Balochistan - the antidote

Sardari system's grip on Balochistan fuels discontent, hindering progress & empowering militants and tribal elites.

The crux of Balochistan problem is the prevalent Sardari System that has kept the State machinery hostage to the whims of traditional elite. Sardars fear that Pakistani state's encroachment would affect their privilege, mainly their financial clout, as they 'generally' have no other sources of income or quality education. Hence, they regularly blackmail the Establishment through bogeys like fears of Baloch secession, law and order, popular discontent, migration or narazgi (angst) etc, manipulating respective tribes that are intentionally kept isolated, backward and misguided against the distant State and the 'Punjabi' Establishment.

The State finds no alternative to this entrenched elite, as in the distant, especially the militancy-affected areas, the State's inability to reach out leaves even routine and essential state functions dependent upon these traditional strongmen.

In this self-perpetuating exploitative cycle, education seems to have made some inroads, enabling the youth bulge to challenge the status quo. However, the local Sardar-militant-teacher combine channelises and diverts the youth angst against the State, protecting its own power, privilege and patronage. Election and democracy will not work as in the lackluster turnout, entrenched Sardars-cum-politicians are returned to the assemblies again and again, further enhancing their blackmailing powers.

With the problem stated, we explore some other facts. Baloch, in the Sulaiman Mountains, have some 27 tribes (tumans) under a tumandar - Sardar. They are mentioned in 10th Century Arabic chronicles, and their original homeland was probably the Iranian plateau. Arid Balochistan, at the eastern end of this plateau, is almost evenly split between Pakistan and Iran's Sistan-Balochistan province. It also occupies small parts of Afghanistan's Nimruz, Helmand and Kandahar provinces.

Sanjarani, Jamal-al-Dini, Badini, Mohammad-Hasani and the Brahui-speaking Mengal tribes live on either side of the Pak-Afghan border. Of the estimated 90,000 Baloch living in Afghanistan, around 10,000 (Narui-i, Rigi, Sanjarani and Gurgec tumans) have relations in both Iran and Pakistan. Most Afghan Baloch are presently refugees in Pakistan, besides around 300,000 mainly Pashtun Afghan refugees in Balochistan.

Hence, Islamabad must contend with the Iranian influences, Afghan connection, smuggling along respective borders and the coastal belt, and the more than friendly interests of the Indian, British and other intelligence agencies.

As per Census-2017, Balochistan's population is 12.34 million with only 3.41 million (27.62%) living in urban areas and an overwhelming 8.93 million (72.38%) living in rural areas. The male at 52.56% outnumber female at 47.43%. Out of its six administrative divisions (comprising 31 districts), Quetta has 33.81% of the population, Kalat 20.37%, Nasirabad 13.47%, Zhob 12.50%, Makran 12.04% and Sibi 7.81%. And a whopping 48.69% are under 15 years, another 18.20% between 15-24 years of age, making this youth bulge highly dependent.

The 35.49% Baloch population is divided into the Sulaimani and the Makrani groups, separated by a compact block of Brahui tribes (17.12%). North Balochistan including Quetta is entrenched Pashtun Belt (35.34%). Balochistan's literacy, at 43.58%, is way below the national average of 58.92%, and further low for women population (31.89%). Population density is 18.91 persons per sq-km (Nasirabad Division highest at 109.79; Kalat lowest at 17.97), much below the national average of 260.8 person per sq-km.

Administratively, like the rest of Pakistan, a Balochistan district gets divided into sub-divisions; subdivision into tehsil(s); tehsil into Qanungo Halqas, further divided into Patwar Circles (PCs); and PC into Mauzas (revenue estates) in settled areas. In the un-settled areas, tehsil is divided into UCs which is further divided into villages. Balochistan Police is responsible for law-and-order maintenance in urban areas only, called 'A Areas.' Rural areas, more than 80% of Balochistan, is 'B Area' policed by Balochistan Levies, whereas the Frontier Corps (FC) operates in both. For some years now, Army-led FC has been divided into a North-South Force.

The provincial economy stands on mining, subsistence agriculture, sheep farming, cotton/wool manufacturing, limited textile, fishing, food processing, carpet weaving, leather embroidery, handicrafts, etc. Nomadic Baloch tumans are settling down.

Academically, Baloch ethnicity is not clearly defined. Many communities identifying as Baloch are of alien origin and assimilated over four centuries. There is no evidence that all Baloch communities scattered in Iran, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan (non-Balochi-speaking) are in fact historically related, with common ancestry like Pashtuns.

Baloch traditions contain commendable traits like 'Bijjar' (cooperation) and 'Fafan-o-Kharch/Kharch-o-Kaffan' where relatives, friends and fellow tribesmen contribute to marriage and funeral expenses, respectively, in cash or kind. Under 'Maihrh', the party in conflict sends a mediator to the other party to establish peace. The mediator calls for truce on agreed terms, like the nanawatee tradition among Pashtuns. Like the Pashtun 'hamsaya' and 'melmestia' traditions, Baloch tumans practice 'Baahot' to provide shelter, protection and hospitality to anyone entering a Baloch home. Despite such humane tribalism, it is deplorable that Punjabi travellers in Baloch lands are brutally murdered by the so-called flag-bearers of Baloch pride and traditions.

Having explored relevant factors, we move on to the antidote. Synchronised efforts be made to contain youth discontent and its recruitment by militants, deflating militant narrative, addressing genuine grievances, and enabling youth to come out of the Sardari-Militant influences. State should 'initiate' narrative and not just 'respond' to militants' one.

Secondly, doling out money to Sardars, political engineering and patronage have not helped the sparsely populated Balochistan, especially the Central Balochistan under militancy. Therefore, it is recommended that State, especially in the affected areas, need to enhance its administrative and security footprint under full, continuous and unflinching support of all LEAs. Military/FC may consider pervasive brigade size encampments. Local acceptance would accrue overtime. Pano Aqil Cantt is an example.

Thirdly, nurturing indigenous leadership alternative will succeed once the recalcitrant Sardar is considerably weakened. This necessitates trying a different form of Administration under a 'mostly' non-local provincial bureaucracy with Federal oversight (political and Army/FC), controlling resource-allocation and utilisation till the time a good level of mainstreaming in the entire Baloch area, especially the central part, is achieved. Process can be phased.

Fourthly, certain drastic measures ought to be 'considered' like: a) populating the central Baloch areas with migration from other parts of Pakistan…KP and Sindh initially (Afghan Emir Abdur Rehman/Kashmir model); b) division between Pashtun North and Baloch South, or any administratively practical contraption, in sync with sentiment for smaller provinces. And as a rule, the major federating unit should stop denigrating smaller units by looking down at them.

It is time to act, now and fast!