The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute

It needs to be understood that the issue cannot be resolved unless the parties are willing to forge a compromise

The liquidation of the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1991 led to the eruption of several crises fueled by nationalism, ethnic identity, territorial claims and secessionist movements. In 1988, the then Soviet Socialist Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan went to war over the festering dispute of Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous oblast of Azerbaijan. Both sides suffered heavy casualties: about 38,000 military personnel and civilians lost their lives. Armenia not only occupied Nagorno-Karabakh but also took over the adjacent Azerbaijani districts of Aghdam, Jabrail, Gubadli, Fuzuli, Kalbajar, Zangilan and Lachin. The Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) brokered a ceasefire in 1994, which kept the region relatively calm for more than two decades. However, on Sept 27, 2020, the simmering ethno-territorial conflict again burst into an almost full-scale war.

Though internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1991 and is now being governed by the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, recognised only by three non-UN member states. Even Armenia does not recognise Artsakh as an independent state. As Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over the region dissolved in the wake of the war, the secessionist movement of the ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh flourished.

The conflict has been shaped by historical, ethno-cultural and structural factors. The Muslim Ottoman empire’s dealings with the Christian Armenians during its long period of conquest in the region laid the historical and ethno-cultural foundations of the crisis. Despite the initiation of various reforms by the empire in the mid-19^th century, the Armenian imbroglio remained unresolved. During WWI, the Ottomans looked askance at Armenia’s association with Imperial Russia. This added another unsubtle layer of complication to the scenario. After the October Revolution of 1917, the Red Army turned Armenia into a Soviet Socialist Republic. Subsequently, Nagorno-Karabakh — primarily comprising ethnic-Armenian Christians — became a part of the predominantly Muslim Azerbaijan.

This territorial readjustment of Nagorno-Karabakh created two serious structural issues for Azerbaijan. One, a large swath of ethnic Armenian population stuck in old hatreds and persecution psychoses came to be concentrated in a single geographical area. It not only made the task of governing the oblast a highly complex endeavour but also paved the way for the Armenian separatists to mount insurrections against Baku. Two, the USSR’s highly centralised political apparatus militated against Azerbaijan’s ability to pursue a robust security policy. This inherent weakness did not allow it to smother the secessionist currents emanating from the region.

Since the 1994 truce, Armenia and Azerbaijan have participated in several rounds of peace talks held under the aegis of the OSCE. However, the global community’s efforts to resolve the issue have always remained lacklustre, dreary and uninspiring. Key players like Russia, Turkey, the EU and the US have not acted meaningfully to stabilise the region. There is also a visible trust deficit in both Armenia and Azerbaijan vis-à-vis other states and multilateral organisations. Due to their history and the gory war they fought in the 1990s, the people of the two countries harbour an almost pathological animosity towards each other. The notoriously intransigent behaviour of the governments in Baku and Yerevan reflects this fact. The absence of a watertight security superstructure that could guarantee the territorial integrity of both the countries is also a major obstacle.

It appears that the OSCE is the international community’s best bet to: one, end the ongoing military hostilities in the region; two, jumpstart negotiations between the two warring neighbours; three, engage regional powers in a well-conceived mosaic of conflict resolution; and, four, encourage Armenia and Azerbaijan to follow the well-known archetype of confidence-building measures i.e. communication, constraint, transparency, and verification. Concrete proposals regarding the resolution of the dispute could follow. It needs to be understood that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue cannot be resolved unless the parties to the conflict are themselves willing to forge a compromise.

Published in The Express Tribune, October 8^th, 2020.

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