Comprehending Iran

While covering the Iran-Israel-US war in June this year, I had concluded that: a) the combined US-Israeli attack had badly damaged the Irani nuclear infrastructure and ambition, without obliterating it, as President Trump had claimed; b) Iran will never abandon its nuclear ambition and will sooner than later acquire nuclear arms; c) the Shia arc stands eclipsed before a Sunni crescent given that Iran's 3H proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis) stand militarily degraded, and its client state Syria is out of Tehran's orbit; d) in 'missile economics' Iran retains the capability to target Israel with precision using cruise and ballistic missiles and that threat remains; e) contrary to Western expectations, Iranians rallied around clerics whose grip on power remains firm 'for now'; f) the battle redefines the nature of warfare, especially the non-contact conflict, particularly for India and Pakistan. Population on both sides must now contend with intense psy ops; and g) 'counterintelligence' and espionage emerge as niche force-multipliers in warfare.

An eminent US scholar of Irani descent, Prof Vali Nasr recently published his new book, Iran's Grand Strategy: A Political History. The venerable professor, who has visited Pakistan and has previously worked with Richard Holbrooke, is a keen observer of the region. His MIT/Harvard educated father, Seyyed Hossein Nasr is also a respected scholar of Islam and a former professor at George Washington University. Mr Hossein has undertaken critical work on Allama Iqbal.

Back to the work of Prof Vali Nasr, who concedes Iran's role in almost every crisis in the Middle East, that has caused 'serial humiliations' to Tehran recently. First, Prof Nasr thinks Iran's contemporary strategic vision is driven more by Iran's 'national security rooted in regional rivalries', and lesser by its revolutionary intent. Although Islam remains the language of Iran's politics, whose 'aims are now secular in nature'.

Second, the eight years' war against Iraq in 1980s deeply affected every facet of Irani sociology and body politics. Western analysts generally downplay the effects of this conflict, as it mainly ended in a stalemate, despite overwhelming Western support to Iraq; and the West Plus subsequently took an embarrassing U-turn against Baghdad under Saddam Hussein. The ensuing strategic culture has guided Iran's behaviour blending 'encirclement fears with outsized ambition'. The response to Iraqi invasion in September 1980 strengthened Iran's ayatollahs; engendered some sort of strategic autonomy; and ushered in self-sufficiency, religious zeal and patriotism. There are chronicled tales of Basij Militia's heroism in the literature pertaining to Irani resolve during the war. Consequently, the war made Tehran lean towards and depend upon proxy power, and owing up the anti-Israel cause. A popular slogan among Irani volunteers was — "The path to Jerusalem runs through Karbala".

Third, the strategic shift and revolutionary zest caused events like the 1979 storming of American embassy in Tehran and the ensuing 'Iran Hostage Crisis' for 444 days; the 1987 demonstration by Irani pilgrims at Mecca wanting to 'uproot the Saudi rulers'; the 1988 downing of Flight 655 by the US; and the 1992 bombing of Israeli embassy in Argentine, to mention a few. Khomeini perceived the US determined for regime change in Tehran, and his characterisation of the US, the 'Great Satan', was that of a dog, that needed to be firmly confronted to make it back off.

Fourth, when President Rafsanjani pursued the 'Grand Bargain with the Great Satan' in the 1990s, and President Khatami in 2003 wrote a conciliatory letter to Washington, Khamenei - the successor to the leader of revolution, Imam Khomeini - held the view that rapprochement with the US was not possible. Emphasising continued resistance to the US, Khamenei reiterated that 'pursuit of the ideals is more important than attainment of the ideals'; that setbacks would be temporary; and that victory may be long drawn. This proclivity still guides Iran under the gerontocracy of Khamenei and his inner circle.

Fifth, the war with Iraq gave the Pasadaran — the IRGC — more political power, a taste for private enterprise, and changed Iran into a 'technical autarky' resulting into self-sufficiency. The belief in rebounding from setbacks inspired Tehran's strategic doctrine of 'forward defence' formally adopted in 2003. The doctrine nurtured raising, equipping and manipulating proxies to neutralise threats to Iran before they reached Tehran. The slain General Qasem Soleimani, who used the IRGC's Quds and Jerusalem Brigades to deadly effect, was a great exponent of 'forward defence'. Soleimani shared intelligence with the 'Great Satan' over Afghan Taliban after 9/11; persuaded President Putin and Hezbollah in 2015 to intervene militarily in Syria; and used Afghan Shias in Syria.

Sixth, however, despite heavy indoctrination through 'sacred defence museums' all over the country eulogising sacrifice, the Iranian old guard finds its rule over younger generations through revolutionary fervour and religious zeal, tenuous. Limited civil liberties, comparative oppression, economic hardships and lack of opportunity are making the young and the restless to question 'forward defence'. There is palpable but slow unravelling of the clergy's stranglehold on the levers of power.

Seventh, Iran's limitations of resources finally caught up with its strategic overreach in the changed Middle East, where Israel backed by the US is now a resurgent and dominant power. Iran's loss of Syria, key to the region, is far greater than its diminishing influence in Iraq, Lebanon or Yemen cumulatively. Iran may, however, find it difficult to stomach and abandon 'forward defence' anytime soon. The Arab states, guided by similar calculations, sided ostensibly with Israel during the recent conflict to deflate Irani dominance.

Finally, on the succession issue, Prof Nasr considers Mojtaba, the 56-year-old second son of Khamenei, as the likely and preferred candidate. He is principal advisor to his father. However, this succession might bring the 'Islamic Republic closer to becoming a hereditary monarchy'. The change might perpetuate the 'forward defence' doctrine more aggressively under a relatively younger ideologue and that might have implications for Iran, its people and politics, the region and the world. And despite efforts by the EU, the nuclear deal with Iran over terms favourable to West Plus is likely to remain a pipedream.

In all this, the silver lining for Pakistan remains Tehran's post-conflict realisation of the value of its friendship with Islamabad, at least for now.