Choosing chiefs

Choosing chiefs of army is the favourite pass time of this nation. A process which probably is the cleanest and most transparent begins to be discussed for either political concurrence or just as a preferred guessing game every three years or six depending on how we have treated this institution. The problem is with those who must make the decision to appoint a chief. Every political party will have a preferred choice and treats a probable candidate among a group as a racing horse they must bet on. Articles will be written and TV shows held on an issue which is patently procedural and sacred for its impact on the armed forces and the defence of the country. Appointing a chief instead becomes a fable for the public square.

Not that it helps. Anyone that a political party will proffer as a candidate or show inclination for is sure to lose out simply because one, he is labeled and tarnished, and two, the deciding authority, which is the prime minister — any prime minister regardless of his credentials is empowered in the constitution to make the choice from among a list of the three to four senior most generals in the army — may simply shirk away from someone who even if deserving has become someone else’s favourite and a fodder for the evening news. What should be a common candidate of all, opposition and government, is not how it happens. They will have two different choices in search and futile hope for ‘their man’. In doing so they are hoping to save their politics than keep the primacy of national defence in mind.

It is evident none reads history or learns from historical experience which amply informs that an army chief, or any armed services chief, is of the nation and of the service he is chosen to lead than be of a party. When ZAB picked up Zia ul Haq from low down the order to be his army chief little did he know that Zia shall be signing his death warrant. In the 1990s the two appointing authorities, the President and the Prime Minister, feuded over an army chief’s appointment subsequently giving way to a third option. It is amazing that each government in that decade was cut short for some sort of dissention under the combined persuasion of their chosen army chief and the President. Nawaz Sharif as the prime minister sacked a perfectly good army chief to bring in Pervez Musharraf and got removed and exiled by him soon after in a military coup. Many might also look at the most recent removal of Nawaz Sharif in the same light. Imran Khan thought he was on the same page till finding that the page read differently to each side. Kayani was extended with another term by the PPP when in power possibly in a futile hope that he will influence the party’s way back in power but ended up losing their political base across Pakistan in the 2013 elections when Kayani chose to keep the army out of political fracas.

What does happen however is that the army, largely, and the military in general, seems to over-own responsibility for the nation. The saviour complex is generationally inherited especially after the politics of the country began to go astray; probably ZAB and after. Army has been in power for around three decades in 75 years of country’s existence. This not only develops a corporate memory of governance at the national level but also reinforces the saviour image within the service. Hence the frequent forays into areas considered alien to military culture like the economy which irks many. Foreign policy, and by extension trade policy, security and defence amalgamate into a relevant interest keeping the army interested in the political domain. Whether it should be the case is another matter.

The obvious answer is no especially how the last eight years have played out across the political landscape. It is in army’s own interest to keep the institution above political fray and not fall for one or the other inducement to support a political cause. If the country is seen to be misgoverned under a political dispensation it is about time that the need to intervene is shelved for the people to make their judgment through the electoral process and keep the army out. There is an increasing proclivity to drag the army into common political discourse, especially by the mainstream political parties and their leadership, with an obvious consequence of diluting its image and de-sanctifying its existence below the mantle where it has been held in popular perception. It may be unintended or deliberate doesn’t really matter. It is about holding the institution above the ruckus which only gets dirtier by the day.

What of the process in light of questions that Imran Khan has raised? Even if the intent is to have a chief nominated fairly the consequence is to keep the office of the chief in discussion and not let the person of the chief a moment away from persistent scrutiny. That aside, a nomination process begins with tabling before the Ministry of Defence the names of three to four senior-most lieutenant generals which then prepares the summary for the prime minister to make his recommendation which is then forwarded to the President for a pro forma approval. Even when a lesser expected choice is made from among the nominees given our political predilection the damage is minimal since the difference in capability among the probable(s) is minimal. There may also be imperatives based around specific service needs or in the case of army the point in national journey transcending beyond strictly military determinants when one may be more suitable than others with appropriate attributes. That is why while merit places all almost equally it is a more nuanced process which political genius must address. Though, they hardly ever work to that level and their preferences are superficially driven.

The army has the most transparent and most fair promotion system in the higher ranks. A deserving officer is rarely denied his promotion since the slots for lieutenant generals are sufficient to share the honour. The placement of each then is the preference of the army chief but his needs too are driven by professional imperatives than personal whims. That sadly is not so in other services where the chiefs tend to be far more driven by personal preference and can stop an officer’s rise whimsically forcing a retirement on him. Such discretionary powers need to be curtailed and the process instituitonalised. The army however is structured differently and every three-star will serve his four years regardless of how he fares with his boss. If all the three-stars in a recommended batch for the chief’s slot tick all the boxes each is eligible to be the chief. The noise for selection on merit is thus misplaced. Next, the process is administrative. To politicise it is insidious. To keep it in the public square is demeaning.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 16^th, 2022.

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