Why Islamic State has been unable to enter Pakistan?

Throughout its rise and steady retreat, the organisation failed to get the widely speculated traction

If it was not up to random terrorist attacks globally, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) would have been on a run as its annexed land in Iraq and Syria has been shrinking. Even though ISIS has not been harmed yet, it has been exhausted to a significant extent. Throughout its rise and steady retreat, the organisation, well known for its Arabic acronym Daesh, failed to get the widely speculated traction.

It has also not set any inspiring examples for its supporters globally through its conduct as a ‘caliphate’. The gains in Iraq were largely due to sectarian policies of Nouri al-Maliki and tactical accommodation of Bashar al-Assad, who along with Russia preferred to fight Syrian groups than the much more lethal ISIS.



Nonetheless, conservative think-tanks in US and the West, as well as India and Iran have raised false accusations of ISIS foothold in Pakistan. The conclusions they drew from participation of radical Pakistanis’ in Taliban militia were not just deceptive but far-fetched, leading to baseless predictions.

ISIS struggles in gaining foothold

The first and foremost difference between Taliban and ISIS is geography, which may keep the latter out of the country. Afghanistan shares a largely porous border with Pakistan that neither Syria nor Iraq does. Thus, a Daesh lover will need a passport, a valid visa for Turkey or Iraq and an airplane ticket to reach his handlers in the region, while Taliban’s supporters did not have to go through any of these bureaucratic procedures or bear the cost. Turkey’s capital Ankara, on the other hand, has adopted stricter screening procedures to check movement of Daesh volunteers throughout the country.

Secondly, Pashtuns had centuries old tribal, cultural and trade relations on both sides of the Durand Line and no such links exist in the case of the greater Levant. Besides, Pakistan supported insurgency against communist Soviets at the time, as a matter of policy. The very concept of a militia undercutting the feuding warlords (then called mujahideen) was nurtured by Benazir’s trusted Major-General Naseerullah Babar, along with the military establishment. The short-term end result was to be under Taliban’s control, occupying 90% of Afghanistan, and imposition of the Shariah law in its narrowest interpretation. As a result, Islamabad was the last one to withdraw legitimacy to Mulla Omar’s government and none of this is parallel to Daesh-controlled states.



Moreover, apart from the state’s explicit or tacit nod, the sympathisers of radical Islam are exhausted with ‘fruitless’ prolonged war in Afghanistan followed by Pakistan’s own operation clean-up. Besides, ISIS may not even be in need of religiously charged foot soldiers, considering Daesh is al Qaeda 2.0. From tactics to strategy and symbolism to display of dreadfulness, ISIS insurgents are far ahead of Mulla Omar and Osama bin Laden’s militants.

Supporters of Daesh in Pakistan

Defying all odds, however, there have been quite a few cases of Pakistanis making their way into ISIS territory. A dozen or more reported cases include a mother leaving Lahore with her children to join ISIS. But, according to estimates resulting from unreliable data sources, Pakistanis joining the group are said to be a few hundreds out of its vast 180million population. Many of whom are the ones studying or working in the West and have little trouble in arranging the logistics and contacts. They are also likely to be smarter at technology than mere foot soldiers, for which Taliban had appetite for.

Nonetheless, the bloodiest Daesh-inspired (not Daesh-executed) case in the country was Safoora Chowrangi massacre that killed 40 people. There could have been more similar attacks if the security agencies were not so watchful. Moreover, a smaller number of sympathisers of ISIS are most likely existing amongst the Salafi clique across the country and the agencies have been vigilant of such clusters, madrassas and mosques. However, with Daesh losing ground and vital assets, such as refineries etcetera, the sympathy may transform to anger but not enough to cause mobilisation to save the ‘caliphate’.



Pakistan and Turkey have also been working closely to ward off movements of any terrorist groups. But Pakistan’s security forces are strained due to the prolonged operation and overstretched in terms of deployment. The responsibility must now be taken by the civilian intelligence agencies and local police stations, which shockingly remain politicised and under-equipped.

For Pakistan, there will never be a time to loosen the guard. Presence of various smaller regions without a state writ can harbour ISIS sympathisers to plan terrorist attacks. But, for now, we have to wait and witness the strategies ISIS adopts after the liberation of Raqqa and other key cities. The Muslim world, including Pakistan, may have to brace themselves for more bloodshed if Daesh transforms itself into a guerrilla outfit with significant financial resources, weaponry and men in its cadres.

Naveed Ahmad is a Pakistani investigative journalist and academic with extensive reporting experience in the Middle East and North Africa. He is based in Doha and Istanbul. He tweets @naveed360.