Talks with India: a reality check

Since the agreement last month between the Directors General Military Operations (DGMO) of Pakistan and India to revive the 2003 ceasefire accord and address each other’s “core issues”, well-meaning people in Pakistan have expressed high hopes of an improvement in bilateral relations. Subsequent events have moved rapidly with resumption of stalled talks on the Indus Waters, a message from Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Pakistan Day and a forthcoming meeting of the foreign ministers in Dushanbe. However, despite the hype, there is a need for the optimists in Pakistan for a reality check. This should be based on Indian motives and intentions as well as experience of negotiating with India.

Past and present Pakistani leaders have consistently advocated a dialogue with India to resolve outstanding issues. The recent developments, therefore, are in line with this policy and Pakistan did not need any persuasion to engage with India. What is more important is why the Modi government has suddenly changed its “muscular” approach towards Pakistan and agreed to resuming talks without the earlier precondition of an end to Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorism. Perhaps one reason is that the Biden administration has privately advised India to lower temperatures with Pakistan so that it can focus on collaborating with the United States against China in the Asia-Pacific. Another more important reason could be that after the Indian military’s confrontation with China in Ladakh, the Modi government has realised the perils of a two-front confrontation with Pakistan and China.

However, this does not mean that India is ready to resolve its disputes with Pakistan. Based on past experiences, it is more likely that the Indian intention is to use the dialogue process as a tactical ploy to ward off external pressure from the US and perhaps also from China. In this case, Pakistan-India talks, if they actually take place, will again prove to be sterile. Such a divisionary dialogue, devoid of any substantive results, serves India’s purpose to deflect external pressure.

Past experiences demonstrate that whenever India comes under international criticism for its repression in Kashmir and consequent tensions with Pakistan, it engages in talks with Pakistan, arguing that this is a bilateral issue and the international community should not interfere. But in the talks, India maintains that Kashmir is an “internal” issue and the only subject to be discussed is Pakistan’s support to Kashmiri “terrorists”. The dialogue thus becomes an endless circular argument. Even on other issues, such as Siachen, Sir Creek or the Wullar Barrage, the Indians adopt inflexible positions and refuse compromising solutions. On several past occasions, India has even reneged on agreed solutions, such as in the case of Siachen.

Another key objective for India has been to use the dialogue process to demoralise the Kashmiris by signaling that Pakistan has abandoned them and that their only hope is a union with India. Yet another diversionary tactic is to propose that the difficult issues like Kashmir be set aside while progress can be made on soft issues like trade and people-to-people contact. The purpose is to create a façade of normalisation behind which repression of the Kashmiris can continue.

In the light of such experience, Pakistani decision-makers need to be realistic about their expectations from the anticipated talks. Modi is not Vajpayee or Manmohan Singh and even their “soft borders” solution is not acceptable to him. After changing the status of occupied Kashmir and seeking to alter the Muslim majority demography of the region, Modi’s henchmen are now talking about occupying Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.

Pakistani views about a new beginning with India have now become irrelevant. Modi’s India perceives itself as a global power, with American backing. It, therefore, requires Pakistan’s capitulation and subservience like other South Asian states. In this environment, Pakistan’s relations with India cannot improve. On the contrary, Pakistan will be asked to not only abandon its position on Kashmir but also to accept Indian dictation on its foreign relations, such as with China. Consequently, any acquiescence with Indian demands now, even implicitly, would prove to be a slippery slope in the future.

Pakistan should not put its faith in the US either. Due to the Indo-US strategic convergence against China, Washington’s geo-political interests will continue to override its principles about human rights or Pakistan’s national interests. While the US calls upon Pakistan and India to bilaterally resolve their differences and is willing to facilitate such a dialogue, its preference is for Pakistan to accept the status quo in Kashmir and acknowledge Indian hegemony. As such, the US is an impartial interlocutor.

The foregoing is not to argue against resumption of a dialogue with India, at least to test the waters. But Pakistan should do so with the confidence of a nuclear-armed state with credible deterrence against India. While it does have its challenges, India too faces several problems. Externally, it has to contend with a two-front confrontation with China and Pakistan. In occupied Kashmir, it has failed for decades to overcome a popular uprising. Internally, several Indian states are beset with raging insurgencies. Modi’s propagation of the fascist Hindutva agenda has divided the country and alienated 200 million Muslims, apart from tarnishing India’s secular credentials. His economic policies combined with mishandling of the Covid pandemic has slowed down economic growth, increasing the number of Indians below the poverty line. India, then, is not the great power that it pretends to be and it is certainly not in a position to dictate to Pakistan.

Therefore, while engaging with India, Pakistan must not compromise on its principled position. Pakistan should also engage directly with the Kashmiris and take them into confidence so that they do not feel betrayed. It should also consult with China which has a major stake in Kashmir and the Pakistan-India dialogue. This would further strengthen Pakistan’s negotiating position. Above all, the Pakistani people need to be taken fully into confidence since any outcome in the dialogue process must have national support.

Published in The Express Tribune, March 30^th, 2021.

Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.