Avoiding credibility trap

In international relations, credibility is an assessment that states or leaders will follow through on their threats, promises or commitments. It is a subjective assessment depending on whether other actors believe any state will make good on its declarations. There is no question that the US still demonstrates overwhelming hard power and retains the unique ability to project and deploy this power in any theatre of war with devastating consequences. The USA's sustained air campaign and military deployments in its current war against Iran show that not just today but for decades to come, it will be able to project force globally. So, in purely military terms, the US military's credibility has remained intact and is unlikely to collapse in decades to come. But what has come under question about the US under the leadership of President Trump and his administration is its moral, political and strategic credibility. The US and European allies seem uneasy and very much alienated, and the lack of a clear endgame in the Iran War raises doubts about the USA's strategic clarity, judgment and credibility. For a great power, credibility is not just about the projection of power but the willingness of its allies and partners to rely on its ability to make the right strategic decisions.

The US under the Trump administration seems to have moved into a scope condition and landed in a credibility trap. To offset this, it seems President Trump is left with little choice but to escalate, just to avoid looking weak. The high point of the US credibility in the past has been its reliance on the rule-based order. However, the recent declared targeting of the Iranian civilian infrastructure during a war, and the use of extreme rhetoric by the American president to push Iranians "back to the Stone Age where they belong", has severely damaged its credibility and its ability to lead a world order based on rules and established international norms. It is not just the external American credibility; internally, a majority of Americans are pessimistic about the Iran War and oppose further escalation. Doubts raised domestically matter because the credibility of great powers is sustainable only through internal political stability. Modern conflicts like the one we are witnessing today bring home an important lesson – that you can win battles but still lose your credibility as the battlefield outcomes fail to match your rhetoric. Today, the US credibility in the Iran War has taken a hit, and one can deduce that while the US military credibility remains strong, its political, moral and strategic credibility seems to be under severe visible strain.

The US President, given his country's power potential, would do a great favour to the world if he considers reorientation of his foreign policy, given the global concerns his policy decisions are creating. I would like to quote two historical examples where two great powers, Russia and Britain, given the challenges they faced at that time, were asked through a comprehensive report and a memorandum to reconsider their foreign policy options. In 1900, Russian Minister of War Prince Kuropatkin wrote a comprehensive report for Tsar Alexander II on the strategic situation. He provided three critical assessments to the Tsar, all of which were controversial at that time but, seen in hindsight, cautioned the Tsar on what not to do to ensure the sustainability of the Russian Empire. He advised that Russia was a satisfied power and needed no further expansion of its core interests; that any further expedition which Russia may undertake would frighten the other states, causing them to build up their own forces or ally against St Petersburg; and that, given the Russian power and that of its potential enemies, Russia could ill afford any confrontation and needed to do all it could to reduce tensions with other major powers. Kuropatkin's report was based on a core analysis that though Russia was weak at that time, it could still seem strong and threatening to others if it remained satisfied and avoided expansionist designs. The Russian Tsar didn't give heed to his War Minister's advice, and what followed was a defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, a defeat in World War I, and the ultimate Russian revolution. Great powers rise and decline, and the greatness of American power is not permanent either. How long the US lasts as a great power is proportional to how few mistakes are made by it. The Iran War looks like a big mistake it has made.

The second example is of Great Britain, which declined as a global power, giving room to the rise of the US after the rapid dismantling of its empire. In 1907, a British diplomat, Sir Eyre Crowe wrote a memorandum for the government outlining the need for a thorough reorientation of its foreign policy. The core of his assessment was based on the analysis of the British Empire's overall power position and the fundamental challenges that were being presented by the rise of Germany. He strongly recommended that the British Empire should concentrate on its dwindling resources on the problem of containing the rising German power. As a political analyst, he had correctly read the German domestic politics, its statecraft and its intentions. His advice was not paid any heed. Great Britain ended up fighting two great wars against Germany, and in the Second World War, faced intense and sustained city bombardment popularly known as the Blitz of London. The German Luftwaffe targeted Britain's major industrial centres and port cities, causing enough damage to weaken it. The campaign ended when Germany turned its attention to the invasion of the Soviet Union, but not before inflicting enormous punishment on London and consequently accelerating its journey on the pathway of demise as a global power.

History tells us that paying heed to the advice of scholars, political analysts and advisors on evidence-based inputs adds credibility to policymaking. It helps transform decision-making from subjective, political choices into evidence-backed strategies. President Trump would do well to leverage expert knowledge and to not repeat mistakes like those that resulted in the decline of the global powers of the past which failed to understand the complex issues of their time, and to reduce the risk of unintended consequences.