Pakistan’s Taliban puzzle

It cuts across counterterrorism efforts and puts it in a situation which is problematic and complex

Pakistan has been confronting a dilemma posed by the emergence of Taliban regime in Afghanistan since August 2021. It also cuts across the counterterrorism efforts in the country and puts it in a situation which is problematic and complex. There are two possible scenarios. First, if the situation in Afghanistan improves and Taliban strengthen their control in the main cities then groups like TTP get emboldened and intensify attacks against law enforcement apparatus in Pakistan. Already, the current security in Newly Merged Districts (NMDs) is presenting an intricate picture where local militant groups are jostling for territorial control with military and paramilitary forces. The situation has become intense with increase in cross-border attacks whereby militants carry out hit-and-run operations. The lethality of attacks suggests that the kind of weaponry used by these militants may have a major role in high casualty rate in last few months. The attacks have been extended recently to Tank, DI Khan, Dir and Peshawar. It may expand further to other settled districts as well. The reaction to these incidents also varies on a wide spectrum. It involves localised tactical measures, operational conciliatory postures, joint operations against TTP groups such as Hafiz Gulbahadur and even hot pursuit initiatives in isolation. It is expected that LG polls may augment chances of emergence of a local level political force to galvanise the population against militancy.

Second, if the situation deteriorates in Afghanistan and local Taliban forces fail to control it effectively then counter-Taliban elements, such as ISKP, may become more active in the region. Recently a number of attacks have been conducted both in Pakistan and Afghanistan wherein a minority group has been targeted. With the augmentation of counter-Taliban forces, Pakistan may experience rise in sectarian incidents both in physical and non-physical spaces. Moreover, TTP can also brace for some kind of tactical adjustment with ISKP elements, or a transmigration of TTP elements or other militant groups into ISKP may take place. Already, evidence suggests that members of militant outfits having comparable ideology to that of ISKP are joining it on one reason or another. This has expanded its reach and accessibility. The groups like TTP or Baloch sub-nationalists may also offer tactical platforms to ISKP for operations.

The big question is how to come out of this impasse. There are three possible modes of actions. First, assist the current Taliban regime through the technique of combined counter-militant measures. The current regime in Afghanistan has ample expertise in staging militant or insurgent actions but it is lacking in counter-insurgency initiatives. These measures must ensure border securing along KP and Balochistan. A joint regional mechanism needs to be evolved to further boost border monitoring mechanism between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Second, the division between Mehsuds and Wazirs needs to be studied to understand TTP command structure. Since TTP is currently based on individuals belonging to Mehsud tribe, a weakening of social cohesion among them may help in reducing the effectiveness of TTP operations against LEAs. The division of South Waziristan into two districts is a step in this direction. Meanwhile, TTP is modelling its militancy on the pattern of Taliban’s struggle against US forces. This trend is not only dangerous but also endorses tactical and operational manoeuvres of the Taliban commanders. The recent surge in criminal activities such as extortion, kidnapping for ransom, narco-trafficking, etc further enhances the bond between militancy and crime. The police, CTD and military need to break this nexus. Third, it is time that the main leadership of these groups needs to be targeted and traced. Effective measures against foot soldiers or tertiary level members of TTP or ISKP can have their significance at tactical level nonetheless these groups may face operational setbacks if the primary or secondary level leadership is properly engaged or eliminated.

Pakistan needs to solve the Taliban puzzle in way to evolve counter-insurgency measures in NMDs or Balochistan rather than relying on limited counterterrorism posture.

Published in The Express Tribune, May 7^th, 2022.

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