War in Gaza: peculiarities, fatal flaws and security assumptions

Today's article focuses on some distinct peculiarities, fatal flaws and the growing security assumptions of Israel's war on Gaza. Any peculiarity is defined as an unusual feature and the big unusual feature of this war is that for the first time Israel is fighting a war that it has begun on its own soil. Previously its security concept was based on fighting short and decisive wars on the enemy territories. In the past Israel has always fought short and decisive wars not in the Israeli but the Arab territory that surrounded it. Since last defeating an Arab coalition army in the 1973 war, Israel never allowed another threatening Arab coalition to form against it and thus never faced the might of a combined Arab coalition that may have threatened it on a multiple-front war.

Decades after defeating a collation army in the 1973 war, Israel today is threatened and confronted not just by non-state actors and groups but an 'axis of resistance' that promises to fight a long and protracted war. This adds another peculiarity to the Gaza war: this time around Israel is fighting a prolonged preventive war with no end in sight. In Gaza it executes ground and air operations but the threat posed on its northern border by Hezbollah in Lebanon remains a deep worrying factor. Counterterrorism operations in West Bank also keeps Israeli troops bogged down there but externally it is the threat of proxy groups from Syria and air strikes by Iran or military actions in Red Sea by Houthis from Yemen that have targeted the US forces in the region and may target the Gulf states and their interests - something that makes this war a very complicated affair.

To sum up the peculiarities of this war, it is the first time that Israel has initiated a war inside its territory; it is the first time that it fights not a short and decisive but a prolonged war; and today it confronts not a singular but multiple threats, a security dilemma that Israel didn't confront since its war against the Arab coalition in 1973.

The fatal flaws of this war are in the political and legal domain. The more Israel is embroiled in a prolonged military struggle the more its political and legal problems are likely to grow. The ruling on the amount of force to be used during a military campaign is more of a political decision taken by the political leadership. Without a clear political goal, any military strategy would lose its direction as it extracts credibility from the political will and a clear political goal set by the political leadership. If war is an act of politics, as described by Carl Von Clausewitz, then without a clear political goal army leaders will be hesitant in proceeding with the execution of war as a political act. Since the use of force is political, what the Israeli politicians need to consider is not just the means but also the end. How is politics playing its role in the war in Gaza? Is the Israeli political strategy only limited to defeating Hamas in Gaza? Is this strategy of military coercion not producing corresponding global repercussions? Is Israel's military action in Gaza not harming the entire world, as in the globalised world the economies of all states are interdependent?

The entire world will keep suffering if the political element of the Israeli strategy to fight this war remains without a clear end-goal. As of now it seems that the political goal is not just the end of the threat of Hamas and the return of refugees but pursuing a broader agenda which leaves the world guessing about the true motives of Israel for fighting this war. The danger is that this Israeli approach may lead to a broader conflict in the region. Israel estimates Hamas to have 30,000 fighters and claims that it has killed about 18,000 of them. What it doesn't share is how many more have been enrolled and recruited by Hamas to continue to fight against this Israeli tyranny? Politically, Israel faces global isolation and legally its actions have been challenged in the ICJ which has declared PM Benjamin Netanyahu a war criminal. The world challenges the legitimacy of Israeli military operations in Gaza and has pulled the carpet of legitimacy from underneath the feet of its fighting armed forces. Without a clear political goal to end the war Israel continues to inflict huge costs on its economy, society, army, and above all on its reputation as a nation state.

This brings me to the last part of highlighting some of the growing security assumptions about Israel's war in Gaza.

The first assumption is that it would take Israel a prolonged war to vanquish the threat it faces and the additional threats it creates. Without a clear political goal and an exit strategy Israel will continue to fight a prolonged and protracted war.

The second assumption relates to the ability of Israel to fight this war. It would need greater stocks of weapons, ammunition and spare parts to fight. For now, it can continue to rely on the US but in the medium and long term, if the US is dragged into other theatre of operations then Israel's ability to carry out simultaneous military operations on multiple fronts will be increasingly diminished. Even if it increases its defence budget and expands its defence industries, this can only come at the cost of its civilian industry and an economy that will struggle to create and maintain social stability.

The third assumption is about China or Russia being drawn into this war. These two great powers don't like what they see happening in Gaza. Both powers are very critical of what's happening there. In international relations, great powers interact under the ideas of either competition, engagement or containment. Unfortunately, the US as a global hegemon is implementing the policy of containment against both the great powers. This means that Russia and China would also be happy to see the US bogged down in the Middle Eastern conflict as this would give them the desired leverage and the strategic space to achieve their own geopolitical ends in regions as regards the challenges they confront in their sphere of influence.

Ending the war in Gaza; preventing Hamas from taking over West Bank; replacing Hamas with a Palestinian regime; dealing with the Hezbollah threat in Lebanon; preventing Iran from arming its proxies and its pursuit of nuclear weapons; and dealing with the threat of Houthis in Yemen are all challenges that Israel faces in this multi-front war. Is there an end game? None that I can see.