Engaging with Afghanistan — regional perspective

Afghanistan’s huge and largely untapped mineral wealth a huge attraction for inter-state interaction

A lot of diplomatic activity about Afghanistan — internationally and at regional level — has been underway. After the re-ascent of IEA to power in Afghanistan, Iran hosted a Regional Conference on Afghanistan in Tehran on October 27, 2021, to develop a “road map” for improved security and economic conditions in Afghanistan. The foreign ministers of Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan attended, whereas Chinese and Russian counterparts participated via video-link. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, addressed the meeting remotely, underscoring measures to “avoid a total meltdown of the Afghan economy.”

Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) held a meeting on ‘Afghanistan: Security and Economic Development’ in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) on July 26, 2022. ECO Member States, China, Russia, India, Arab countries, USA, relevant European and UN agencies, EU, regional and international organisations, as well as the members of Uzbekistan-based diplomatic community attended. From Afghanistan, acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi headed the delegation.

India hosted fifth round of its two-day ‘Conference of National Security Advisors (NSA conference instituted in November 2021)’ of regional countries on 8-9 February 2023 involving China, and Iran along with Central Asian countries. Pakistan did not participate in this India-sponsored event, not considered too pertinent.

The fourth meeting of ‘Samarkand Dialogue’ was hosted by Uzbekistan on April 13, 2023, in Samarkand. Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan’s neighbouring states (China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) participated. Issues highlighted included peace, unity, sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan; drug trafficking; inclusive and broad-based IEA government; counterterrorism and security cooperation among neighbouring countries against all terrorist groups, namely Da’esh (ISIL), Al-Qaeda, ETIM, TTP, BLA, Jundallah, Jaish al-Adl, Jamaat Ansarullah, IMU etc threatening regional peace and global security. All parties appreciated the key role of the UN in providing humanitarian aid to Afghans and emphasised engagement with IEA.

On 1-2 May 2023, UN organised closed-door talks on Afghanistan in Doha. The UN Conference was attended by 25 countries including the US, China and Russia, major European aid donors and key neighbours such as Pakistan. Agenda was engaging IEA on women and girls’ rights, inclusive governance, countering terrorism and drug trafficking. Afghanistan was not invited due to ‘non-recognition’ technicalities of the interim government. In December 2022, the UN General Assembly had postponed (for the second time) decision to recognise IEA. However, IEA was allowed to send its UN ambassador...Suhail Shaheen.

Finally on July 30-31, 2023, the US held first direct wide-ranging talks with IEA in Doha, ‘to discuss economic issues, security and women’s rights.’ Returning the Afghan central bank’s assets frozen in the US was also considered. IEA delegation was led by Foreign Affairs Minister Moulvi Amir Khan Muttaqi.

Under ‘Moscow Format’, Afghanistan’s neighbours including Pakistan, China, India, Russia, and Central Asian States are scheduled to meet in the Russian city of Kazan on September 29, 2023, to discuss ‘the current Afghan situation, particularly the progress towards inclusive government’ besides counterterrorism and drug-related crimes. During last year’s meeting, IEA was not invited. This year Foreign Minister Muttaqi is attending ‘to bridge the perceptual and other differences’ between the Islamic Emirate and other countries ‘through dialogue’ and ‘direct discussion’. Ambassador Asif Durrani, special envoy for Afghanistan, will lead the Pakistani delegation.

Besides internal Afghan issues like governance, and terrorism etc, affecting the wider region, Afghanistan’s huge and largely untapped mineral wealth is also a huge attraction for inter-state interaction. Afghanistan also has deposits of seventeen rear earths, besides hydrocarbons etc. Chinese interest in context is understandable. Afghanistan is also a trade and energy corridor from Central/West to South Asia and from Iran to Pakistan.

In specific regional stakes, India would want to maintain direct or indirect presence in Afghanistan to entangle Pakistan; check potential jihadist violence from spilling over; keep strategic listening post to eavesdrop on China; and project its soft power. Russia, with Soviet-era legacy and recent war in Ukraine will continue to offer limited logistic, diplomatic, and political intervention for Afghan pacification, as it affects its extended soft underbelly in Central Asia, especially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Turkey’s recent acrimony with IEA and its Dostum legacy would lead towards subdued interlocution. Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, would leverage its Afghan investment and Islamist outlook. Its proxy conflict with Iran in Shiite Hazarajat in Central Afghanistan is likely to ebb. Iran would maintain its influence through sectarian and diaspora manipulation and alternative trade corridor via Chah Bahar. It will continue to view Sunni Afghan Taliban with a suspicious eye, and forcefully retaliate in border skirmishes.

Pakistan ubiquitous importance remains central to any Afghan specific venture...diplomatic, political and economic. The nemesis of Pak-Afghan peace and some elements in an angry and/or manipulative International Establishment, meanwhile would keep the Af-Pak belt embroiled through actors like ISIS, as some analysts claim (without credible evidence). Outside the constants of Pak-Afghan imperatives (geography, culture, religious affinity, history, trade/commerce, and demography etc), negative variables like TTP would remain to define short-term Pak-Afghan outlook.

Afghanistan’s cooption into an extended CPEC would not only provide strategic depth and stability for CPEC, it will also enhance Chinese regional geostrategic and economic clout.

The above discourse leads to the following conclusions.

That regional apprehensions vis-à-vis IEA comprise human, especially women’s rights, in particular right to education and employment; inclusivity for IEA interim government; drug trafficking; terrorism emanating from Afghanistan: lack of social, economic, and political development; and better connectivity with the world.

That IEA signaling validates their willingness to concede on cited issues on IEA terms. For example, Taliban perspective respects women’s rights under ‘strict’ interpretation of Islamic law.

That there is realisation to engage the IEA, as exclusion leads to communication breakdown and curtailment of leverage(s).

That Regional stake holders and international organisations would hold on to the ‘recognition’ of IEA, to influence simultaneous development on the cited issues, especially human rights.

That despite the group think, each regional nation pursues specific interests in dealing with Afghanistan. And IEA knows it.

That IEA has so far, weathered the economic meltdown through corruption-free levies and tax collection, minimal cost of government, and largely through sustenance economy.

That IEA is conscious of Afghanistan’s considerable mineral wealth and would be willing to its exploitation through multiple parties, in the country’s best interest.

That IEA realises the criticality of TTP being a legacy issue, leaving scope for IBOs, cis/trans-frontier targeted operations and self-neutralisation and dispersal of TTP cadre with ‘connivance’.

For Pakistan, TTP neutralisation is important, but Afghanistan in more important.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 28^th, 2023.

Like Business on Facebook, follow @TribuneBiz on Twitter to stay informed and join in the conversation.