Miscoordinated policies and ANDSF collapse

America’s prioritisation of ‘short-term security assistance’ over ‘long-term security cooperation’ played a roll

We continue to explore ‘systemic reasons’ behind the collapse of Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF), in the light of February 2023 report by US SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction).

America’s prioritisation of ‘short-term security assistance’ over ‘long-term security cooperation’ played a role. According to US definitional implications, security cooperation is a long-term commitment, not necessarily massive troop-deployment, such as in South Korea, Japan and Germany. In this model, the American ambassador traditionally manages bilateral relations, implements US foreign policy and oversees security cooperation through the embassy, while the local military command implements day–to-day activities. However, 9/11 attacks upended this model given the urgency of response. It drew USMIL from day one in active combat under a diplomatic vacuum in Afghanistan.

This subsequently dictated priority of fighting Taliban over raising, training, advising, sustainment and professionalisation of ANDSF. Paradoxically, Taliban were also a politico-diplomatic problem besides being a military challenge. Yet senior military commanders emphasised employment of military instrument alone, without amply coordinating with US embassy. Later, a lukewarm Obama-era military-civilian surge tried to address this anomaly, but it was too little too late.

The US preference for military response also resulted in neglecting ‘governing institutions’ that oversaw the entire war effort in a whole-of-govt-approach. ANDSF force size and capabilities were tailored to suit fighting the prevalent security challenges, and not the Afghan government’s sustenance ability afterwards. Without effective ministerial support, operational forces could not “absorb and benefit from lower level advising”, moving supplies, paying salaries or providing medical care. The two small programs in 2008 — the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI) and the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program — were not robust enough to address the problems.

Consequently, security cooperation in Afghanistan became an extension of warfighting, a short-sighted goal. Long-term framework remained missing. General John Nicholson lamented that the US lacked “strategic patience” in Afghanistan, compared to South Korea, where it had “a long-term outlook”. General David Petraeus observed the US “never adopted a consistent strategic overarching approach and stuck with it from administration to administration, or arguably even within administrations.”

Secondly, any American focus on institutional capacity-building was haphazard and delayed. With one foot out of Afghanistan, trainers/advisors followed a dual track strategy. Under political pressure to raise ANDSF quickly, hand over security to them and get out Afghanistan, they resorted to augmenting critical gaps in Afghan capabilities (close air support, medical evacuation, logistics and leadership), increasing ANDSF’s long-term dependence on foreign forces. Foreign forces (partnered) were encouraged to assume a larger part in combat, to ensure ‘appearance of success’.

Defense institution capacity-building commenced optimally only in 2015, when ISAF transitioned to Resolute Support. Without fully functional ministries; administration and logistics, audit and oversight of combat forces were simply non-existent, making it difficult to manage Afghanistan’s defense sector. Plans frequently changed; interagency coordination was ad hoc and divided between different chains of command. So, the end generally differed from “what they [Afghans] had wanted”.

In 2002, ad hoc teams of civilian, military and contractor personnel were deployed to develop ministerial capabilities. Contractors helped Afghan MoD and Army General Staff in reforms, writing doctrine and teaching operational planning and coordination. MoI and ANP reform initially entrusted to State Dept was transferred to DOD in 2005, reflecting subpar progress.

In 2006, US decision-makers were pivoting towards capacity-building ‘through security-sector assistance’. This led to the creation CSTC-A (Combined Security Transition Command — Afghanistan), mandated to help ANDSF in establishing its own recruitment, training, acquisition and personnel systems. Besides mentoring Afghan leadership and staff in Defence and Interior Ministries, this was to assist in system development for procurement of weapons, uniforms and military equipment, etc. NATO developed complementary NTM-A (NATO Training Mission -Afghanistan) in 2009.

The single dual-hatted Commander NTM-A/CSTC-A, through two deputy commanders (one each for ANA and ANP), exercised control over advisors embedded with Ministries. However, the arrangement only became effective after mission transition from ISAF to Resolute Support, when CSTC-A assigned advisors with expertise in three core ministerial-level functions (policy, budget and human resources) to the mission. The project also lacked requisite evaluation criterion to monitor, measure and assess achievement of specific goals and benchmarks.

The ANDSF development project structurally lacked unity of command. No single country or agency completely owned the enterprise, leading to ‘piecemeal and uncoordinated approach’. There was lack of coordination between Americans and NATO, among various US government agencies, and among services. Although the US-NATO commander was unified in theory, he had no command over the entire NATO military forces, and civilians — working in embassies, the EU or other international organisations — involved with training and advising ANDSF. Due to lack of diligent assignment of specific responsibilities for key aspects, multiple agencies and services delegated any assumed tasks to advisors, usually deployed for a year or less.

Afghanistan security assistance was divided among 51 NATO and non-NATO partners. Some of these nations had useful niche capabilities like familiarity with Soviet-made aircraft and police advising. However, the widely distributed effort created its own problems of synergy and standardisation. US Secretary Defense, Robert Gates, called the arrangement a “hodgepodge of jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes”.

Gen Benjamin Freakley, commander Combined Joint Task Force-76, viewed NATO important at strategic level, but with limited operational and tactical usefulness. Although the Alliance adapted over time, its policies and processes obstructed the standardisation of US-led security assistance.

All participating nations retained full operational control over their contingents and ‘national caveats’ hampered the needed synergy. Lt Gen Ken Tovo, former commander CSTC-A, described NTM-A/CSTC-A as an “...ad hoc headquarters in a constant state of environmental turnover”. So, the product (ANDSF) suffered.

Published in The Express Tribune, June 22^nd, 2023.

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