During 2008-2013, a weak democracy beset by civil-military schisms defined Pakistan’s governance. The military strongly resisted attempts by the civilian government to reform the country’s premier intelligence agency, the ISI. A campaign was orchestrated, which moulded public opinion against the Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB) bill in 2009. The KLB bill was projected as an assault on Pakistan’s ‘national interest’). An unprecedented reaction through an ISPR press release (bypassing the ministry of defence) was given to the civilian authorities when the military aired its reservations about the KLB bill. The latter marked a significant shift in Pakistan-US relations: for the first time, an attempt was made by the Obama Administration to engage with the civilian government. Earlier, US relations with Pakistan were mediated through military cooperation, which bred domestic perceptions that the US always backed military dictators in the country. The establishment identified the orchestrator of the KLB bill as Husain Haqqani, our then ambassador in Washington.
General Kayani’s second term marked a period when relations soured with the US. The Raymond Davis case in 2011 brought into perspective the troubling fault lines in Pak-US ties. There was a propaganda campaign against the civilian PPP government for allegedly helping the US by giving many of its spies visas. Yet, as we found out later, Davis was given safe passage to leave the country by invoking the Qisas and Diyat laws. The popular belief was that this was done through intervention of the establishment. Perhaps, the worst moment in Pak-US relations was the OBL raid of May 2011, which led to much public criticism and even the military’s most ardent supporters were angry over the ‘negligence’ shown by the armed forces.
The infamous Memogate case was another needless intervention that created more fissures in the civil-military relationship. An unsigned memo addressed to US authorities asking their help in the event of a coup, was the subject of public outcry. The ISI chief reportedly visited Middle Eastern governments, checking potential reactions to a coup in Pakistan. Civilians were seen as ‘traitors’ seeking outside help against ‘national institutions’. All of this happened under the stewardship of General Kayani.
The ineptitude of Pakistan’s civilians cannot be overlooked either. They were divided and often seemed clueless, especially in terms of giving a direction for the security policy. The end result was that Ambassador Haqqani was sacrificed by the civilian government to pacify the establishment.
It was expected that after Musharraf, the army would rethink some of its worn-out security paradigms, chiefly, the containment of India at all costs in Afghanistan, the related preference for the good Afghan Taliban and ambiguity in Pak-US relations. Nothing changed. Take the case of drones: the lack of a clear policy has resulted in major public confusion. The state owns and disowns them according to the targets and convenience. This may be a tactical response to manage relationships with a powerful ‘ally’, but it has now divided society and obfuscated discourse on extremism. Most Pakistanis now cite extremism as a ‘reaction’ to drone strikes, which is a fallacious argument. The first suicide bombing took place in 1995, well before the US war on terror. However, these facts have been buried under the imperatives of using anti-Americanism as a bargaining tool.
Serious questions were also raised about the manner in which the army tackled the Baloch insurgency. Dozens of missing persons still haunt our polity and court petitions, thus far, remain ineffective. The question of ‘foreign’ intervention and support to Baloch separatists is far from settled. A political question needs to have a wider policy response than just brute force.
On the issue of extremism, General Kayani made several encouraging statements but he could not follow through on the changes that were required. In part, the civilians failed to lead. But the security framework vis-a-vis Afghanistan and India needs to change. For instance, in a speech in August 2012 General Kayani said: “ ... the war against [extremism] is our own war and a just war too. Any misgivings in this regard can divide us internally, leading to a civil war situation ... ”. Such top-level policy statements remain to be translated into operational strategies. To give credit to General Kayani, he did support the civilian government’s initiative on visa liberalisation and trade with India. Contrary to all speculations, the army did not block or sabotage the relations, except perhaps, that it still wants a carefully calibrated, slower approach to normalisation. Sadly, since January 2013, the clashes along the Line of Control have denuded the modest gains made earlier.
General Kayani could have done much more, especially during his second tenure but then, narrow institutional interests and short term-ism drive policy in Pakistan. The complicated relationship of the state with the multiple brands of non-state actors will have to be recalibrated for our long-term security. There is acknowledgement that the ‘strategic depth’ doctrine and reliance on proxies have landed us in a royal mess. Our assets have turned into nightmares and for this to change, the army will have to make a fresh start. Let’s hope the civilians will not abandon their role for political expediency. Nawaz Sharif will have to avoid past mistakes, needless power contests to guide the military and assume the responsibility to reset our direction.
Published in The Express Tribune, November 30th, 2013.
Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.
COMMENTS (15)
Comments are moderated and generally will be posted if they are on-topic and not abusive.
For more information, please see our Comments FAQ
Question is not when the first suicide attack took place. Question is that do drones create more terrorists then they kill?
The only thing which goes to General Kayani's credit is that he resisted all temptations to take over while the PPP government provided a number of opportunities. Even for this he deserves only a partial credit because the mishandling of Judiciary, public sentiment and economy by Musharraf during his last 3 years did not leave Kayani an "environment" for any misadventure. In Pakistan's peculiar situation, both the authority and responsibility for external defence and internal security has mostly rested with the Military. After the the installation of the present government however, it has to share the responsibility with the civilian government. During the PPP's 5 year, the political leadership was unable to provide any internal security policy. Therefore, the Army under the command of General Kayani dealt with the internal security, in Balochistan and against Taliban. The Army did a good job in Swat, South Waziristan and some other areas but the civilian authorities could not sustain the gains. If the Army decided not to pursue Taliban in North Waziristan, the decision was its own. The civilian government could not dictate any such decision. The Army's failure to clean North Waziristan provided sanctuaries to TTP. It also provided the Americans a pretext to launch drone attacks on the terrorist sanctuaries inside Pakistan, which further fuelled terrorism. The present upsurge of terrorism is a direct result of this failure. Just telling the nation by General Kayani that "the war against [extremism] is our own war and a just war too. Any misgivings in this regard can divide us internally, leading to a civil war situation." is correct but not good enough. The Military has to help the civilian government in both formulation and implementation of correct policies to root out terrorism and militancy from every inch of the country.
@History Maniac: seriously what are you drinking? who said pak society is divided? almost all of them oppose this war except of course the dollar minting mafia of few pol parties and media... it is an American war and it will be an american war no matter how much media propaganda is done...
Army Generals taking charge and retiring is a routine job in any country. Why only in Pakistan the whole country start analyse every actions of Generals ? Mostly what I have read in these columns portray Gen.Kayani in good light just because he did not repeat the coup history of his predecessors , whereas they criticize his in inaction in containing terrorism in the country?
Get a better picture taken Mr. Rumi.
Very good article...... why without any comments ? ...... FYI General has retired now :)
"Change has to be measured for sustainability before it is judged for acceptability. I would rather change things by 10 percent, if they are sustainable and acceptable, rather than change things by 80 percent, where they will not be sustainable, nor acceptable."- Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kayani.
Pakistanis are never satisfied. He did a lot to put Pakistan and Pakistan army on the right path. We are embroiled in a war and change takes time. It doesnt happen in 90 days contrary to what Imran Khan might have you believe.
I know analysing Kayani's tenure is a hot topic right now, but Ejaz Haider has already done a good job and wrapped up this topic quiet neatly and informatively. Can we move on now please?
The conspiracy theory-based narrative advanced by Imran Khan & other Right wingers that has divided Pakistani society over issue of extremism & terrorism, goes over my head. The premise of this fallaciou narrative is that US does not desire peace in Pakistan. Will these stalwart answer: can America afford nuclear-armed State of Pakistan go in the hands of fanatic terrorists? Unfortunately Gen Kiyani could not translate into action his words "War on terror is our war..." as rightly pointed out by learned writer. The same was the case with Drones during his leadership of Pakistan Army. Drones which kill the killers of our innocent civilians & security personnel were unnecessarily made controversial by Army leadership during Gen Kiyani's tenure. The "theory" that America is Pakistan's enemy No.1 also gained much currency by words & acts of Army leadership during Gen Kiyani's stewardship. All these gave currency to flawed narrative, which has divided our society with reference to our war on terror.
What about Salala Incident? That was part of his tenure too .....
And Salala, Raza Rumi? Won't mention that, will you?
The basic summary for 'Practical Purposes'- a waste of 6 years. The biggest barometer-in our fight with Extremists throughout Pakistan,we have been on the defensive/backfoot,what to speak of other disasters while facing other powers that be.