Front line ‘ally’: Befriended at barrel’s end

Musharraf tells of the "blatant ultimatum" to stand with America in War on Terror and allowing US use of two bases.

KARACHI:

It was a pleasant 28 degrees Celsius, with scattered clouds, when the general inspected the newly renovated, pristinely polished marbled gardens at Jinnah’s mausoleum in Karachi.

He was “happy to be in the city [he] loved,” on an otherwise uneventful September morning, not aware that on the other side of the globe, “yet another event involving aircrafts” was about to alter the course of his life, and the course of Pakistan.

“Little did I know that we were about to be thrust into the front line of yet another war, a war against shadows,” recalls the then-president of Pakistan General (retd) Pervez Musharraf.

Initial reaction: the F word

Musharraf was “horrified and shocked” when the reality of what had happened, hit him. Images of smoke from burning aircraft fuel and the dust and debris from two of the tallest buildings in the world made him instinctively utter “the four-lettered word of condemnation.”

The initial thoughts were ominous. In a great blow to its ego, the world’s most powerful country had been attacked on its own soil, with its own aircraft. America was sure to react violently, like a wounded bear.

“If the perpetrator turned out to be al Qaeda,” Musharraf thought, “that wounded bear would come charging straight towards us.”

First stop: the Governor House in Karachi, where the foreign office advised him to give a statement.

He scribbled one quickly and announced on national television that Pakistan “condemned this vile act, [was] against all forms of terrorism and stood with America at this appalling time.”

The threatening call

The notorious phone call came in next morning when Musharraf was chairing a meeting at the Governor House.

The military secretary informed the general that the US secretary of state Colin Powell was on the phone.

“I said I would call back later but he insisted that I come out of meeting and take the call,” says Musharraf.

It was in this call that Powell uttered the infamous “you are either with us or against us” remark.

“I took this as a blatant ultimatum … [but] we did not negotiate anything,” he says.

Musharraf was also threatened that “if Pakistan was against the US, then it should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.”

Analysing the cards

“I made a dispassionate analysis of our options, weighing the pros and cons,” says Musharraf.

The only viable option the US had to attack Afghanistan was through Pakistan. “If we did not agree, India was ever ready to afford all-out support,” he says, adding that a “US-India collusion would obviously have to trample Pakistan to reach Afghanistan. Our airspace and land would have been violated.”

The economic dimension of confronting the United States also needed serious analysis. Pakistan’s major export and investments are to and from the United States and the European Union. Any sanctions on these would have crippled our industry and choked the economy.

China also has serious apprehensions about al Qaeda and the Taliban along with other Muslim countries, including Turkey and Iran. The UAE and Saudi Arabia – the only two countries other than Pakistan that had recognised the Taliban regime – had become so disenchanted with the Taliban that they had closed their missions in Kabul.

List of demands

On September 13, 2001, the US ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain brought to Musharraf a set of seven demands, primarily calling for cessation of all ties with and support for the Taliban regime, and providing unconditional support to US including “blanket overflight and landing rights” and “territorial access to … naval ports, air bases and strategic locations on borders.”

“Some of these demands, such as ‘curb all domestic expressions of support [for terrorism] against the US, its friends and its allies,’ were ludicrous,” says Musharraf.

Asking Pakistan to break off diplomatic relations with Afghanistan was also not realistic, because the US would have eventually needed Pakistan to have access to Afghanistan, at least until the Taliban fell.

As for unrestricted territorial access to US, Musharraf “offered only a narrow flight corridor that was far from any sensitive areas.”

“We allowed the US only two bases – Shamsi in Balochistan and Jacobabad in Sindh – only for logistics and aircraft recovery. No attack could be launched from there,” he says, insisting that Pakistan gave “no blanket permission for anything.”

The demands were taken to the Cabinet and then between September 18 and October 3, Musharraf met with academics, editors, columnists, intellectuals, tribal chiefs, students, and leaders of labor unions to develop a consensus. The decision was also discussed with a Chinese delegation on October 18, he says, adding that he also visited garrison towns and talked to soldiers.

“I am happy that the US government accepted our counterproposal without any fuss,” he says.

In Pakistan’s interest

Retrospectively, Musharraf is unrepentant and feels the decision to ally with the US was “correct” and taken “in the larger interest of Pakistan.”

“The US was not the only casualty of 9/11. The attacks hit Pakistan differently, but with equally savage force … we feel the ramifications to this day,” he says.

“No other country has faced as many threats on as many fronts … [yet] we stood with the US, and we stand with the entire world, in opposing terrorism.”

Published in The Express Tribune, September 11^th,  2011.