During the first week of March 2021, the United States Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, wrote to President Ashraf Ghani and Mr Abdullah Abdullah, outlining the Biden administration’s “initial conclusion” about the Afghan peace. This was in the backdrop of Pakistan’s advice to negotiate directly with the Taliban and Zalmay Khalilzad meeting the Taliban in Doha.
Emphasising the need to “accelerate peace talks and to bring all parties into compliance with their commitments […in Doha agreement]”, the letter outlines a four-point plan towards “a settlement and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire” in consonance with “regional countries and the UN”.
First, the US intends to “convene foreign ministers and envoys from Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, India and the US” to discuss a “unified approach to supporting peace in Afghanistan.” The US believes the countries listed have an “abiding common interest in a stable Afghanistan.”
Second, Ambassador Khalilzad, retaining his job, will discuss with the Afghan government and the Taliban “written proposals aimed at accelerating discussions on a negotiated settlement and ceasefire”. These proposals — the letter explains — would draw upon ideas that Hamdullah Mohib, the Afghan National Security Adviser and former Afghan ambassador to the US (2015-2018), discussed with Ross Wilson, the current US ambassador in Kabul.
This input, ostensibly will not be dictation to either the Afghan government and to the Taliban, but would aim at laying; (a) a foundation to guide “future constitutional and governing arrangements”; (b) a roadmap to a “new and inclusive government”; (c) and terms for a “permanent and comprehensive ceasefire”. Ghani has been urged to “develop constructive positions” for discussion with Khalilzad.
Third, the US in “coming weeks” will ask Turkey to host a senior-level meeting of parties to “finalise a peace agreement”. Ghani or his “authoritative designees” have been asked to join the Taliban in this meeting. Turkey has proposed the moot in April.
Lastly, Blinken reiterates “every effort” towards a “revised proposal for a 90-day reduction in violence” to forestall the Taliban Spring Offensive and support the intended political settlement between the parties. Ghani has been again urged to “positively consider the proposal”.
Ghani has been advised to “broaden” the quartet comprising the Ghani-Abdullah-Karzai-Sayyaf peace initiative to include the Taliban making it “inclusive and credible” for the common Afghans. The quartet is to negotiate with the Taliban “about governance, power-sharing, and essential supporting principles” and “public messaging” demonstrating “unity of purpose and effort”.
The letter ends by warning Ghani that the US option of complete troop withdrawal by May 1, 2021 remains on the table. Blinken warns Ghani that in such an eventuality, despite the US financial support to the Afghan government forces, the Taliban will be militarily ascendant. He ominously asks Ghani to “understand the urgency of my [Blinken’s] tone”.
The Biden administration takes all the wind out of the sails of the Afghan scene’s pseudo-analysts. The letter more than obliquely charges Ghani and his cabal for spoiling the peace… given the frequent urgings to remain positive. It asks him of “urgent leadership”. Team Biden retains Khalilzad as the point man, rather than re-inventing the wheel — and it does not consider the side issues of the Afghan Constitution, minorities and women’s rights, etc. as urgent at this stage, compared to the more urgent issues of ceasefire and power-sharing.
The spirit of the letter and the presumed “review” of the peace deal does not abrogate the February 29, 2020 agreement with the Taliban. The intended focus is on adherence-monitoring by all sides, fine-tuning implementation and jump starting the stalled intra-Afghan dialogue, in a changed setting with behind-the-scene NATO facilitation. True to Biden’s internationalist credentials, the scope has been enlarged.
Seeking Turkish interlocution as an extension of Qatari mediation, the Biden administration probably defers to the role of NATO. Reference to the UN role and US support during and after the settlement remains in line with the Part Three of the Doha agreement as covered by me in “Peace Agreement and American Options in Afghanistan”, published on February 25, 2021.
India’s inclusion is ostensibly an inducement to mainstream side-lined India, which by default drifted to the disruptive Ghani camp as a spoiler, in quest for its hegemonic regional relevance and its anti-Pakistan machinations. Indian place on the table would force it to remain constructive for a settlement. Similarly, bringing in Russia, China and Iran would dilute the environment of competition, ensuring a synergetic approach to pressure the stakeholders to move towards peace. The exclusion of the Arab camp especially Saudi Arabia, reinforces Biden’s not-so-hidden disregard for the kingdom. The Turkey-Qatar bonhomie facilitates a shift towards Ankara as an ‘extension’ of the Doha parleys, as stated by the Turkish Foreign Minister on March 12.
The US has realised the futility of the situation militarily and aims at cutting down unnecessary expense in the bottomless pit that Afghanistan has become, under a corona-depressed US economy. Domestically, Biden is fulfilling one of his campaign promises. President Biden has refrained from “picking violence” as an option, avoiding the reinforcement of a failed strategy, and has stayed the course by keeping alive the option of total withdrawal by the May deadline. The buzzword remains “negotiated settlement”.
Ambassador Khalilzad, has requested Pakistan’s interlocution with the Taliban for instituting a transitional peace government to conduct Afghan elections.
Meanwhile in an apparent convergence of interest, Moscow has invited a moot on Afghanistan (inviting Pakistan, China, Iran, the Afghan government, the US and Taliban) commencing on March 18, to restart the stalled intra-Afghan dialogue. Moscow hosted a similar meeting in 2018 with the Afghan Taliban; the US attended as an observer.
Russia also supports an interim government including the Afghan Taliban and others and backs the Taliban’s claim of “flawlessly” implementing the Doha deal. Russia had supported the Taliban iterations in their open letter in February this year. Pakistan recognises Russia’s importance and role towards a peace settlement. Ironically, President Ghani has balked at the interim government proposal, citing a five-year mandate for his administration. His government has, however, agreed to participate in both conferences.
With renewed and converging impetus; and the Taliban’s possible willingness to manage a 90-day ceasefire without compromising their military capability, there is some light at the end of a long tunnel. However, the composition of an interim government would be a major impediment. For reasons explained in my writings, the Taliban cannot and would not concede to anything less than a major share in the future political dispensation. Let’s hope they are understood.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 18th, 2021.
Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.
COMMENTS
Comments are moderated and generally will be posted if they are on-topic and not abusive.
For more information, please see our Comments FAQ