Mehran, through the glass darkly
By design or through characteristic recklessness, the delicate strategic balance in the region has been disturbed.
Within three weeks, Pakistan has been tested twice and found wanting: On May 2, by the most powerful military in history and then on May 22, by a small unit of commandos, made up of non-state actors, challenging the state of Pakistan. The American raid to take out Osama bin Laden plunged the country into deep anxiety, first, about the cause of the attack — incompetence or complicity in Osama’s oft-denied presence — and then, secondly, by the utter disdain shown for Pakistan’s sovereignty. The low-tech assault by a ‘fedayeen’ squad, instantly claimed by the TTP (Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan) as its own, on the PNS Mehran, left the nation stunned. That both the incursions accomplished their mission led to much demoralisation.
There are several questions about Abbottabad that have not been answered and may never be answered. In the case of the Mehran base, there is no fog of high technology: The truth shall have to be dug up from wherever necessary. In a self-assured state, there would never be any doubt that investigations would be comprehensive and credible. Unfortunately, there is now a touch of a witch-hunt raging in public debate, which creates motive to brush facts under the carpet. There is glee in some quarters at the military’s increasing discomfiture. Furthermore, apprehensive that its traditional insouciance about national tragedies would not be prudent this time, the political government is combining inane statements by the top leadership, with more substantive civil-military consultations, to project an image of full engagement. The two points revealed by the media after the meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet are that it has authorised pre-emptive strikes against terrorists and permitted the use of all possible means against them. Considering the allegations of retaliatory excesses by security forces in Balochistan, Fata and Swat, the resort to ‘all means’ needs clarification that is would not validate extrajudicial violence.
On TV screens, conspiracy theories multiply by the hour. No doubt, India is the main beneficiary of the destruction of the P-3C Orion aircraft, but do we not need more evidence before implicating it? And did Washington provide us with seven such aircraft, only to have them destroyed by hired guns from among the Taliban? This does not, however, mean that Washington would hesitate to use this incident to rub in the vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear assets.
The attack did seem to be driven by a specific mission to cripple the navy’s air arm. The argument that the TTP, or other insurgents, had nothing against the navy is simply not true. It is an important component of the multi-nation Combined Task Force — which its officers have commanded in rotation. Apart from playing a crucial role in India-specific air surveillance, the destroyed aircraft were expected to watch any seaborne activities of al Qaeda and its allies. The repeated attacks on naval personnel, suggest a particular terrorist animus against the Pakistan Navy.
By design or through characteristic recklessness, the al Qaeda-TTP commando has disturbed the delicate strategic balance in the region. It took the Pakistan Navy more time than its Indian counterpart, to gain recognition of its needs from the ultimate decision-makers. Once New Delhi embraced the concept of a ‘blue water navy’, with its projected regional role and global aspirations, the Indian Navy got what it takes to project power in the region. The construction of the huge naval base, INS Kadamba, near Karwar for the Western Command, the expected induction of aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov from Russia) and the nuclear submarine Arihant in 2011/12, are major milestones in this quest for power projection. The Pakistani Navy wisely invested in submarines, a cruise missile, air patrol and surveillance aircraft to build up reasonable deterrence. While intensifying diplomatic efforts to improve relations with India, Pakistan must also ponder over the dilemma of making up the navy’s loss.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 31st, 2011.