The Arab awakening: Continuing or faltering?

Many observers had expected that, as in Tunisia and Egypt, the ‘strongman’ of Libya would recognise that, in the face of the mass uprising, his position was untenable and would resign. These hopes have been belied. Qaddafi continues to hold out and, by all accounts, his grip on the levers of power, at least in Tripoli, remains strong. The big difference has been the army. Learning from his own experience when, as a young officer, he used the army to overthrow the monarch, he has kept the army weak and ill-equipped, while providing the necessary training equipment and facilities only to units under the direct command of his son — the brigade popularly known as the Khamis brigade — or other security units — the People’s Security Organisation and the Revolutionary Guards Corps — whose unquestioning loyalty he could count on and perhaps, above all, the internal security apparatus commanded by his brother-in-law, Brigadier General Senussi. If reports from Tripoli are to be believed, he has had no hesitation in deploying these forces with live ammunition to disperse demonstrators, even in the vicinity of mosques, on Friday last.

Does this mean he will prevail? The people of Tripoli, where Qaddafi’s hold is strongest, made it clear on the few occasions they could talk freely to the 130-odd correspondents Qaddafi had invited to see ‘normalcy’ in Libya, that they hated Qaddafi but feared retribution if they were caught and if Qaddafi ultimately prevailed. This same fear pervaded the conversations of ordinary people in Benghazi in the east from where, at least for now, it seems that Qaddafi’s forces have been permanently evicted and where a temporary government has also been set up. They had lived for too long with the dreaded security police and their spies, whose reports could lead to torture and death, or to unexplained disappearances.

The forces the rebels have mustered are a ragtag motley lot. There is more enthusiasm than military skill. Understandably, they shy away when faced with superior weaponry. But one can see that there is courage, perhaps born of despair, and the hope, perhaps futile, that eventually even Qaddafi’s trusted loyalists will refrain from harming their own compatriots. There must have been an element of this involved in the siege of Zawiya, a city situated a little over 40 kilometres west of Tripoli and home to one of Libya’s largest refineries. On March 4, and again on March 5, all reports seem to agree that the Qaddafi units, with tanks and armoured vehicles, moved into the centre of the town but then pulled back without having suffered any significant losses or an organised counter-attack.

And this will, in my view, be the reason for Qaddafi’s ultimate downfall. Even the members of his elite units will have relatives in the rebel camp and shooting en masse at one’s kin to ensure the survival of a leader whose shenanigans have long been a source of shame, will perhaps be impossible no matter what the rewards on offer.

The Libyan people will prevail and will perhaps do so with a measure of unity that was not expected when the uprising began. There have been signs of discord in the provisional government that has been set up but these seem to have been squelched. There were reports of Qaddafi seeking to exploit tribal differences but these too seem to have been subsumed in the larger struggle. There was the constant refrain in Tripoli of the al Qaeda hand but this seems to be no more than a last ditch effort to exploit an imaginary bogey.

Qaddafi, however, is tenacious and the struggle may well be longer than was at first anticipated. Libya is fortunate. It has the resources to be able to overcome, in a relatively short time, the economic costs — already some 40 per cent of its 1.5 million barrels of oil has stopped flowing out and this figure will probably rise. The world, as much as Libya, will pay the price for the shortfall in oil availability, despite the Saudi willingness to use their excess capacity to meet the shortfall.

But Libya is not alone. The entire Arab world is in ferment. Notably, King Abdullah, on return to Saudi Arabia after an extensive period abroad for medical treatment, made an immediate announcement of $36 billion in additional emoluments and benefits to the people. This, however, was not sufficient and he has now announced, after the first demonstrations in eastern Saudi Arabia by the Shias, that further demonstrations were banned, as they were not in accord with Saudi tradition and would be firmly dealt with by the security authorities. While I do not anticipate any overthrow of the monarchy, reforms are almost inevitable.

Bahrain continues to be in a troubled state but, after the initial escalation in demands, it appears that the demonstrators will be happy if the cabinet and, in particular, the prime minister, the uncle of the king, were to be dismissed. The crown prince has a good chance of being able to compromise with the demonstrators once the uncle is out of the way, without jeopardising the monarchy.

In Oman again, it seems that the monarchy can be preserved if it becomes less autocratic because the sultan continues to be popular. In Yemen, however, the writing is on the wall — President Ali Abdullah Saleh will have to go. The resignation of people from his party has created an untenable situation. But it is Egypt which has to be watched most carefully because it is Egypt today that will influence, more than any other country, the course of events in the Arab world. The army has already acquiesced in the demands of the demonstrators, and has replaced Prime Minister Shafiq and his replacement has been bold enough to go out to the crowds in Tahrir Square to seek their blessings and ask for their help in rebuilding Egypt. It is only a matter of time before the army takes the other measures required — creating the conditions in which political parties can be formed, an independent election commission legislated for and the holding of elections only after these steps have been completed.

In all these steps, one thing seems clear. The ferment may eventually benefit the Islamists but, for the moment, they are in no position to dictate the course of events nor do they appear to want to do so. The Ikhwan has announced that they will have candidates in only 150 of Egypt’s 454 constituencies and they will not field a candidate for president. Elsewhere, the Islamists have returned but with a similarly low profile.

Published in The Express Tribune, March 8^th, 2011.