The writer is a defence analyst who retired as an air vice-marshal in the Pakistan Air Force
It turned out to be reasonable effort, in the end. The Commission chosen to investigate Pakistan’s May 2, 2011 humiliation, when Osama bin Laden (OBL) was taken out by the US Navy Seals in a daring raid in the hilly city of Abbottabad, began as a motley group of non-associated professionals assigned to investigate failures, which encompassed, policy, strategy and operational and tactical inadequacies in both conception and response.
They first had to learn what was to be investigated since the entire Neptune Spear raid was built around detailed tactical planning, deep operational comprehension of the time and space dimensions for the operation, and placed at risk serious strategic issues. Intelligence, of all hues, was the elephant in the room and typically, in the tradition of the ‘blind men’, members of the Commission either chose to miss the critical defining parameters that may have carried the blame to someone’s door step, or simply saw it the way any blind man would.
There were three specific failures that needed to be explored by the Commission:
Policy — was the US a friend or a foe; if a friend, why did it choose to take OBL out in a secret raid; how was the raid to be seen in the context of the $7.5 billion aid that Pakistan continued to avail before and after the raid — if indeed the raid was a stealthy attack against Pakistan’s sovereignty, why were we still continuing a relationship and accepting monetary assistance; why was there a widespread anti-American sentiment among the people at large, while the state and its government were variously included as Major Non-Nato Allies and a frontline state in the war against terror; why was there confusion in the minds of the people that Pakistan was fighting America’s war.
Intelligence — how was Osama not detected; how wasn’t he kept track of as he moved from one place to another, hiring houses, getting treated, producing children and surely eating and living, including paying bills, frequent visits by the census guys and the local patwari and the thanedar, perhaps paying some sort of a municipal tax too. Clearly, of the two survival strategies, he chose the one that placed him right before the eyes of all with a greater assurance that that was the last place someone will look as long as he kept his wits about and melded with his surroundings; the other, of course, is to choose a place most difficult to access and breach, simply because everyone would suspect him to be exactly in such a locale. Would he need to be lucky? A lot; in either case.
Military — this was, perhaps, the most technically complex and also the simplest aspect to discern as a failure. First, the easy part: when a superpower chooses to violate a territory in completion of its mission, it will normally do so without a hint of an opposition from a smaller country. If both also happen to be partners in a venture — read war on terror — there is a case for plausible inaction. Despite the infamy of having been ‘violated’, the going joke was what if the American forces had indeed been detected entering the Pakistani territory? Answer: it would have entailed an even bigger dilemma, of both decision-making, and the consequences.
The more complicated part of the inadequate air defence response: with a friendly air force controlling the skies of the western neighbour, the air defence deployment and response was as for peacetime. Perhaps, the best way to understand this paradox of sovereignty and lack of preparedness to defend the western borders is to compare with the need for a car in an emergency. It would be paranoia to keep the car started up at night even as you sleep just because of an apprehension that a need may arise. It would be foolish to do so when you do not foresee the need at all. In case of a threat, the defences are fully deployed and perpetually activated with short-fuse response to initiate action. The air force’s reaction could and should have been quicker, far quicker, except that the decision-making hibernated between the realities of a simple response action, with very complex consequences.
If the report seems short of landing direct blame, other than identifying systemic organisational failures, it directly relates to the absence of such a term of reference, which will invariably ask for “apportioning blame, if any”. But even more importantly, there wasn’t the ‘smoking gun’ that got found. Yes, Osama was the smoking gun, as indeed was the US raid to kill him. But who really was holding the smoking gun when both Osama and the raid happened, has remained a mystery. For Osama, the entire intelligence structure is held responsible, even if chiefly the ISI, and the inability to react appropriately to the raid is a systemic collapse which failed to determine if the US indeed was a friend or a foe. The then DG ISI accepted the blame and offered to resign but was reprieved. Heads should have rolled even if it were as a consequence of internal departmental processes. If indeed this was done, it never was publicly shared.
To the corrective measures then. The recommended restructuring of the security apparatus in the policy domain is well suggested; except that thereon the space has been rather profusely devoted to some ramblings on individually preferred notions of nation building. It is best to be direct in the mode of recommending remedial steps and leave transformational notions to public forums where those must first be debated.
Are we better placed now to handle emergent situations loaded with significant consequences? Perhaps not, and that makes the future dicier than what it was on May 2. Think Ayman alZawahiri. There simply will be no place to hide.
As this aircraft carrier of a state slowly wheels around, there are likely to be a few more hiccups. But it must all begin with the government first taking ownership of the Report.
Published in The Express Tribune, July 13th, 2013.
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COMMENTS (31)
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Most worrying issue in all this analysis by our media and probably the entire nation is that "We have reconciled that safety of the country in and out is the responsibilty of ISI and Army only". Police is just meant to lookafter the VVIPs and Parlimanterians who are playing PING PONG with them. We hardly see a police officer at one station for more than 3 months. Who is responsible for all this under these circumstances....... May Allah Guide us
If government owned this report what will happened? I think we have lost proper thinking way. We need to recover it 1st.
@KBK: Pray tell who is this AVM sahib? . AVM stands for Air Vice Marshal which is what the author was before he retired.
@Polpot: Hahaha! Good one Polpot sahab (or Polpot sahiba) as the case may be!
"if indeed the raid was a stealthy attack against Pakistan’s sovereignty, why were we still continuing a relationship and accepting monetary assistance;" ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Yes the raid was a stealth attack against Pakistan’s sovereignty, Why were we still accepting monetary assistance; cause we believe thats our birthright.
Post 2nd May Pakistani Army has sought that Indian Army would provide 24 Hour notice of any planned invasion ( So that the Top Brass can recover from their Hangover) and any such invasion must happen within civilized hours of daylight. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Any violation would result in India being dragged to the UN.
US taxpayers and government also reviewed the May 2 OBL operation from their point of view too and has asked the same question is Pakistan friend or foe? The answer was more obvious when Pakistan allowed China to examine the piece of Helicopter.
What surprised most ordinary global citizen was the reaction of Pakistan. People expected a thank you or claim of joint operation and sigh of relief not the issue of sovereignty of Pakistan. Analogy: If US and Pakistan were two friends in jungle on a mission to kill a man eater beast. It is not important who shot that beast as long as that beast was killed. The same sovereignty issue keeps coming up in drone attack. Global citizen expect Pakistan to own such drone attack as a joint operation in fight against terror.
The other issue is failure of detect US Seal team: If one is relying on US equipment than expect a built in system to neutralize the use of the very same equipment against US. Also stealth helicopter with heat and noise cancellation system was a new technology.
Isn't this the same guy who said TTP was being backed by RAW like an year or so ago on these very pages?
@A Citizen: Add few more too if he was OBL than why his body was disposed off so secretly? Was OBL responsible for 9/11? Was OBL a CIA asset? Why all the blame is directed towards Pak Mil when it was collected responsibility of all to detect him? Who issued Visas to those CIA agents who were using Shakil Afridi ?
@Strategic Asset Since when an ordinary citizen of a neighboring country is taking such keen interest in our internal issues, please mind your own business.
In spite spending so many years in Uniform the ex AVM has put questions, the answers to which even an ordinary citizen knows. US has never been friend or foe to Pakistan. Both work together with in tight compartments of strategic interests. US did not trust Pakistan because of its experience of complicit so went alone. At high level Pakistan intelligence was compromised thus facilitating US successful action. US military in any case is superior to Pakistan military in all aspects. In the wake of jamming how air defence can work. With the experience and stature of AVM some thing new was expected which he failed to deliver.
The commission needs to provide answers these questions
Who issued Visa to OBL? How can OBL remain undetected in Pakistan for nine (9) years? How can OBL live next door to the Kakul Academy and our agencies did not know? Why didn't a fort-type building raised any alarms in the neighborhood of the Kakul Academy? How many low ranking civilian/military officers knew about OBL? How many high ranking civilian/military officers knew about OBL? How many new "OBLs" are being patronized by different sections of our establishment?The commission has failed miserably to provide answering any of these questions
The most important things that we need to learn have been apparent to any thinking person long before this report got leaked; in fact as early as 1947. We are a nation that refuses to learn from our failures, mainly because we have just too much Ghairat to accept failure to be wiser. This report glaringly makes that clear.
We have Generals who become more and more dangerous with seniority. Our soldiers are the best in the world, but become a rather blunt weapon when wielded by inept Generals. That is why we have never won a war even though we started all. A good general makes sure the assessment of enemy strength and possible reaction are the bedrock of his planning. Our Generals are always surprised by what happens to them once the hostilities commence.
Did anyone in the Army, the self-appointed custodians of our defense and foreign policies, even think of the possibility of something like the Abbottabad raid actually happening? (I refuse to buy the theory that OBL was hiding) Did anyone assess the possible reaction of Raja Hari Singh before we entered Kashmir in 1947? Did anyone know how India might react when we tried to capture J&K in 1965? Why did we attack India on December 3, 1971 when we knew our forces in East Pakistan will have no way to escape surrender? (The other option was total annihilation). Did Musharraf cater to India using its Air Force against his Kargil venture? (He in fact was so sure India would do no such thing that he kept our own Air Force in the dark about the operation). Can we look at this weakness in us at least now?
This piece does not even hint at this aspect, and makes me ask, “Why must we always cry over spilt milk”?
Most of our problems would vanish if we start thinking honestly and put Ghairat aside till we have something to be really proud of as a nation.
And that will never happen if you are reading this in a publication other than ET.
AVM u should know better it is business as usual
"Are we better placed now to handle emergent situations loaded with significant consequences?" ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Tacit Confession that similar HVTs are living inside Pakistan! Well done Mr. AVM.
"the US a friend or a foe;" +++++++++++++++++++++ The answer will be clear post 2014 when Pakistan will not be able to blackmail US anymore. In the meanwhile measure the friendship in terms of US Flags burnt every day in Pakistan.
We all know the past, would it not be better to live in the present ? Does the civilian Government have the power to place responsibility for locating and eliminating foreign terrorists currently residing in Pakistan with the Intelligence Agencies ? This nonsense of whose job is it -- Police, Military, Intelligence Agencies, simply will not wash. Public must be informed who has been given the responsibility so they are held accountable. Can the Intelligence Agencies be given a deadline of 3 months to find Ayman Zawahri with the clear understanding that if they do not succeed they alone will be responsible for subsequent cuts in their Budget. Without a no nonsense approach accountability cannot be fixed.
@Strategic Asset: Pray tell who is this AVM sahib?
"The Abbottabad Commission Report: what next?" ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ The Kargil Commission Report and its leakage. Pls wait.
Friend or foe ? Our esteemed defense analysts as usual still treating relations between countries as character studies of some spy thriller movie. By continuing to mull over the friend or foe debate we forget that in the end all we simply have to analyze is "What is good for Pakistan in the short and long term". Fact is, the whole world cheered and celebrated the demise of OBL while we got caught with our pants down, all red face with anger and embarrassment. Instead of going after the people who may have helped OBL live a comfortable life in Pakistan, we went after those who helped US take him out. Just goes to show our twisted priorities and mangled sense of pride and honor. Even after the outing of the report, our "experts" main focus is on our relationship with US and not on how we can fix our priorities, policies and the intelligence gathering and sharing infrastructure so wanted terrorist like OBL can no longer see Pakistan as their favorite vacation spot.
another attempt by the establishment-paid author to defend the indefensible. Instead of focussing on why "keep the car running at night" you'd do well to focus why OBL was kept hidden for 9 years next to the Military academy and why Dr Afridi is still in jail?
It has been proven times and again that we are at war NOT with India but on our western borders. It has been the history on May 1-2, as well as Salala that the attackers have more than two hours before we could come into motion from our slumber. The establishment has no option but to choose between accomplices or failed. Obviously they chose to be called a failure despite the largest defenses in the third world countries. Whether the establishment was unaware or not the security guards around the army base could have called their superiors on the cell phone if not hotlines. While the civilian neighbors were communicating with the whole world what were army security guards doing during the hour long intrusion? Are our bases left this defenseless during the night that not a single shot is fired?
The Army decided on behalf of 180 million citizens that it was in Pakistan's interest to shelter the world's most wanted man. Since our generals are isolationists by nature, it did not even occur to them that the superpower would turn Pakistan upside down looking for this man - thereby causing harm to the interests of the 180 million who were never consulted about protecting OBL on Pakistani soil. Then the inevitable happened on May 2nd. The next two or three generations of Pakistanis will be labelled as terrorist protectors and treated as such by the world. Thank you Pakistan Army, please carry on making more decisions on our behalf, the Constitution of Pakistan gives you that mandate.
Important question why this report is out now and what purpose it will support. Will it be another distraction tactic by new Government, or it has a purpose to increase the internal divide within Army or it is released to buy more time for already failing approach.
In now a days context this report can not serve many purpose but only display how weak and not calculated things are coming up.
Coming back to National Security Policy, we are still not discussing or selling important construct of a new approach in making.
Already people has been still put out of the decision making process, it would be an interesting watch what a New Government will come up to save human lives which is already fearing more dangers after advent of new approach.
Best line of the op-ed (metaphorically)..."Heads should have rolled even if it were as a consequence of internal departmental processes"
The report would not have been released by the government but, quite mysteriously, it has been leaked. The bottom line is that it is a collective institutional failure that is akin to saying that all organs in the body are on the verge of failing. This leads to another question: is Pakistan a failed state or is it a failing state? What next Air Vice Marshal?
The answers to the authors questions are pretty simple/obvious. The American's didn't confide in Pakistan because they don't trust you - for good reason. Your intelligence failures are obvious and likely a simple cover for Pakistan actually helping OBL - something that becomes more apparent when you consider that Pakistan has spent zero time trying to find those that helped OBL for the last decade. As far as the military end - the "failure" wasn't due to insufficient radar or lack of high tech planes - it was due to "self preservation". Remember the American's called both Zadari and Kayani while they were still on the ground in OBL compound - they told your leaders that they had discovered/killed OBL and would use lethal force if Pakistan interfered. Since the compound was 1/4 mile away from a major military base the lack of response wasn't due to anything complicated - just common sense which dictated that starting a war with America wasn't the smart choice.
AVM Sahib: I am just an ordinary citizen of an adjoining country, but as usual I find this analysis shallow. . US, Friend or Foe? This is not a determination for both the US and Pakistan to make. After all friendship requires more than one person. But can you tell me if in the aftermath of the May 2 raid as well as the Kunduz airliift and numerous preceding events whether Pakistan chose to act as a friend? If Pakistan had detected OBL and handed him over during Dubya's administration or in the early years of Obama, the US would have been very thick friends with Pakistan by now. But that is not the path Pakistan chose since around 2005 as most analysts abroad have realized. . I do not wish to go further since the whole issue is moot. But do you, dear AVM sahib, realize that he problem is that you have multiple security apparatus running in your country at cross purposes not only with each other but also that of your elected government and by extension your people? Isn't it time you disbanded these for the betterment of your own people?
Say what?