For reasons of state

Weaker states still have to find the means to survive; they still do it through balancing or bandwagoning, or both.


Ejaz Haider May 31, 2011

Here’s a basic formulation on Pakistan-United States relations: The US doesn’t trust Pakistan but needs it; Pakistan doesn’t trust the US but needs it. The difference is, the US can coerce Pakistan. It has already indicated, through a physical raid inside Pakistan, that if and when it thinks it is required to act in its core interests, it would not hesitate to take unilateral action, the legal issue of the sovereignty of another state be damned. What are Pakistan’s choices?

No one can grudge the US. History is the story of raison d’etat and realpolitik. But the story begins much before the French and the Germans coined those terms.

Scene: The sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian War fought between Athens and its empire and the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta. Athens sends a force against the isle of Melos, a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit to the Athenians like the other islanders. Melos has at first remained neutral and taken no part in the struggle, but afterwards, upon the Athenians using violence and plundering their territory, has assumed an attitude of hostility.

The Generals Cleomedes and Tisias, encamping in Melos territory backed by a sizeable force, send envoys to negotiate. What happened is reported by Thucydides, and I excerpt from the point where initial exchanges have already taken place (the italics are mine):

Athenians: For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences — either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us — and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.

Melians: As we think, at any rate, it is expedient — we speak as we are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of interest — that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got to pass current. And you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon.

Athenians: The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten us: A rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we are come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we are now going to say, for the preservation of your country; as we would fain exercise that empire over you without trouble, and see you preserved for the good of us both.

Melians: And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule?

Athenians: Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.

Fast-forward to now: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accompanied by Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff came to Islamabad. They addressed a press conference. Let me excerpt some parts of what Mullen said:

“This is Pakistan’s war and Afghanistan’s war. It’s a reasonable war against a common enemy, a war in which all of us share a stake and all of us must hazard certain risks. For our part, my military took many risks going after Bin Laden, risks to the lives of our men and women in uniform, risks to civilian causalities and to collateral damage. We took the risk of being wrong about what we thought we knew of the killer’s whereabouts. And yes, in our desire to preserve secrecy, we incurred a certain risk in our relationships with other nations in the region. But this particular relationship with Pakistan is too critical, and now is too critical a time to allow whatever differences we may still have with one another impede the progress we must still make together.”

The Peloponnesian War raged from 431 to 404 BC; we are in the 21st Century. Much has changed in terms of technology. But the central point about power and its exercise remains unchanged. This, despite our attempts to finesse our dealings. The crudity in the projection of power, depicted in the Melian Dialogue or that great but diabolical speech by Henry V, Before the Gates (Act 3 Sc III) in Shakespeare’s play of the same name, may have been replaced by more subtle controls of the narrative but the nature of the state has not changed even as, ironically enough, the concept of the state has undergone many changes since the Greek city states.

Weaker states still have to find the means to survive; they still do it through balancing or bandwagoning — or when they are smarter, through both. The Melians put it incisively when they said that “It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn more ways than one both in thought and utterance”.

It was good to see that this time there was no joint presser. It is important for Pakistan to improve relations with the United States; but equally important it is to re-establish the red lines that have been crossed. It would have been better still if, before the arrival of Mrs Clinton, Pakistan had registered its protest at the United Nations. It would have been best if Islamabad had politely asked Mrs Clinton, or, before her, Senator John Kerry, to postpone their visit until some basic issues had been resolved.

The US has made plain its intentions and its parameters for this ‘relationship’. The ball’s squarely in Pakistan’s court. There are areas where Pakistan cannot play against the US. But by submitting meekly even in areas where it can, it has left the field open for the US to treat it at will. Foolhardiness is not bravery; but neither is pusillanimity discretion.

As always, we continue to swing between the two extremes.

Published in The Express Tribune, June 1st, 2011.

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