Exceptional cases can always be claimed. Urgency can always be invoked. But international law rarely collapses through open defiance. It erodes through precedent.

When jurisdictional limits, immunity rules and use-of-force thresholds are treated as optional rather than binding, the cost is not merely legal inconsistency; it is the gradual thinning of the legal order itself.