Barking up the wrong tree

The recent episodes of police misbehavior, torture, and custodial deaths have created a stir. Calls for police reforms are ubiquitous and loud. However, it is unlikely that this public outrage will lead to systemic changes that can produce better performance and conduct.

Various reform proposals from senior police officers are depressingly agnostic to the issues of police torture in particular, and governance in general. They are remarkably similar in their diagnosis of the problem and its solution. They invariably cite the lack of manpower and resources, an archaic legal framework, and political interference as the main reasons for poor performance. If police functioning is to improve, it is argued, we must update the relevant laws and rules, build new infrastructure, recruit more people, pay them better, and upgrade the transport pool.

For example, the five-year strategic plan recently prepared by the Lahore Police seeks an additional 19,000 people and Rs20 billion per year for Lahore alone, to bring its constable-to-citizen ratio and physical infrastructure on a par with cities like Istanbul or London. The plan, which has been sent to the Chief Minister for approval, considers these additional resources a pre-requisite for improved performance.

The police’s case for increased investment is not without merit. However, in asking for more resources, the police require from stakeholders (politicians, citizens, etc) a giant leap of faith to trust that its performance will improve due to these inputs. Not many people will be ready to take this leap. After all, hasn’t all this been asked and granted before?

In 2008, the then Punjab government doubled salaries of all police officials across the board. Did performance improve? It is hard to answer this question in the affirmative. Similarly, in 1998, police inspectors were directly recruited through the Punjab Public Service Commission with a lot of fanfare in hopes of changing the thana culture. Did the thana or its culture change in any manner whatsoever? I’m afraid not.

The connection between what the police ask — and they are asking for a lot — and improved performance is quite weak. Housing police headquarters in modern towers on the pattern of New York Police, buying new vehicles, and bringing the police-to-citizen ratio on a par with developed countries will not improve performance automatically. Rather, chances are we will be spending much more and still getting the same results. So to be credible, any plea for more resources into policing will have to establish a stronger connection between increased investment and improved performance.

It is also worth asking if the police are making good use of existing resources. Everyone can cite personal observations of wasteful use. Here is an interesting one. Mr Jehanzeb Burki, a former inspector general of police, was provided guards post-retirement at his residence as per official protocol. The good gentleman died five years ago, but two police constables continue to perform duty at his residence even today. Not only do they draw a salary from public funds, but they also carry official weapons and use official motorcycles. A police van supplies meals thrice a day. If the police are using existing resources for guard duty at houses of deceased officers, their request for more constables is weak, to say the least.

When the police ask for more men, money, equipment, vehicles, buildings, and training, the implicit assumption is that improved performance is a function of these inputs. Are we sure this is the case? Or is there a possibility that improved performance, howsoever it is defined, is also a function of better governance, transparency, and accountability. If this indeed is a possibility, any meaningful reform planning must spell out how it will improve governance and accountability.

Further, modern policing is no longer about putting more boots on the ground. Instead, it is about intelligence gathering, using modern techniques to collect evidence, and using technology to achieve policing objectives. Any additional resource input should go towards these activities, rather than the conventional picketing, patrolling, and interrogation techniques, which lead to the perpetration of violence on suspects to extract evidence.

Another favourite ingredient in the reform recipe is the administrative, functional and fiscal autonomy for police. Policing, it is argued, is a highly technical function which should be insulated from bureaucratic superintendence, political interference, and so on. If we pursue this logic we will have to grant a similar autonomy to doctors and teachers since they too perform a highly technical activity. Are we ready for that? Should doctors and teachers autonomously define our health and education needs, and how these can be addressed? If not, then a larger societal oversight and superintendence is required for police functioning as much as it is required for other professionals.

Moreover, there is a fine line between being autonomous and being free from external accountability. Public management literature tells us that institutions function better when subjected to rigorous and transparent external accountability. Police functioning will improve if there is rigorous external accountability at each level.

The police’s case for more resources will be strengthened if it is linked to improvement in performance standards. Incentives work best when tied to performance improvement. It should be possible to define in concrete terms what a police officer or official is expected to achieve in say, three-year tenure at a particular position. This process should start with higher echelons, and move downwards. For each official, a small set of results should be clearly identified that he can be expected to deliver within his tenure.

It will be important to identify how these results will be measured. So, for example, it should be possible to assess the general perception of public friendliness, use of non-violent means for interrogation, or ease in FIR registration, etc in a police station and compare this with the same indicators after three years. This progress can become the basis of promotions, postings, and rewards.

Furthermore, improving the police force or any department for that matter, within the constraints of seniority-based postings, and time-scale promotions will remain a Herculean task. In a good institutional setup, the top man should be able to build his team of DIGs, SPs, SDPOs, and SHOs based on their reputation and the energy they bring to their assignments, rather than the seniority lists maintained by clerks in his office. If someone lacks energy, dynamism, integrity, civility or basic intelligence, he will lack these qualities in any age. And if someone has them, it should be possible to post him in positions of responsibility regardless of how many years he has put in service.

Finally, there must be a system to expel people from the service for poor performance or administrative delinquency. Police, like other government departments, has miserably failed on this count. Unless we have a police force which prunes itself regularly, each year and at each seniority level, we will continue to end up with mediocrity rising through the ranks to warm various seats in the hierarchy.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 13^th, 2019.

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