Gwadar-Chabahar dynamics: competition or cooperation?

Gwadar and Chabahar ports could complement each other, but geopolitics fuels rivalry over strategy

Gwadar and Chabahar are often described as "sister ports" due to their geographical proximity (140 km apart) and shared access to similar hinterlands, including Afghanistan, Central Asia, West Asia and Western China.

Geographically, both ports are naturally positioned for cooperation. However, due to geopolitics, China's role in Gwadar and India's investment in Chabahar have pushed both ports toward competition. Moreover, the great-power rivalry between the US and China has deepened this competition. Let's analyse how geopolitics and great power competition make both ports competitive rather than cooperative.

Gwadar is located about 400 km east of the Strait of Hormuz. Nearly 20% of the world's oil and 40% of China's imported oil pass through this route. Because of its strategic location, Gwadar provides China with direct and easier access to the Arabian Sea.

It is developed under the $65 billion CPEC framework. China has gradually increased its investment in Gwadar since 2016. Notably, China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC) has funded different infrastructure projects, including $230 million international airport, expressways, energy corridors and special industrial zones.

Gwadar significantly shortens Beijing's supply lines: The Gwadar-Kashgar corridor offers significant economic and time benefits. Compared to the traditional Malacca route from China's eastern seaboard to the European, Gulf and African markets, this corridor avoids chokepoint vulnerabilities. This development saves China almost $71 billion annually in trade with key destinations across West Asia and Europe.

Apart from Gwadar's strategic significance, it also serves as Pakistan's primary gateway to West Asia, Central Asia, Africa and Europe. This port presents a crucial entry point for China to increase its economic outreach in these regions, especially in Africa.

China-Africa bilateral trade has reached $296 billion in 2024, and Gwadar is envisioned as an anchor of a China-Gwadar-Africa trade Corridor to further enhance China's trade with Africa. Significantly, Pakistan and China have agreed to operationalise this corridor with five feeder routes and bonded warehouses under Pakistan's Five-Year Maritime Action Plan for 2025-2029.

These projects are anticipated to generate tangible economic benefits for local communities and regional businesses. For instance, Gwadar is likely to generate 25,000 jobs and 30% increase in its GDP by 2027. The port is also expected to manage 400 million tons of cargo annually by 2030, surpassing Chabahar's estimated capacity of 10-12 million tons.

China plans to expand CPEC towards Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia. It reflects Beijing's ambition to integrate east-west BRI routes with north-south trade corridors. By connecting these corridors, China aims to enhance trade efficiency, reinforce regional economic gains and strengthen its economic outreach.

On the other hand, Chabahar port is located in Iran's Sistan-Baluchestan province (140 km west of Gwadar) and serves as Iran's eastern maritime gateway. It connects West Asia, South Asia and Central Asia and avoids the chokepoint vulnerabilities of Persian Gulf ports.

For India, Chabahar holds immense strategic and economic significance. It provides direct access to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and even Russia, crucially bypassing the ports of Karachi and Gwadar in Pakistan. India's involvement in Chabahar started in 2003 when Iran and India signed an MoU to jointly develop the Chabahar port.

Due to the US sanctions on Iran, Chabahar's development remained delayed. However, interim operations started in 2016 when Iran, India and Afghanistan signed a partnership to develop Chabahar port along with rail lines to connect India with Afghanistan through Iran, while bypassing Pakistan. Therefore, Chabahar has become the linchpin of India's 'Connect Central Asia Policy'.

To operationalise this vision, India and Iran signed a 10-year contract in May 2024 to develop Chabahar port. Under this agreement, India has committed to invest $120 million, along with additional financing of $250 million for infrastructure development, and acquired operational control of the Shahid-Beheshti-Terminal.

India Ports Global Limited (IPGL) took charge of Chabahar's operations in 2018. Since then, it has handled 90,000 containers and 8.4 million tons of cargo. Through Chabahar port, India has shipped 2.5 million tons of wheat and 2,000 tons of pulses to Afghanistan. The cargo capacity of Chabahar port has increased from 2.5 million tons to 8.5 million tons, and is projected to increase by 50% through development projects.

Chabahar is also a key pillar of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) – a network of highways, sea lanes and railways connecting India, Iran, Russia, Central Asia and Europe.

Compared to the traditional Suez Canal route, this corridor reduces the transportation costs, shipping time and distance. Thus, for India, Chabahar presents a crucial gateway for economic integration with Eurasia and aligns with the US's offshore balancing against China.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy of Washington provides the broader strategic frame within which the dynamics of Gwadar and Chabahar should be understood. This strategy aims to empower India to counterbalance China, demonstrating how the regional infrastructure projects take shape.

As Dr David Brewster observes, the Gwadar-Chabahar dynamics are shaped by structural restraints and the strategic ambitions of the states backing them, resulting in opposing regional visions.

The question of connectivity is deeply shaped by competing geopolitical visions. If Gwadar and Chabahar were ever connected, China would gain direct access to the Indian Ocean and Central Asia, reducing its reliance on US-dominated chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca.

Therefore, Washington has long sought to prevent this outcome, and the absence of connectivity here reflects the influence of great-power competitions on infrastructure planning.

These dynamics are further reinforced by US sanctions. According to Alex Vatanka, Iran has tried to cushion the impact of these sanctions through Shanghai accounts, local-currency settlements and emerging digital financial channels. However, the unpredictability of US policy has pushed Tehran closer to Beijing.

These shifts forced Washington to recalibrate its approach to India's presence in Chabahar. It was reflected in Sept 2025 when the US invoked India's Chabahar waiver, later extended up to April 2026, reflecting a strategic calculation. Because the US prefers India to retain its presence in Chabahar to counter deeper Chinese involvement in the region.

Iranian scholar Prof Mohammad Reza Dehshiri argues that the future of Chabahar deeply depends on India's capability to exercise strategic autonomy despite US pressure.

Ultimately, geography encourages complementarity between Gwadar and Chabahar, but geopolitics continues to push them toward competition. As long as great-power rivalry overshadows regional cooperation, Gwadar and Chabahar will be more defined by the strategic contest surrounding the two ports than by their economic potential.