K-P police law: reform or rhetoric?

The newly promulgated police ordinance in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) has been hailed by many as a landmark reform. K-P has turned out to be the first province to legislate on the issue, with the exception of Punjab that introduced some minor amendments in the Police Order 2002, three years ago. Proponents claim that for the first time, the police has been given autonomy and made accountable to the public. There is, however, a need to objectively analyse the new law from three perspectives. Firstly, what is new that this piece of legislation offers, and how is it different from the previous law? Secondly, does the ordinance propose a workable solution for the problems at hand in the justice sector? And lastly, is there finally a harbinger of hope for the citizens, the ultimate clients for the criminal justice system?

The K-P Police Ordinance 2016 has definitely minimised the discretion of political masters by giving tenure security to the Provincial Police Officer and fully empowering him to transfer and post officers of his choice. By abandoning the powers previously enjoyed by the chief minister, the K-P government has set a commendable precedent towards ensuring autonomy of police and prevention of political interference. Furthermore, through various commissions and bodies, the law has attempted to create a system of police accountability to the public. The public safety commissions will review performance of the police and will approve policing plans, whereas regional complaint authorities will enquire into citizen’s complaints. The district assemblies will be able to recommend the premature transfer of district police officers on grounds of unsatisfactory performance, but only after passing a resolution with two-thirds majority and only once during their tenures.

However, it is pertinent to note that the previous legislation also provided tenure security to the IG and even covered safety commissions and complaint authorities. The actual problem was that these provisions were never made functional. Irrespective of how sound a statute is, effective policing needs a functional system of checks and balances, which still remains a challenge and how the K-P government will address that is yet to be seen.

Furthermore, the newly given autonomy to the IG is based on the presumption of fairness and objectivity on his part to counter any meddling by political bosses. On ground, however, the differentiation is rarely that clear. Some police officials and bureaucrats have known to be highly partisan. The new system would work perfectly if the province has a good IG but what if the choice of the top position is not correct. Do we have a system to ensure that we’ll always have the right man for the right job?

The question is not whether the chief minister or the IG should review performance of the police neither is it about the turf war between the police and the civil bureaucracy. The issue is the absence of objective data that could enable impartial evidence-backed decision-making. What lies at the heart of policing systems in developed countries is robust performance management based on quality inspections and measurement of crime incidence, conviction rates, etc. In the absence of such information, the chief minister, IG or even the safety commissions are expected to manage the problems in a knee-jerk manner, relying either on unauthentic newspaper reports or delayed bureaucratic inquiries. The solution, therefore, lies not in shifting control from one person to another but rather in reducing discretion and making decision-making objective.

The concept of safety commissions has been seemingly borrowed from England and Japan, but only with substantial deviations. In the UK, a similar concept of territorial police authorities has been abolished after experimentation, replaced by elected police and crime commissioners, who are fully empowered to hold the chief constable accountable and to manage the police fund. In Japan, the National Public Safety Commission is not just a recommendatory body as proposed in the K-P Police Ordinance but rather has full administrative control over the National Police Agency and powers to appoint or dismiss senior police officers. These countries have learnt to institute clear accountability structures rather than multi-tier advisory bodies that may not deliver desired results. If we are ready for public accountability, we should go all out and empower these commissions and authorities and if we are not, we should not take refuge in fancy nomenclature.

The third and the most important issue is citizens’ perspective. According to the new ordinance, an aggrieved citizen can reach out to a complaint authority, but only after an ‘excess’ has been committed and not merely because of overall dissatisfaction with police performance. The complaint will have to be in ‘writing’ on an ‘affidavit’, exposing the complainant’s identity and the authority will send it back to the respective district police officer who could be a party in the complaint. If the authority is not happy with his response, it may constitute a committee to inquire further. If a citizen is fortunate to get a favourable decision, it will then be referred to the ‘competent authority’ for appropriate action. Knowing how committees and inquiries work in this country and the quantum of complaints people have regarding the police, the ordinance may not be of much comfort to citizens. It is anybody’s guess that with this elaborate procedure, how citizens should be expected to get any justice.

The criminal justice system comprises a number of institutions ranging from watch and ward and investigation to prosecution and from courts to the correction system, all in need for major reforms. The new law is neither aimed at nor should be considered a coherent response of the government for extensive criminal justice reform. The K-P government, however, is not solely to be blamed especially after introduction of Article 142(b) in the Constitution that gives a clear mandate to the federal government in this area.

Any political party that successfully reforms the criminal justice system is likely to get significant political dividends; however, one question that any policymaker should ask before introducing a reform is how it is going to impact the crime rate, the conviction rate, public confidence in policing and general satisfaction with public safety. 

Published in The Express Tribune, August 27^th, 2016.

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