A new Middle East?

Donald Trump may have set out to change the face of the Middle East by launching a 'war of choice' or one forced on him by Israel; it seems he may just get his wish fulfilled. Over time, and not strictly in the manner of his preference by upstaging Iran and its leadership a la Venezuela, but through a set of likely consequences where the Middle East may be the architect of its own destiny. Though that is a tall order for a region of nations that are kingdoms first, and whose destiny lies in the hands of ruling families. The social contract between the ruler and the ruled ensures that the people will have security, stability and a decent life. Not a fulfilling life, but a decent life. The kingdoms assure this through oil money which keeps the subjects pacified, and by contracting out the administration and security at an attractive price. Except that with the first shot, the birds take to the air and safer shores, or where else do the contractors best need their services.

The war in Iran has been revelatory on many counts. The apparent bubble of a make-believe world cocooned within a sphere is hardly as invulnerable as it seems. The guns for hire that the region has depended on for security were as fickle as the wind, which began blowing elsewhere. The kingdoms were also structured for another kind of war. Jointly operated squadrons of fighters between locals and the contractors weren't of much help. Neither were the elaborate air defence systems idealised for assaulting waves of enemy aircraft – the enemy chose to fight a different war. Nor was there the need for the navies, which were more coastal than impactful on the blue seas. A lot will need to change, thus as a consequence of the ongoing war. And a lot may not.

The structures in these states are tuned for stability and continuity. The new generation of leaders in these countries is far more enterprising, worldly, and in step with the modern determinants. Their fathers, or the generation before, were mostly the ones to create and solidify the system of a nation, giving it the permanence that was inevitable for a primitive and tribal society. They were the ones who used oil money to build their nations. The new generation is the one knocking on the doors of newer horizons and diversifying economies around modern dictates. The Gulf is known today as the emerging hub of technology. Their foreign policy has broken away from the constraints of their religious roots and re-found its purpose to connect with technology hubs for investment, infrastructure and manpower. Silicon Valley in the USA, and India are its new friends.

These nations chose a different path away from war, hostility and confrontation. They may instead have encountered a different kind of confrontation between them in different parts of the world, seeking minerals and metals required to establish the modern AI and tech-driven industry. The conventional reasons for war, like oil and associated trade, were a settled matter. The war sprung a surprise on them. Their vision of stability and security, which they felt was guaranteed, was punctured by major powers warring for conventional interests of exclusivity and control over resources in the region. The Gulf nations may have wanted to keep war out, but the world at large was still being driven by a competitive run to arrogate natural resources into its respective control. The Gulf is a prime exporter of what keeps the world's economies churning, providing many of the essential ingredients that enable newer technologies to take shape. The disruption thus was not only global in nature; it hit hard closer to home when the settled turned unsettled, and the revenue plummeted. The closure of a critical waterway by Iran has meant the suspension of all supplies from these states, ceasing all exports which remain the principal source of funding structures, and seeking pathways to newer riches through niche economies. Would such assured and secured existence ever be disrupted at the hands of external powers? After all, Yemen has been a fire refusing to be doused.

The common refrain that if these nations had the world's most eminent power with its wherewithal in one's corner, especially with its deployed assets, security would be granted is far more circumspect now. Whether these nations will see war even if they refuse to seek it, turned out to be an existential fact. If so, how will it change the state's behaviour and conception of its needs, different from the old paradigm? These nations primarily remain welfare-oriented structures that seek uninterrupted revenue for their existence. Other than the respective organic sources, they have set themselves up as attractive destinations for the world's free capital. Built on a capital-intensive, finance-oriented, state-society structures – other than oil and with time, tech – the region will remain the envy of many. The bigger powers, the US and China primarily, will vie for influence and implicit control. If it be so, and it looks so, the Gulf nations will need foolproof, organic and undiluted systems of security to defend themselves from foreign predators.

Can these nations agree to combine forces under a unified command structure for collective security? Considering that each has its own national ideals and systems to pursue those, sometimes competitive, even if that is the only viable option, it is unlikely to be so. The geographical area is too large to manage deployments or control of these forces. The region is sensitive to keeping strict control of the armed forces. Separate geographical commands, therefore, are unlikely. As is one unified command whose placement will become a major dealbreaker. Individual force structures, as they exist today, remain the only possibility. Except that these need to be far more potent and responsive. Do these nations have the manpower required for such professional engagement in a committed career, rather than the off-ramp for other careers following short-term engagement, as is currently the case? Sadly, no.

It remains thus that the region will continue to be dependent for its security on external agents, with the exception of Saudi Arabia to an extent. The King or the Emir, thus, will continue to be the arbiter of the fate of the societies. His personal engagements will, in all probability, define the preferences where he may lay his trust. Defensive operations against aggressors, automated and integrated, will be the recourse. This is where most investment in defensive security will come. Republicanism is unlikely. Can the experience, though, usher in constitutional monarchies? The people find comfort in the existing arrangement, and are too small to be the critical mass for any monumental change. They would rather have peace, will shun war and conflict, and thus be their pacific selves. To attain such peace, these nations will aim to seek rapprochement and shun conflict. As will Iran, after it reviews its strategy employed during the war. Iran, too, has a lot to reconsider.