National security

Since terrorism is not predictable in any scenario, responses cannot be programmed into a national security strategy.

National security can be empirically defined as protection of core national interests from external threats. Even though security can easily be defined as physical security, economic prosperity, and preservation of national values, institutions, and political autonomy, the contexts of these can vary tremendously at different times, according to the grounding of these issues in real-politik. For instance, if a state conceives its national security to be threatened by encroachment upon a territory not actually in its physical control but to which it lays a claim to, the context of physical security, for instance, can be expansive and is sometimes not easily accepted by the competing states in their own contextual paradigms. National security doctrines, on the other hand, are the institutionalisation of national security by not just contexts, but also by the physical, socio-economic, military and other means to serve these goals. Such national security doctrines are usually sustained over a period of time by the state and it is rare to see a paradigm shift that totally changes the way that national security is institutionalised by some particular state. There are, of course, incremental adaptations, the tinkering of the system to cater for changing times, so to speak. The paradigm shifts only happen after a major change in the national identity of the state, as for instance after defeat in a war, or the sudden fading away of a threat. For example, the threat of war in post-World War II was replaced by a need for economic integration in Europe, spurred on by the end of the cold war.

Then there is the issue of threats to national security that can be termed ‘the national security uncertainty environment’. These are the ambiguous threats, ones that have not been properly understood because they tend to operate outside the paradigms of a conventional national security strategy, since any such strategy would have to be against an opponent. Thus, in framing strategy, one needs to have an opponent, a conflict, a competition, or a situation where an individual or a group is trying to achieve a goal against somebody else. Uncertainty arises when the threat is so diffusely interspersed that it can no longer be recognised by a clearly identifiable opponent, but by a more confusing pattern. Historically, in political literature, such uncertainties usually arise after major wars such as World War II, implosion of a rival such as the disintegration of the Soviet Union, or reconciliation transforming the enemy into a friend or at least a neutral. Any tensions that arise after such major shifts may not be immediately recognisable clearly.

However, perhaps the biggest national uncertainty producer of modern times is terrorism, which has changed the entire context of national security uncertainty. When there is a clearly defined opponent, it is easier to plan, since one can go about preparing to meet him head on, based on one's own capability thresholds. Put simply, if the opponent is big, the preparation to meet him face to face is big as well, and vice versa. Terrorism circumvents this symmetrical logic precisely because it is asymmetric. Terrorism vies against a national strategy by adopting niche tactics that can offset the larger resource base of the state with lesser resources. Terrorism as a political philosophy does not need to defeat the national security strategy of the state in outright battle, but to fatigue it with the war of a thousand cuts. Thus, terrorism seeks to invoke a state of national security uncertainty by exposing the vulnerability of the conventionally based national security strategy paradigms, thereby causing the state to make changes to the latter. These changes are what the terrorists will also try to manipulate, as these can sometimes be quite predictable. For instance, the terrorist will sometimes try to encourage a heavy backlash by the state in the form of military reprisals, which seems illogical as these would wipe out more terrorists. However, at the same time, uncoordinated and hasty operations may also sometimes cause more collateral civilian casualties, thereby turning the opinion of the citizenry against a state, and vindicating the terrorists' stance that the state is tyrannical. This may increase the indoctrination base for terrorists, which offsets the losses accrued due to enhancement of military operations. I have used just the example of terrorism; there are certainly many other factors which cause national security uncertainty, but terrorism is the most troubling in the 21^st century. Its inherent asymmetry implies that it is not easy for any state to be always ready to roll out a preconceived plan of engaging in negotiation, long or short war, counterinsurgency, engagement, or any other strategy. In other words, since terrorism is not predictable in any given scenario, the responses cannot simply be programmed into a national security strategy, but have to be modulated for every terrorist stimulus in its own right. Whatever the rationale and causes, a state of national security uncertainty is always dangerous and finding the balance continues to be one of the biggest challenges for national security in this century.

Published in The Express Tribune, March 24^th, 2013.