The fate of Sudan

As the confrontation between activists and the ruling military authority persists

The fate of Sudan in the wake of President Omar al-Bashir’s ouster is in the balance, with activists and the ruling military authority confronting each other over whether the country will be a democracy or just a continuation of Bashir’s repressive thirty-year rule.

The crisis in Sudan started as a public protest that led to the overthrow of President Bashir, one of Africa’s longest-ruling dictators. If ignored, the political turmoil in Sudan has the potential to be worse than the Syrian civil war which may even lead to the destabilisation of the region including Egypt, a key US ally.

Bashir’s toppling, triggered by an unwavering, peaceful campaign by a diverse and well-organised protest movement, gave hope to the country that a transition to a more inclusive, civilian-led rule might eventually take place in Khartoum. That transition has been slow and hesitant primarily due to the old military regime showing little appetite for democracy in one of the most geographically diverse states in Africa.

Ostensibly, the April coup is a multifaceted event that could have regional implications in the long run. Shortly after the removal of President Bashir, who was a known ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Saudi government, which has been active across the Horn of Africa and particularly influential in negotiating a peace treaty between Ethiopia and Eritrea, loosened its purse strings and dished out $3 billion. The economic aid was an indirect lifeline for the transitional military government in Sudan. In some ways, the move also highlights the familiar pattern of Riyadh’s ramped up adventurism since 2017, evident in Libya and Yemen, where pro-Iran rulers were systematically marginalised, and replaced with regimes that are pro-Saudi Arabia.

At this point along with the Emiratis and the Egyptians, the Saudis have carefully aligned themselves behind Sudan’s ruling military council and their support could tip the balance toward the ruling Transitional Military Council.

It is obvious that the Gulf powers have two very clear motives behind their support: one, they do not want the Islamist party to rule Sudan; and two, they want Khartoum to sever all ties with Tehran.

Subsequently, all Islamist political leaders in Sudan were arrested and the Gulf powers are now relying on the vicious Janjaweed militias, currently known as the Rapid Support Forces, to consolidate power. The militia group, notorious for the genocidal violence in Darfur, is headed by Lt Gen Mohamed Hamdan widely known as Hemeti who by most calculations is the de facto ruler of Sudan. Consequently, if Hemeti, who was the chief enforcer during Bashir’s regime, ends up being installed as Sudan’s next ruler, the civil society will not rest and there is a significant chance that Hemeti’s militias who are also fighting Riyadh’s war in Yemen will continue to commit atrocities across Sudan without any accountability.

Another dangerous outcome of the Gulf influence is that it creates an imbalance in the already combustible internal dynamics of Sudan. Foreign financial support for one of the most vicious groups can lead to direct confrontation between the three armed organisations in Sudan: the Rapid Support Forces led by Hemeti from Darfur; traditional military; and the National Intelligence and Security Service, an incredibly powerful body that runs the country in many ways.

Unfortunately, when a blood-soaked ruler like Hemeti is propped up it can only lead to more chaos — particularly when he serves as a constant reminder of Sudan’s depressing past. After all, these misadventures have failed in both Yemen and Libya, where the Gulf powers and other key players refuse to abandon the wars regardless of the casualties.

Perhaps, democratic transition in Sudan is only possible if Western powers apply diplomatic pressure not just on those who rule Khartoum, but also in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh who by default control the power dynamics in Khartoum.

Published in The Express Tribune, July 28^th, 2019.

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