Why the Taliban need to be involved in Afghan peace talks

In December 2009, in a speech televised live across America, US President Barack Obama set July 2011 as the deadline to begin withdrawing US military from Afghanistan. A decision was also taken to send 30,000 additional troops to accelerate the process of handing over responsibility to Afghan forces. The White House hoped these developments would spur the government of Hamid Karzai into action.

Back in 2001, the US did not seek a UN mandate to conduct an operation across Afghanistan. The Nato-led security mission (Isaf) — initially tasked with securing Kabul and surrounding areas to allow for the establishment of the Afghan Transitional Administration — hardly captured any well-known al Qaeda operator, while Pakistani security forces apprehended more than 150 members in 2001.

The Isaf, apparently, did not take the Taliban as a serious threat and did not approach lower-tier members to reintegrate them into society. By 2003, the Taliban regrouped, joined hand with Gulbadin Hikmatyar, al Qaeda and Pakistani banned jihadi outfits, and initiated an insurgency in Afghanistan. It was then, in October 2003, that the UN authorised the expansion of the Isaf mission throughout Afghanistan. By 2006, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) were formed to improve security and facilitate reconstruction outside Kabul. By mid-October, the PRTs were deployed in all provinces but by then, the Taliban had gained a pervasive influence across the country, operating a parallel political administration in some districts of Kunar, Kandahar, Laghman, Badghis, Paktiya, Paktika and Khost.

A three-day loya jirga, held in June, represented the first major public debate, on how to end the war. The main proposals discussed involved reintegration of the Taliban into society, the formation of a peace council as a negotiating body, removing the Taliban leadership from the UN blacklist, offer of asylum to Taliban leaders and release of insurgents held without trial. The Taliban rejected the jirga on the plea that foreign forces must leave before any talks can begin. The US administration and army commanders have recently admitted that they are in communication with the Taliban but formal talks have not yet been initiated. The goals set in the peace jirga are not likely to be achieved by July 2011.

The withdrawal deadline is likely to be discussed in the US military’s formal review of progress in December 2010.The ground situation dictates that the schedule be revised. However, in case the US administration sticks to its schedule, Afghanistan may once again plunge into  civil war as the Taliban try to expand their rule as they did in the nineties. However, the Taliban must be aware that, back then, they were dealing with warlords, while now they have to fight a well-equipped army. The Taliban should also realise that after 31 years of continuous war, nearly every Afghan is in favour of peace.

The best option for them is to sit on the negotiation table and get a definite date of withdrawal of foreign forces. They can negotiate the amendments in the constitution, the composition of an interim setup, the implementation of peace jirga proposals and modalities for holding of elections. Any other strategy would lead to more bloodshed. On the other hand, America should not abandon the Afghans this time. Their forces may withdraw at the appropriate time, but they have to evolve ways and means to ensure that the country does not plunge into yet another civil war.

Published in The Express Tribune, October 19^th, 2010.