DEI(th) of USAID

.


Abbas Moosvi February 25, 2025
The writer is a researcher, social activist and development practitioner. He tweets @AbbasMoosvi

print-news

It seems 'authoritarianism' is always inversely proportional to the extent to which one toes the US line.

Republicans have a particular set of claims about USAID, America's premiere state-led international development body. The first is that through the agency, the US has systematically peddled a pro-LGBTQ+ agenda via 'diversity, equity, and inclusion' (DEI) initiatives - popularising a culture of gender fluidity and sexual non-conformity in the developing world. Second, they argue that its activities destabilise recipient countries by nurturing 'pressure groups' that seek to topple existing governments. President Trump alleges that these disbursements have undermined America's geopolitical interests and called for the agency to be shut down altogether. As a consequence, projects worth $850 million have been discontinued in Pakistan alone. While litigation battles around the issue kick off in the US, it is worth probing into the extent to which these claims are valid.

It is a fact that a significant proportion of USAID programmes contain a DEI component. Standalone programmes around transgender rights, women empowerment, interfaith harmony, and the curtailing of racial/ethnic divisions are also a common feature. While those at the helm of the Department of Government Efficiency claim that this is equivalent to fostering a 'radical Left' ideology in recipient countries, its net effect is actually the exact opposite. As anyone who has worked with multilaterals in the developing world knows, DEI buzzwords are merely checkboxes to be marked: with the simple requirement of 'attendance' from 'marginalised communities' in the events and activities that take place. In other words, it is largely a symbolic gesture. Governments and 'implementing partners' are indifferent, as long as funds continue to pour in.

The primary audience for these initiatives consists, therefore, of individuals who are already aligned with Left-leaning sociopolitical ideologies rather than the broader public. Within this domain, however, there are two primary subgroups. The first consists of those for whom the central ideological tenet is resisting economic inequality, from which it is believed all other kinds of oppression flow. This is the traditional, class-based politics that seeks to alleviate the adverse effects of capitalism while advocating for a move beyond it. The second is the 'postmodern' progressive: for whom identity-based frictions form the foundations of the larger political project. For this group, 'power' resides not in structural arrangements but interpersonal, moment-to-moment engagements - embedded in culture and language. By strategically funneling resources towards the latter within key domains - media, academia, think tanks, non-government organisations, the legal fraternity, etc. - multilaterals have effectively crowded out the Left in recipient countries, saturating it with a more fragmentary, 'individualised' approach to politics based on essentialised categories.

Take three individuals from a religious minority: a man, woman, and transgender. Although they are all oppressed, the man is in the lowest tier of the 'hierarchy of oppression' in question. The woman occupies the middle tier; the transgender sits at the top. Now assume another set of three, except from an even more oppressed religious minority. This group's hierarchy, while mirroring the first's, will be considered to occupy a higher place in 'hierarchy of hierarchies' of the broader movement. It is easy to see how this leads to internal competition - a kind of Oppression Olympics - between participants with its fundamentally inward orientation and myopic compartmentalisation. Add to this its rejection of metanarratives in favour of 'deconstruction' and emphasis on subjective interpretations over objective reality, and what remains is a hodgepodge of nihilistic, flippant individuals with no collective spirit or guiding ideology. Au contraire, what can be observed is the emergence of a pathological form of tribalism - in which oppressed communities engage in endless turf wars with members of their own to signal their suitability to big multilaterals as 'consultants', 'partners', and 'implementing bodies'. In other words, it is reduced to a coalition that is quite vocal but ultimately harmless.

With funds flowing in and the impression of 'social justice' sold, governments controlling multilateral agencies are able to effectively quell genuine internal resistance to despotic rule in 'developing' countries using the aforementioned strategies and seamlessly peddle specific geopolitical agendas. Where governments are not cooperative (pursuing policies in favour of their citizenry's interests) - for instance various countries in Latin America - the approach tends to cleverly recenter itself around 'freedom' and 'democratic rights' to instigate regime change (not to be confused with systems change). The paradox is striking: the same agency can simultaneously be working closely with dictatorial leaders in certain countries while peddling 'decentralised governance' in others. It seems 'authoritarianism' is always inversely proportional to the extent to which one toes the US line. Convenient!

The irony of all this is that conservatives in the States fail to see how much they share with this group in philosophical terms. For one, the 'woke' prioritise hyper-individualism: 'lived experiences' and free expression are core to their ideology. Put another way, their focus is on removing obstacles to individual liberty rather than pushing for collective preservation. Conservative ideas of 'pulling oneself up by the bootstraps' and Musk's recent obsession with unadulterated speech share a similar spirit. In addition, the toolkit at this group's disposal relies heavily on moral one-upmanship - opposition is often labelled 'bigoted,' 'misogynistic,' 'racist,' etc, framing dissenters as 'bad' in a 'good vs evil' framework. For all intents and purposes, this is virtually identical to the faith-based politics of Trump's support base in terms of its internal logic. Third, the most vocal participants in postmodern ideology hail from upper (elite) and upper-middle classes. They believe micro-level, piecemeal 'interventions' are the optimal vehicles for better socioeconomic outcomes rather than institutional or systemic reform. Elon Musk's strategy is hardly any different; his 'solution' is not to improve procedural aspects of governance or the internal incentive structures of key state organs/institutions, but to merely pull funds from areas he believes are antithetical to his (business) interests. The system works remarkably well for him: by investing $290 million in Trump's campaign, he has monopolised decision-making in the power corridors of the US. While this may sound like a hefty sum, estimated 'returns' on his recent political adventures stand at around $150 billion!

It isn't that the USAID has not pursued DEI in recipient countries or that it has a clean slate in terms of meddling in their internal affairs. The reality is that both have functioned as central tools to preserve the international status quo - which had largely been in America's favour. Until now.

COMMENTS

Replying to X

Comments are moderated and generally will be posted if they are on-topic and not abusive.

For more information, please see our Comments FAQ