Why is Israel not on IS's radar?

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The Islamic State (IS), along with its Afghan branch, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), has long declared its mission as defending Islam, establishing Sharia and reviving the 'golden era' of the Caliphate. Yet, the selective targeting of these groups raises serious questions about their true motivations.

Since 2014, IS has launched a relentless campaign to seize territory and promote global jihad - first in Iraq and Syria and later through numerous branches in Asia and Africa. They justified this by declaring a new Caliphate, led initially by Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. During its rule, IS subjected nearly 80 million people to its violent regime, committing atrocities, obliterating cultural landmarks and generating substantial revenue through oil sales, extortion, theft and kidnappings. All these atrocities were targeted at Muslims and their heritage.

Similarly, while the ISKP expanded its presence in Afghanistan and occasionally in Pakistan, it has mainly directed violence toward local populations. This has not only caused mass suffering within Islamic nations but has made the IS's brand of 'jihad' look more intent on inciting fear than offering genuine defence.

This internal focus has raised doubts over IS's intentions. If IS truly aims to defend Islam, why have they failed to address atrocities against Muslims in regions like Gaza, where Israeli strikes have led to significant loss of life and ongoing displacement? Or in India, where Hindutva nationalism has resulted in recurrent violence and discrimination against the Muslim population?

In 2016, IS released a statement on why it hadn't attacked Israel, dismissing the 'Palestinian issue' as just one among many struggles. It emphasised that fighting 'apostate tyrants' ruling Islamic lands was a greater priority than engaging with Israel, even though protecting Jerusalem is considered a central part of Islamic history. The IS's narrative thus appears less about defending Islam and more about destabilising specific Muslim regions.

IS has struggled to establish a significant presence in India and efforts to mobilise followers there have been largely unsuccessful, with very few Indian recruits joining their ranks. Groups allegedly inspired by IS, such as Janood-ul-Khalifa-e-Hind, have failed to gain any substantial ground. The lack of large-scale IS operations in India indicates that the group is either unwilling or incapable of addressing the situation in India.

By failing to act on behalf of suffering Muslim communities in Gaza and India, IS and ISKP inadvertently reveal that their goals may not align with a defence of Islam as they claim. Rather than embodying a force of Islamic solidarity, they appear to exploit Islam to legitimise their violence. Their agenda not only destabilises Muslim nations but also promotes a distorted image of Islam as a religion of bloodshed. Instead of confronting the oppression of Muslims in non-Muslim states, IS has managed to convince some of its followers that internal conflict is a greater priority than external defence.

ISKP's media wing, Al-Azaim Foundation, has adopted an advanced, multilingual approach that far surpasses any other IS branch, mirroring its original media strategy. Al-Azaim now produces content in multiple languages, expanding its reach and attempting to rally Muslims globally. However, the substance of their message shows little genuine interest in protecting or supporting Muslim populations under threat in regions like Gaza or India. Instead, they incite against governments in Muslim-majority countries while sparing non-Muslim governments that have been implicated in Muslim persecution.

The absence of action in Gaza and India strongly suggests that IS's priorities lie elsewhere. While their narrative is veiled in religious terms, their actions serve to weaken Islamic states rather than unifying or defending them. It is also speculated that these groups are strategically positioned to keep Islamic countries mired in conflict and disorder, potentially benefiting geopolitical actors who prefer a fragmented Muslim world.