Conviction of former DG ISI: political impact

A Field General Court Martial has convicted Lt Gen Faiz Hameed (Retd) on multiple charges, including political interference, violation of the Official Secret Act and misuse of authority. The punishment awarded to the former DG ISI is not only historic; it is also exceptional. This judgement impacts three key areas: the opposition, PTI; the government, led by PML(N); and the military. No major event occurs outside a given environment, and in the context of this conviction, understanding the current political environment within which the governance system operates is crucial.

The system is being run by a hybrid regime in which elected governments operate, but the strategic lines are dictated from elsewhere. So, if I coin the phrase 'ideology of hybridism', it means power sharing between elected and unelected institutions, balancing order and democracy. Hybridism, taking root in Pakistan, is operating on an implicit belief system. The belief that the civilian governments on their own are too fragmented, unstable or even corrupt to manage national affairs, while the military is uniquely capable of providing discipline, continuity and strategic direction to the civilian government.

The military sees controlled democracy as a necessary equilibrium between order and representation, assuming an UN-like central authority role. Like the UN, it retains informal mechanisms like surveillance, veto power and intervention. This ideology is fast reshaping democracy, public expectations and institutional reforms. The political system that runs Pakistan today is a blend of democratic form and bureaucratic-military guardianship. Only if the readers agree with my description of the political system that runs our country today will they be able to relate to the impact of the General's verdict on my aforementioned key areas.

First, the opposition. The impact is that Imran Khan is likely to be more politically isolated. By this, I mean there is a clear tap on how the establishment may no longer tolerate any soft facilitation for PTI from within the system. From PTI's point of view, this verdict suggests that the system is eliminating anyone linked to the party. Already subjected to a nationwide crackdown, PTI's pathway back to power now seems longer, harder and in the light of this verdict, more institutionally blocked. Even if PTI remains popular on street level, this verdict means that the establishment wants no more internal PTI military sympathisers, no bureaucratic leverage and no hidden alignments to facilitate its politics.

PTI supporters may view this as part of a bigger power struggle, and not an act of accountability but as score settling by an entire system that is against it. The PTI -aligned digital supporters are happy pushing the narrative that accountability should not target only those that are out of favour — it must truly be across institutions. Overall, politically, this verdict fuels further government-opposition polarisation, ongoing legitimacy contests and narrative battles that will become more penetrating and intense.

For PML(N) and the government, the verdict means, 'finally our narrative is proven right as the interference in 2017-2022 is being punished." They would be trumpeting it as a victory for the rule of law and a clear signal that no institution is above accountability. More than that, they will be reminding everyone that this is proof that their narrative of 'state within a state' is finally being corrected. For them, the political playing field becomes more predictable. Bureaucracy that runs the day-to-day machinery of the state will also interpret this as a signal that political engineering is no longer safe and there are greater risks for those who align with informal power centres.

For the military, the big message is about institutional accountability. Tightening of internal discipline and a clear message that senior officers should not meddle in politics, as even powerful military figures can be tried and sentenced. The military, under the strong centralised command of the Chief of Defence Forces, through this verdict, is communicating to the officers of defence forces that there will be zero tolerance for political freelancing. For the young officers (Brigadiers and below), this means that loyalty to the chain of command is paramount, and political involvement not only leads to ruining that loyalty but also military careers.

For the senior officers, the message is acute, the internal military housekeeping may continue and a clear warning that political engineering will be punished internally. This verdict sets the stage to define the Army's culture for at least a decade, in which the senior officers will realise the dangers of building any political constituency or slipping into playing a political role or becoming a political actor.

All revolutions hinge on an ideology to succeed. Chairman Mao borrowed the communist ideology; the French Revolution hinged on Napoleon's Bonapartism, which emphasised order, efficiency, national unity and powerful leadership. Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism pushed forward the Russian Revolution. We believe it or not, the political system in Pakistan is also undergoing a revolution, and I think the ideology of hybridism is driving it forward. The political culture and the military's internal culture are both experiencing a change. The political worldview and the military's security-first thinking are blending to redefine nation-building and the future trajectory of our nation-state.

This is a hybrid model of politics and a hybrid model of state revolution. I don't recall whether such a model has been tried before or has ever succeeded or failed. My deep concern is that democratic stability requires civilians' high trust in military professionalism and the military's deep trust in civilian institutions through competence, reform and performance. The ideology of hybridism does not by itself guarantee a new era of safe and stable journey of a progressive Pakistan. The civil-military balance requires sustained shifts beyond the individual cases.

It requires the understanding and implementation of Clausewitzian great trinity of power — people, government and the military. What is missing in the ideology of hybridism, the silent revolution that Pakistan is experiencing, is the lack of 'will of the people'. That is a sour point, and that needs to be fixed by all those who believe in making Pakistan a strong nation-state.