Chinese for mangoes

If we are moving from US to Chinese patronage, it's important for Islamabad to know its patron, negotiate interests

The other day I met a friend, who lived in Islamabad many years ago and was eager to know if the city had changed. Recounting the new features, which included more traffic, high-rise buildings and chaos, I remember telling him about one of the new features of the city — a noticeable presence of Chinese nationals. There seem to be more Chinese nationals in the city than mango trees. And you can’t eat and throw them away as they are here to stay as long as no one else claims to fill the gap left open due to the growing irrelevance of the US as a patron in Pakistan’s geo politics.

The Foreign Office spokesperson was spot on when she said that the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India would not have an impact on Pakistan-China relations. Surely, what was not in the brief was the fact that Beijing needn’t worry about losing Pakistan. It understands that Pakistan is not going anywhere, and that whether there is a civil or military leadership in the country, Islamabad has little option but to turn to China. It, in fact, doesn’t even bother about creating employment in Pakistan as Islamabad dare not pressure China about doing so. Beijing probably understands Pakistan’s habit of dealing with the world through the prism of a patronage framework — you will either live as someone’s patron or vice versa.

The Chinese indeed have a free run of the country, which is more than what a Western patron could ever manage. Travel from Khyber to Karachi to find Chinese nationals in most parts of Pakistan now. In most instances, these people do not even bother to follow local norms or traditions as is expected from other foreigners. They seem far more confident of being beneficiaries of excellent state-to-state relations. We rarely get to hear about the negative impact of the free trade agreement with China or how it can be less than generous when negotiating deals, as is naturally expected from the relationship.



It is not very different in other parts of South Asia, such as Sri Lanka, where the situation is similar. The Chinese model for countries like Pakistan and Sri Lanka is to exploit their need for investment in infrastructure development. There are huge projects conceived, such as the new seaport near Colombo, as well as power plants and roads that make the country appear modern, but at an extremely high cost. Neither Pakistan nor Sri Lanka gets grants. The work might be done against soft loans, but then loans are liabilities, which have to be paid back by the government. For instance, the new Colombo port/harbour reportedly makes little money. While the Chinese government is currently sustaining the project, which it bankrolls, ultimately the money will have to be paid back by the Sri Lankan people.

The Chinese model of investment requires building on the needs of a country at two levels. First, they understand that the larger south and Southeast Asia requires an alternative patron, who is willing to throw the money required both, by the greedy leadership and the people at large. The US may still have a presence in the region, but Washington may not be willing to invest resources in developing these states or bankrolling war or peace directly. China, on the other hand, has more resources to play with. So, be it the military junta and the monks in Myanmar, the family-led oligarchy in Sri Lanka or the civil-military conglomerate in Pakistan, there is money to be made through fulfilling needs of people and their leadership in need. Beijing has the kind of capital it can invest in such places, perhaps not like America, but more cautiously, and at places where it is guaranteed higher returns.

The Chinese model of developing its clientele in the region is different also in that it initially gives a greater sense of independence and a fair amount of confidence to the client. Ask around people in several states of South Asia and they will sing praises about how Beijing does not interfere with foreign policy. At least, its method is not direct and brash. It does not necessarily tell you who to talk to and what to do. However, this tactic totally diverts attention from the fact that the world is not dealing with a communist or even an ex-communist state, but a new neo-liberal design in which dividends are piled up in favour of the investor rather than the recipient. Moreover, this is a relationship based on a collusion of interests between the ruling elite of the recipient state and the government in China. Sure, Xi Jinping did not visit Pakistan during the crisis, but not because he intended to abandon the old regional ally. He was possibly deterred by the idea of not dealing with a government that did not seem to be in total control. Beijing understands that irrespective of the regime type in Islamabad, the next decade or more of Pakistan’s future belongs to China.

The issue here is less about Beijing’s geo political supremacy in the region and more about the inefficiency of these resource-deficient South Asian states and their inability to defend their rights. Even if we are moving from American to Chinese patronage, it is important for Islamabad to know its patron and negotiate its interests. Right now, we have little people-to-people dialogue. We probably have more knowledge of the Americans and Europeans (even though superficial) than of the Chinese. Furthermore, too focused on finding someone who might invest in infrastructure development in the country, we lack the capacity to negotiate terms of business beneficial to both. But to change the rules of the game, it is vital for us to discard the traditional myths — the China-Pakistan friendship has to be defined in more practical terms rather than through the lens of the superficial mythology of this being deeper than the Arabian Sea and higher than the Himalayas. It is a linkage in which both can benefit. If we can’t work this out, we may be heading towards building a relationship that will eventually taste very sour.

Published in The Express Tribune, October 9^th, 2014.

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