America's emerging calculus in Afghanistan and beyond

President Trump recently claimed that the US needed to regain control of Bagram Air Base, the sprawling facility the US once operated north of Kabul, because it was an hour from where China makes nuclear bombs. China's nuclear sites are instead in central and eastern parts of the country, far beyond an hour's flight from Afghanistan. However, behind these 'alternative facts' lies a more serious question: is Washington contemplating a return to its old Afghan footprint?

The idea is not as far-fetched as it seems. During the US presence in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, Bagram had served not just as a launchpad for counterterrorism operations, but as a geopolitical listening post astride the fault lines of South and Central Asia - within reach of Iran, Russia and western China. In an era where the Pentagon is increasingly concerned about great-power competition, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, such a foothold could prove indispensable.

China is steadily consolidating its own influence. Its trade with Afghanistan surpassed $500 million this year, and Beijing is cautiously pursuing the possibility of the Taliban regime joining its BRI. Conversely, tensions between China and India are pushing New Delhi to seek limited rapprochement with its rival. That recalibration underscores why Washington may want options that do not rely solely on India to contain Chinese influence. Bagram, or an alternative platform in Afghanistan, could offer precisely that.

But the obstacles are formidable. Hardline Taliban factions in Kandahar have flatly rejected any such deal. And the country's neighbours - India, Pakistan, Russia, China, Iran and CARs - have presented a united front through the Moscow Format, opposing any foreign "military infrastructure" in Afghanistan. Even the Pentagon has publicly downplayed the possibility, noting that a base presence would require the deployment of roughly 10,000 troops in advance.

Still, Washington may believe there is room to maneuver. A carefully calibrated mix of incentives, back-channel diplomacy with pragmatic Taliban elements and coordinated pressure from regional actors could shift the calculus. Trump may even seek a "Doha 2.0" - a follow-up to the 2020 deal he brokered with the Taliban.

This time, the Taliban would surely demand international legitimacy - starting with a seat at the UN, relief from travel and financial restrictions and access to frozen funds. The Trump administration is also toying with the idea of investing in Afghanistan's untapped lithium reserves. Here, Ukraine offers an instructive precedent, where Washington's security guarantees have been paired with significant economic stakes.

However, an overt rapprochement with the Taliban would be politically toxic at home. The Bush administration justified the 2001 invasion not only as retaliation for harbouring Osama bin Laden but as a moral crusade to liberate Afghan women. Many Americans have not forgotten that narrative, nor the sense of betrayal that accompanied Trump's original deal with the Taliban, a bargain that critics say also betrayed Afghan women.

If a formal US presence at Bagram proves untenable, Washington could turn to subtler or more indirect alternatives. Covert drone facilities could provide plausible deniability, while outsourcing the management of Bagram to a third party - such as Qatar, which already hosts a US diplomatic mission in Kabul; the UAE, which operates Afghan airports; or even Uzbekistan, which retains Afghan military assets and faces its own cross-border threats - could allow the US to preserve a limited footprint without a formal return.

Washington, however, is likely to be more cautious about relying on Pakistan to help create leverage in Afghanistan again. Islamabad's own relationship with the Taliban has eroded sharply. Yet, Pakistan also appears eager to reassert its strategic relevance. Recent reports concerning Pakistan's offer of a deep-sea port at Pasni - situated just an hour from the Chinese-operated Gwadar port - may offer the US another opportunity to reestablish influence in the region.