The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has recently published that Pakistan continues to increase its nuclear weapons estimating 170 by carrying out an uncertain research methodology for figuring out such number. The paper from the so-called Nuclear Notebook does not elaborate critically the rationale behind Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and the rudimentary rationale for developing such effective countermeasures against the potential adversary. Every nuclear weapon state produces countermeasures against its nuclear rival. As part of nuclear policy, the number of nuclear weapons does not remain static for any nuclear weapons state. Such descriptive analysis, though from a perceived credible source, could deviate the broader audience from knowing the rationale for such developments. Nuclear strategists and serious security analysts do critical analysis of such a description.
It is important to note that Pakistan practises credible minimum deterrence (CMD), and full-spectrum deterrence primarily falls with the ambit of CMD i.e. to counter the adversary in the full-spectrum dynamics. In other words, it is to produce effective countermeasures for plugging deterrence gap so that the potential adversary remains fully convinced that the relevance of nuclear deterrence remains intact and that there is not even a chance of waging a limited war despite the adversary’s dangerous confidence for counterforce targeting through the possession of advanced and sophisticated technologies.
Except for the US and Russia (each possessing more than 5,000 nuclear weapons, accounting for 90% of the world total nuclear warheads in combination), the rest of nuclear weapons states declare following CMD. However, the numbers may vary. Considering the rough estimates from reliable sources, China may now have 410, France 300 and the UK between 260 to 300 nuclear weapons despite their declaratory policy of minimum deterrence. Since the end of the Cold War, France and the UK may not even face credible nuclear threats from any of the perceived potential adversaries.
All these nuclear weapon states possess more nuclear weapons than Pakistan is perceived to have. Both the Soviet Union and the US developed thousands of nuclear weapons within the first decade or so since the arrival of nuclear weapons. Supposedly, if Pakistan develops the estimated 170 number after two and half decades, it can still be considered as minimum. On the contrary, India may possess more nuclear weapons than it might be perceived to have when it comes to its increasing nuclear-powered plants and delivery systems in all their forms and manifestations. Most of them are MIRVed i.e. multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles requiring more warheads. Also, India’s increasing strategic partnership with several countries including the US and waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group reflect that India would have more warheads and their delivery systems. This in turn tempts India for regional hegemony and counterforce targeting the broader South Asia, risking dangerous escalation.
Pakistan practises CMD by producing effective countermeasures against its adversary. Although the term minimum remains innocuous, it does not remain a fixed entity. It changes in accordance with the changed strategic environment. Similar logic applies to all nuclear weapon states. Arguably, the rationale behind all forms of nuclear strategies and doctrinal postures during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union was to create fear in the mind of adversaries, thereby potentially deterring it from waging a direct war. Such posturing is exercised in the South Asian context as well.
To sum up, it is wrongly presumed that Pakistan is expanding the number of nuclear weapons without providing a rationale to such description. Therefore, descriptive analysis on this imperative is not sufficient unless we have the critical analysis on why and how much a state requires. Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and their related delivery systems within the broader echelon of CMD is to deter its potential adversary, prevent wars and restore broader strategic stability in South Asia.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 14th, 2023.
Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.
COMMENTS
Comments are moderated and generally will be posted if they are on-topic and not abusive.
For more information, please see our Comments FAQ