Defying pressure in armed diplomacy

India’s defence priorities are shifting, with growing ties to the US and France despite Russia’s legacy

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India and Russia are navigating testing times in their longstanding relationship. The ongoing war in Ukraine and India’s evolving defence priorities are adding complexity to their ties.

While Russia has traditionally been the major supplier of India’s defence imports, this dynamic is shifting as India diversifies its suppliers, putting greater emphasis on domestic production and broadening procurements by dealing with countries like the United States and France.

This shift is evident with Russia’s share in India’s arms imports dropping from 76% in 2009 to 36% in 2022, while India has secured $20 billion in defence deals with the US since 2018 for advanced weaponry like drones and jet engines.

Indian Navy is likely to secure a deal by January 2025 with France for 26 new Rafale fighter jets and 3 more Scorpène submarines. Concurrently, India is expanding its domestic defence production, with plans to double defence exports to INR 42,000 crore by 2029.

To facilitate this, the government is exploring the establishment of Defence Export Promotion Council (DEPC) dedicated to defence products. Against this complex backdrop, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh recently concluded his trip from Moscow.

Rajnath’s visit featured a comprehensive agenda. He began with commissioning of a new stealth frigate, INS Tuhsil, constructed by Moscow for the Indian Navy, a second vessel, IND Tamal, is still under construction.

Following this event in Kaliningrad, he travelled to Moscow, where he paid tribute at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier and held talks with Russian counterpart Sergei Shoigu. The meeting marked the 21st edition of the India-Russia Defence Dialogue, reaffirming the strong and enduring partnership between the two states.

Rajnath also met with President Vladimir Putin conveying Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s concerns over delays in defence equipment deliveries, especially the S-400 missile systems. While New Delhi signed the deal in 2018, only three of the five systems have been delivered, with the remaining two expected to be delivered by 2025 or may be a year later.

However, what stood out was Rajnath’s statement, made in the presence of Putin, admitting geopolitical pressure India faces and the enormous challenges from both public and private to reduce ties with Russia. This public admission is a rare move in India’s diplomatic stance and is not easily found in its external relations. His remarks about Moscow-Delhi relationship “being deeper than the ocean and higher than the mountains” mirror the language often associated with diplomatic hyperbole, again something rare in Indian diplomacy. Rajnath’s visit and assertive statements send a clear signal to the U.S., which is dissatisfied with India’s ties to Russia.

This comes amid strained relations, highlighted by U.S. accusations against Indian billionaire Gautam Adani, a close associate of the Modi government, over a bribery plot and in response India’s allegations of U.S. funding media groups to destabilize the country. These tensions reflect India’s effort to maintain strategic autonomy amidst external pressures.

Despite the shifting dynamics, Russia remains critical to India’s defence capabilities, especially for advanced technologies like long-range radar systems. India is reportedly considering the purchase of Russia’s Voronezh radar system, which can detect and track missiles and jets at ranges of up to 8,000 km vertically and 6,000 km horizontally.

This potential $4 billion deal would significantly bolster India’s air defence capabilities, particularly against threats from China, mainly against Chinese ICBMS and stealth fighters, and the Indian Ocean region. Also, 60% of the system would be manufactured locally in India, promoting domestic production.

The Western expectation, particularly from the U.S., that India will abruptly sever defence ties with Russia, despite increasing military and technological cooperation, driven by its obsession to contain China, is unrealistic.

Both Moscow and Delhi are focused on adapting and safeguarding their strategic partnership. A key opportunity to further strengthen these ties will arise in 2025, when President Putin—against whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant in March 2023, though India is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, the international treaty governing the ICC—is scheduled to visit India, likely on Republic Day, for the first time since 2021.This visit could serve as a crucial platform to strengthen their relationship while addressing the challenges posed by the West.

The writer is a researcher specialising on India and South Asia