NSG must not override principles

The NSG has played an important role in regulating export of sensitive materials to enhance non-proliferation efforts

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a cartel of 48 countries, which was formed in 1975 in response to India’s May 1974 test of a nuclear weapon. The Indian nuclear test was a big blow to the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and highlighted the fact that technology provided for a peaceful purpose could be diverted to a weapons programme. Despite certain weaknesses, the NSG has played an important role in regulating and controlling the export of sensitive materials to enhance international non-proliferation efforts and has worked to set international standards to this effect. The NSG’s aim is to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field is not hindered.

Earlier this month, both India and Pakistan formally applied for NSG membership. According to the NSG’s procedure, the requests would be decided by consensus. Neither India nor Pakistan is party to the NPT. However, the US push and lobbying to induct India into the nuclear club is no secret despite the fact that the Group was set up as a result of that country’s flagrant violation of non-diversion commitment. Some argue that India’s entry would undermine the NSG’s credibility as an important non-proliferation regime. Despite this, the US is most vocal in promoting India’s case by making efforts to fast-track the decision-making process. The US motivation is embedded in its geopolitical interests in the Asia Pacific region wherein it has undertaken to build an array of partnerships and alliances with countries on China’s periphery – obviously a part of its ‘re-balancing’ to the Asia Pacific region, which is largely seen to counter balance China’s growing power and influence. India is considered a ‘linchpin’ in this US strategic re-orientation. On its part, India is also looking for a shortcut and a country-specific exemption whereas Pakistan prefers to uphold established international norms and supports a fair playing field for all non-NPT states. The US strategic and commercial interests in fostering a strong partnership with India are well understood but in so doing, the principles set forth by export control regimes must be upheld.

Though India has recently aligned its export control system and Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies list with the NSG guidelines, it has yet to achieve some of the important benchmarks agreed in the run-up to the Indo-US civil nuclear deal and the subsequent NSG waiver. India has continued its fissile material production; it remains in limbo on the question of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; and it is building a city in Karnataka, with extensive enrichment facilities, to produce thermonuclear weapons. There have been some well-documented serious lapses in the security of sensitive materials and installations in that country. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, a non-profit group in Washington, has ranked India 23rd in nuclear security practices among 25 countries that possess at least a bomb’s worth of fissile material. Washington either is not fully aware of what India has done to protect sensitive materials and facilities or it intentionally ignores this aspect because of its geopolitical interests in the region.

Another aspirant for the NSG membership is Pakistan, which may not be geopolitically as lucrative to the US as India is. Pakistan anticipates the political support of NSG participating governments on the basis of established international norms and much-avowed non-proliferation principles, as the regime readies itself to possible adjustment of non-NPT states such as India, Pakistan and Israel. In a letter addressed to the chairman NSG, Pakistan’s ambassador in Vienna has stated: “The decision to seek participation in the export control regime reflects Pakistan's strong support for international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Pakistan has the expertise, manpower, infrastructure, as well as the ability to supply NSG controlled items, goods and services for a full range of nuclear applications for peaceful uses.” Pakistan's export control regime on sensitive goods and technologies is backed by comprehensive legislation, and regulatory and enforcement mechanisms. The national export control lists are completely harmonised with the control lists of the NSG, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group. Policy guidelines on strategic export controls lay down strict conditions for transfer of sensitive goods and technologies and in certain cases are even more stringent than international export control regimes.

In order to adjust to today’s realities, the challenges of globalisation and diffusion of technology, incorporating new members in the NSG would be a positive move for global non-proliferation efforts. It would be equally important that the Group maintains its credibility as an important non-proliferation arrangement. All eyes are set on the forthcoming NSG Plenary, which would be held in Seoul soon and in all likelihood, the membership request of India and Pakistan would come up for consideration. The NSG participating governments have the obligation to ensure that geopolitical and commercial interests do not override the long held non-proliferation principles lest it becomes an illegitimate cartel and a tool in the hands of a few for advancing their geopolitical interests.

At a time when the NPT and other multilateral export control regimes are under severe test by state and non-state actors, creating a country-specific exception for NSG membership would adversely impact international non-proliferation efforts besides accentuating volatility in certain regions and fueling a dangerous arms race. To prevent the non-proliferation edifice from falling apart, the NSG participating governments must not override established international norms and should instead promote a criteria-based, non-discriminatory and non-selective approach towards civilian nuclear cooperation.

Published in The Express Tribune, June 6^th, 2016.

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