Lessons from the 1999 coup

On this day, some 14 years ago, the country endured another military coup d’etat. How close we came to a full-blown civil war that day, is no longer a secret. The then director general military operations (DGMO) and the man tasked with coordinating the overthrow of the Sharif government, Lt General (retd) Shahid Aziz, has documented some of the major developments that led up to the takeover in his Urdu memoir ‘Yeh Khamoshi kahan tak’. And some of the details are not pretty. For instance, if forces from Peshawar, Quetta or Kharian would have reached Rawalpindi or Islamabad, the results could have been catastrophic. When an army chief leaves the country, he usually entrusts the senior most corps commander with the charge of managing the daily affairs of the army. But General Musharraf did not do so, while leaving for Sri Lanka, just to avoid the failure of his plan. And yes, there was a plan. General Aziz’s book makes no bones about his participation in several plenary meetings before the coup. The well-written book has many juicy details. It is a pity that, in a pang of guilt, the author lost his sense of proportion and fused the narrative with jihadi rhetoric and in trying to disown the war on terror, sided with the non-state actors slaying his own peers in the army. Since I had just been initiated into the world of journalism in those days, I vividly recall some arguments that were common among the proponents of a coup. The first was of the institutional integrity of the army. It was argued that after removing one army chief, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s desire to see the army fall in line would lead to another sacking, seriously jeopardising the institution’s integrity and compromising the discipline and merit system within its ranks. While the coup definitely removed Mr Sharif from power, General Musharraf did just that to the army by overstaying his welcome and term in office and promoting his confidantes to senior posts.

The second concern, quite common among the liberal circles, and also one of the reasons civil society initially supported the coup, was the Shariah Bill. This bill would have given the prime minister considerable say over religious matters, making him, virtually, a caliph or a monarch. While religious rhetoric is often employed politically, to exploit the sentiments of the right-wing votebank, in truth this was viewed as a thinly veiled bid to acquire absolute power by the ruler. If a coup was to ensure that no one should have that kind of absolute power, then it clearly failed because the country was ruled for seven years through autarchy, with the autocrat enjoying the power to single-handedly amend the Constitution for three years.

The third was the fear of policy reversal on Afghanistan that was quite prevalent within the army ranks at that time. It was believed that to bolster his post-Kargil dwindling authority, Mr Sharif may give in to US pressure and disown the Taliban. That indeed happened but in General Musharraf’s time, not during the overthrown premier’s. In fact, we had to first endure a global terrorist catastrophe that brought war to our own soil. Again, the argument, quite popular in Western circles, that in Musharraf’s absence, Pakistan would not have cooperated in the war on terror, is bunk. A democratic government would have also ensured political ownership of the war.

Finally, there were concerns about a financial collapse under Mr Sharif. After 9/11, there was significant financial boom under Musharraf as dollars flowed in. But, like any other dictator, this boom proved to be just a bubble that ruptured during his own term in office.

There are a few critical lessons for us all. Coups, palace intrigues or other shortcuts solve nothing. In promising temporary relief, they end up complicating the situation further and waylay the prospects of a normal evolution of the system. For the democrats, too, there is a lesson here. Democracy thrives on moral authority and trust, which is undercut by speculations and paranoia engendered by lack of transparency. The rulers, hence, should make a principle of ensuring open and inclusive governance and avoid secrecy.

Published in The Express Tribune, October 12^th, 2013.

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