Afghanistan - analysis and antidote

There is a sense in the analytical community of Rawalpindi/Islamabad and to some extent in the diplomatic corps that: a) Afghanistan does not figure in the US regional priority and preferences due to its leadership's recalcitrance on issues well known (inclusivity, residual terrorism and women rights) and because of the embarrassment of American withdrawal under IEA protection in 2021; b) the remaining US regional interest is limited to contain China and ensure terror-free Afghanistan; and c) the European emphasis to engage with the Taliban-led IEA emanates from the desire to obviate likely ramifications of drugs originating from Afghan soil, the likely regrouping of anti-West terror groups there, and to proactively deal with drugs, poverty and misgovernance problems in Afghanistan from becoming immigrant problem for Europe. America seems to have outsourced Afghan policy to its European partners to focus on more pressing global crises, like the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, a rising China and Sino-Russian collusion.

Regionally, the countries bordering Afghanistan and affected by its instability agree to make recognition of IEA's interim regime conditional to security situation, Pakistan's nuanced approach, women rights and signaling from the West Plus. In case of Pakistan, although the 'constants' of Pak-Afghan bilateralism are all positive like common history, geography, religion, culture and other socio-psychological underpinnings, etc, the 'variables' like TTP, status of Durand Line as international border (IB), fence along the IB, Afghan Refugees (AR), etc are all, sadly, negative.

'Some' stakeholders in Pakistan feel that Islamabad's choices vis-à-vis Afghanistan are narrowing, hence they feel compelled to resort to knee-jerk reactions like border closures as 'actionable options'. The need of the hour for Afghanologists is to provide out of box options to decision-makers, alternative to 'border closures' as the only recourse, always and every time. The rationale follows.

First, conceptually (without regurgitating the abc of this bilateralism), Pak-Afghan relations are based upon on the troika of geopolitical situation, people to people contacts and trade and commerce, singularly and in unison. A) The geopolitics of security, terrorism and big-power interests and focus, and their competing rivalry have traditionally dominated this bilateralism and will continue to do so. Any expectation otherwise is emotive, wishful thinking and not knowing the real politics. B) People-to-people contacts will continue to dominate this relationship despite anybody's likes or dislikes. Two provinces in Pakistan, KP and Balochistan, are co-joined with Nangarhar, Kunar, Paktia and Paktika provinces on the Afghan side, and there is perceptible social, economic, cultural and religious integration between populations on either side. Refugees most of whom only know Pakistan as their home, having never visited Afghanistan, and with economic, social and psychological stakes in Pakistan, strongly reinforce this relationship. This is historic, irreversible, irreplaceable and will continue as long Afghans (AR and other Afghan citizenry) depend on Pakistani hospitals, educational institutions and grocery stores. Pashtun ethnicity and to some extent Baloch nationalism fortify these linkages. Afghan flags fluttering in the recent PTM Jirga in Khyber District should be no surprise, given Afghan support to PTM's ethno-nationalist agenda, and Kabul's traditional claims on the erstwhile British territory, now constituting Pakistan. C) Trade and commerce, whether under the ATTA (Afghan Transit Trade Agreement), 'facilitated' under US interlocution in 2018; or through other bilateral trade; and even smuggling forms the lifeline of border communities and businesses on either side. Afghan demand is generated by traders of Karachi. These linkages are deep-rooted, complex, extremely hard to alter or completely sever, and are the defining parameters of present and future policy and relations between the two countries and peoples. This sensitivity warrants 'gradualism' and wise handling to enforce even legal framework, especially by Islamabad. Shutting any of the identified modes of trade imperils bilateral ties.

Second. Without getting into the oft-repeated arguments and discussion points, the obtaining situation creates certain imperatives. These are: i) non-practicality of the border control, as IB cannot be completely sealed and regulated like between other modern states and will continue to be porous despite the fence. Corruption, particularly on Pakistani side, will keep hemorrhaging the state finances, and any effort to curb illegal trade will not succeed in the short to mid-term; ii) Afghan refugees are here to stay, needing Islamabad to offer a clear path to Pakistani or dual citizenship, besides permanent residence through investment; iii) TTP will keep rocking the boat of bilateralism given its ingress into the Afghan political landscape due to its wartime affinity with IEA rank and file, and its overt Islamist credentials; and iv) situational understanding especially socio-anthropological knowledge, and coordination in dealing with Afghans would remain wanting in Pakistan's security, political, intelligence and governance circles.

Third. In the light of certain 'recently' brought-out factors, the thorny 'variable' of TTP continues to get indirect financing Indian finances and RAW's operational support. Any analysis of TTP's targeting strategy would substantiate presence of a geostrategic mastermind.

Fourth. IEA predicament would remain to be defined by the difference of outlook between the puritanical ideologues of Qandahar in the south, and the more pragmatic and militarily savvy Haqqanis of Khowst in the north. There are already reports circling about Siraj Haqqani and Moulvi Yaqub trying to moderate and modernise the Afghan state and society, outside the Qandahari influence through building alliances within Afghanistan and reaching out to international players. It is in this context that continued hosting of TTP by Haqqanis as a 'force-in-being' should be seen. TTP might 'slowly' turn into Haqqani militia. This also is a turning point to direct diplomacy towards Khowst. Continued infiltration in TTP factions would also be beneficial. Khalifa Siraj may equally see a benefit to rein in and control at least the more hawkish groups of his TTP guests from spoiling his charm offensive. His bonhomie with Aabpara and interlocution for peace in 2022 are well known.

The rider clause is that 'border closure' are inimical to people to people relations, cause losses to trader community on either side, fan 'further' anti-Pakistan feelings and TTP propaganda, hamper regional connectivity and Islamabad's image, and are not a positive 'leverage' per se.

In dealing with contemporary Afghanistan, patience, persistence and policy perseverance are, and should be, the policy standpoints, rather than conflict, confusion and lack of cooperation. Complex problems have no quick fixes other than time.

It is walking in the sand…you cannot run!