Recognising State of Israel?

When the rate of change exceeds the ability to adapt, it results in dislocation. This is true for both human beings and nation-states. There is also a general belief that the problems of the 21st Century will never be tackled by the mental maps that are locked in the 20th Century. I would also like to mention Murphy's Law, which states that "if anything can go wrong, it will." However, we may also believe in Stein's Law, which says, "what cannot go on forever will eventually stop." The only thing constant is change, and Pakistan has, for far too long, only made some minor adjustments, but never a major change in matters of its foreign policy.

Pakistan actively participated in President Donald Trump's 20-point peace plan, a process that is most likely to lead Pakistan to become part of the Abraham Accords, which means recognition of the state of Israel. Will we recognise the rate of change, adapt and transform from being a white elephant to become a goose that will start laying golden eggs? Or will we choose to remain dislocated and disassociated from the major changes that are taking place in Middle Eastern politics? If the Arab world has decided to move on from 'no peace without Palestine' to 'peace for mutual interests', will we stay aloof, locked in the mental maps of the 20th Century, or join the bloc and seek diplomatic, economic and security awards that come with it? The oppression, tyranny and cruelty endured by people of Gaza will, in time, come to an end. Where will Pakistan stand when this tyranny has ended? With the Gulf countries, the Arab world and the United States? Or with none of them and an abstinence from participating in this peace process that seeks to reverse the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and later find a two-state solution to the problem.

I would like to cover three important aspects related to the idea of becoming part of the Abraham Accords and recognising the state of Israel.

First, the moment of greatest danger for any authoritative regime is when it undertakes a major reform. A major reform - in our case, a major foreign policy reform - may or may not come off. I would like to substantiate this point by giving two historical examples. Second, I will explain what the diplomatic, economic and security awards are for the Arab states that joined the Abraham Accords. Finally, I will examine the evolving 20-point peace plan - still in its infancy, though already falling short of achieving its set objectives. In doing so, we must not take our eyes off the epicentre, the ground zero we all know by the name of the Gaza Strip.

Ending the Cold War was the primary objective of Mikhail Gorbachev, as the Soviet Union was paying a price for keeping its mighty status as a superpower. He brought about a major shift in the Soviet Union's foreign policy and initiated the development of a constructive relationship with the Western world. His political argument was: how could 20 million members of the communist party of the Soviet Union rule 200 million people? President Regan, with whom he worked intimately to overhaul the Soviet Union's foreign policy, had earlier referred to the Soviet Union as an evil empire, but when President Reagan visited Moscow in 1988 and was asked if the Soviet Union was still an evil empire, he replied, "I was talking of another time and another era." The consequence of this major Soviet policy shift was the disintegration of the Soviet Empire in the new era. This holds out as a major foreign policy reform that didn't come off.

Konrad Adenauer was the first Chancellor of the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany from 1949-63. He reshaped post-war German and European history more than any other individual. He is recognised as a leader who guided and rebuilt Germany after the fall of Hitler, and Germany's defeat and devastation during World War II. Leading Adenauer embodied the belief that "either you can serve power, or you can serve the truth." Konrad applied a strategy of humility composed of four basic elements: accepting consequences of defeat; regaining the confidence of victors; building a democratic society; and creating a European federation that would transcend the historic divisions of Europe. Audenauer's major shift in foreign policy is an example of how a major change paid off, and Germany today stands as one of the greatest countries in Europe. His achievements are chronicled in Henry Kissinger's book, Leadership - Six Studies in World Strategy.

When the UAE signed the Abraham Accords, the United States agreed to supply it with 50 F-35 fighter jets and 18 Reaper drones. Bahrain, which hosts the US Navy's Fifth Fleet, received mostly diplomatic and security-oriented benefits. Morocco's main reward was the United States' recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara. The UN still lists Western Sahara as a 'non-self-governing territory.' The Polisario Front, which is a Sahrawi nationalist movement, seeks independence for Western Sahara, claiming it as the homeland of the Sahrawi Arab.

Now to Ground Zero, Gaza Strip, where we are in the process of implementing the first phase of the plan. It includes sending 'full aid' into the Gaza Strip, the release of hostages by Hamas, and the release of political prisoners by Israel. The agreement called for the entry of 600 aid trucks per day, which Israel has already cut to half. Israel also threatened a full shutdown of trade when one of its bulldozers hit an unexploded ordnance, which it blamed on Hamas. Famine continues, and as winter approaches, deprivation of promised aid to the people of Gaza may aggravate it. According to UN estimates, 80% of residential housing and 89% of water and sewerage infrastructure in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed, leaving many with no homes to return to. Hamas remains armed, and all is not well in Gaza.

I have tried to highlight some geopolitical realities that can come in handy if a decision is taken to undertake a major foreign policy reform by Pakistan. I haven't even touched the ideological part of this major foreign policy shift. Many people in Pakistan still hold the notion that the question of recognising Israel only has an ideological and not a geopolitical construct, and in that lies the great hurdle in executing this big shift in our foreign policy.