Joe Biden, South Asia and Pak-US ties

The previous two columns on the foreign policy of the Joe Biden-Kamala Devi team were a precursor to the subject of this opinion piece i.e. the United States’ policy in South Asia with special focus on Pak-US ties.

While discussing the entire gambit of Pak-US relations, three factors external to the scope of this write-up would continue to cast shadow, as discussed last week. First being the Biden administration’s future ties with China as our principal in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); its approach towards resuscitating the Iran nuclear deal (2015); and its outlook towards UAE-Saudi Arabia combine, as Pakistan’s discreet interlocutors in Washington.

Democrats traditionally view China as a ‘competitor’ and not as an adversary. Experts hope Biden taking a more conciliatory approach towards China and America to end its criticism of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)/CPEC, that the Trump administration considered a predatory trap for developing countries on China’s periphery. This will reduce pressure on Pakistan. Pakistan will also benefit from the likely US-China cooperation to control the coronavirus pandemic. However, if the trade war persists, and in the event that Pakistan has to pick sides, we need to meander a steady course in keeping with our selfish national interests.

As far as South Asia is concerned. As member and then twice chairman of the influential Foreign Relations Committee (1997-2003), Biden knows the region and the stakes of good relations with Pakistan well. An irate Biden had bluntly told president Hamid Karzai that Pakistan was 50 times more important to the US regional interests, when Karzai tried lecturing him.

Democrats are traditionally strong advocates of democracy, human rights and freedom of expression, hence these issues would remain on the forefront of his presidency. His vice-president-elect Kamala Harris had spoken against the Modi government’s anti-Muslim policies and human rights violations in Kashmir. So with the State Department back in the saddle, some heat on India for the Kashmir situation is expected. But no significant deviation of the US South Asia policy is expected. For Pakistan, it is likely to be more of the same.

This October, the US and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), which grants India real-time access to American geospatial intelligence. This improves accuracy of Indian missiles, armed drones and automated systems, enhancing America’s continued pro-India articulation. The Biden administration would endure supporting India against China.

The president-elect as part of a three-senator delegation visited Pakistan to observe the 2008 parliamentary elections; and being satisfied called for an expanded US economic aid package for Pakistan. The government of Pakistan awarded then senators Joe Biden and Lugar the Hilal-i-Pakistan (Crescent of Pakistan) for their consistent support to Pakistan, being the co-authors of the Kerry-Lugar Bill (2009); a bipartisan US aid plan to provide $1.5 billion yearly in non-military aid to support Pakistan’s economic development.

The US incursion in Abbottabad to kill Osama bin Laden in 2011 also happened during the Biden vice-presidency. President Obama’s latest memoir, A Promised Land (2020), discusses some interesting details of the incident.

During Imran Khan’s US visit in 2019, intermediaries like Senator Lindsay Graham played a key role in arranging his meetings with Trump. President-elect Biden is likely to follow the traditional reliance on the State Department and Pentagon. This would usher in a degree of certainty and stability in Pak-US ties that mercurial tweets by Trump had evaded.

PM Imran enunciated the tone with Team Biden in his congratulatory tweet… “Congratulations @JoeBiden & @KamalaHarris. Look forward to President-Elect Biden’s Global Summit on Democracy & working with him to end illegal tax havens & stealth of the nation’s wealth by corrupt leaders. We will also continue to work with the US for peace in Afghanistan & the region.”

Joe Biden has supported and opposed US military interventions abroad. He backs narrow objectives in force employment and remains skeptical about US ability to reshape foreign societies. Opposing unilateral efforts, he prefers working through diplomacy, alliances and global institutions. During interventions, he has advocated a “counterterrorism plus” strategy; entailing fighting terrorists abroad using small special force teams alongside aggressive air power, rather than large troop-deployments.

Mr Biden was overruled by President Obama in 2009 on Afghanistan, when he advocated deploying a minimal force, mainly for counterterrorism, opposing a ‘surge’, thinking the Afghan war was politically unsustainable. Biden might move towards that goal by converting the in-country US military presence after whatever is left in January 21, when 2,000 troops pull out of Afghanistan as ordered last week by Trump. The residual contingent is likely to comprise a joint command center and five targeting teams to keep Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in check. Biden too supports a light US military footprint of up to 2,000 troops. NATO member nations meanwhile want an earlier reversion of 7,000 or so NATO/allied troops still in Afghanistan.

Full US compliance of the US-Taliban peace deal remains another area to be watched. The Taliban have emphasised that the deal implementation remains “the most reasonable and effective tool” to end the conflict. Biden will continue to follow the Obama administration’s approach of asking Pakistan to “do more”. However, the new administration’s touted emphasis on pressing Pakistan to nudge the Taliban towards a ceasefire and human rights protection etc, irrespective of an orderly withdrawal, might not yield. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad may keep his job.

US intelligence and logistic collaboration with the future Taliban regime is also likely. Biden would be more amenable to keep the future Afghan government on life support irrespective of the reparation for war — that the Taliban may demand — or otherwise. For which, Australia has set the tone last week by offering apology for the crimes of its Special Air Service (SAS) teams against Afghan civilians.

Pakistan may see marginal US military or economic aid given our Afghanistan relevance; however, there seems no likelihood of full-scale resumption of the coalition support fund (CSF) etc. Pakistan on its part has to bring ‘positive relevance’ to the bilateral ties, frozen in security and Afghan peace process. Diversifying ties would be challenging.

Pakistan from its standpoint would continue to press Washington about India’s unhelpful role in Afghanistan. The US would revert to institutional control of Pakistan through economic coercion, arms twisting and proxies like elite or ashhrafiyya, as needed.

In sum, under Biden, given his past amity, there is a likelihood of marginal improvement of Pak-US relations, which essentially would continue to be transactional and issue-specific but stable. Septuagenarians have never brought revolutions, yet Biden promises his will not be a third Obama presidency.

Published in The Express Tribune, November 26^th, 2020.

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