There was a clear and harsh message from the powerful establishment, to the effect that it was not willing to hand over the usurped power to the people’s elected representatives, and the intended reaction, too, was as harsh and clear. Suddenly, the entire Bengali population seemed to have turned into enemies of Pakistan and were subsequently treated as such by the forces that began to be seen as an occupation army. Shahid was with his close friend Imdad when they received a message that Imdad’s father was visiting from Rajshahi. In view of the army’s attacks on the Police Lines, Dhaka University and other places, they decided to leave Dhaka, just like tens of thousands of other people, and live in Rajshahi till things got better. A young student from Lahore, taking refuge with a middle-class Bengali family in March 1971 seems something unbelievable today, but when you read Shahid’s account of how they helped each other in difficult times, it looks natural. The Bengali society was forcefully and murderously divided as a result of the establishment’s fatal decisions, but on the human level things continued as before at some places. Such places were few and far between but show another side of the picture.
Caught between the attacking Pakistan Army and defending ‘Azad Fauj’ (or the Liberation Army, the name Shahid has referred the Mukti Bahini with throughout his dairy) the family, like other such families, were thoroughly confused. You could say that a large part of the population was still sitting on the ideological fence when the powerful elements had decided that the division would be ethnic and not ideological. An event narrated by him about a stranded cat in an abandoned house for several days seems to symbolise the condition of such people. As far as the attacking Pakistani Army was concerned, it treated all Bengalis suspect Muslims and suspect patriots; their mindset had no space for the fact that Hindus were an integral part of the East Bengal’s society unlike Punjab which had undergone a complete ethnic cleansing and the entire social milieu had become dangerously homogenous in religious terms. While raiding at people’s homes, the soldiers would ask the residents to recite the kalima, and would still consider them less Muslim than themselves. The liberation army trying to resist the attacking army’s onslaught would wrest control of one town after another and, in the absence of a working state machinery, impose their own writ on the population caught in the crossfire. They, too, suspected the people of having links with the attacking or occupying forces based on ideology, interest or the instinct of survival. As far as the Bihari population living anywhere in East Bengal was concerned, it had opted to collaborate with groups that were resisting the popular will; when the election results were contemptuously rejected by the establishment and the political parties siding with it — Jamaat-e Islami, Nizam-e Islam Party, Muslim League and so on — the Bihari neighbourhoods throughout East Bengal became islands of collaboration and a target of the liberation army’s attacks.
However, the civil war was fought between the hard fighters on the two sides of the divide. Shahid mentions how he witnessed a strange scene during a morning walk with his friends on the bank of the dried up Padma river. He and his friend saw a long line of prisoners, some of them with tied hands and feet, crossing the riverbed to go towards the border with India, followed by a few soldiers of the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR). There was a jailbreak and all the prisoners had run away. Many of them joined the liberation army. Once the Rajshahi town was taken over by the EPR, a search party went out looking for Biharis and other collaborators. This was when the hosts saved Shahid’s life by declaring him a part of their own family.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 14th, 2012.
COMMENTS (7)
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In a way, both Khurram Mansoor and Faraz have valid points. Bhutto did refuse to accept Mujib's victory and opposed handing power to him. He created a political "NO". However, absolute power was in the hands of the Pakistan Army. They could have, and should have, decided to hand power to the winning party. They were not at all obliged to follow the line of Bhutto who should have been told to mind his business and his party. Bhutto was at fault, but the greater and the fundamental fault was that of the Pakistan Army which resulted in Padma Turns Red - Pakistan a Dream Gone Sour.
said day of Pakistan history
Story of Bangladesh can be seen repeated in Balochistan, FATA, Interior Sindh and GB. Please give people equal rights and respect who live in remote deserts and mountains, as much you give to people residing in Garrisons.
Very sad what we did to bangladesh. and the way our textbooks distort history , fashioning accounts glorifying our army and portraying all dissenters as the 'bad ones'. comprehensive reforms in education are needed. our national pride and self respect must be maintained but our future generations must not be misled and wrapped in a cocoon of lies the way we were. they must be to taught to love our nation, admire and respect the ideals on whch it was built, understand and realize the problems we faced, face up to the mistakes we made and lastly, strive to learn from our mistakes and work towards a better Pakistan.
Many of Pakistan's problems emanate from the lop-sided recruiting of the Pakistani army. In 1971 the army was overwhelmingly recruited from West Pakistan. This biased Yahya Khan to the extent that he couldn't accept a Bengali dominated civilian government. It also led the army's leadership to come up with such harebrained strategies as "the defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan". Unfortunately, intellectual introspection has never been lent any credence in the Pakistani Army which sets its store by ideology. So we haven't learnt any lessons from 1971. Today, we the lop-sided recruiting for the army continues with overwhelming Punjabi presence, which biases the army's attitude towards governments dominated by the PPP and its follies in Balochistan and FATA.
@Khurram Mansoor
The establishment was directly in power since 1958. Generals were the governors and ministers. Yahya held all the power not Bhutto. Yahya was supposed to transfer his powers to Mujeeb. Instead he decided to launch military operation. How can Bhutto, who led the minority party, force the all-powerful army to launch military operation against the majority party? And if out of power Bhutto could control the army, then why couldn’t he prevent his own hanging by the same army? Come out of the textbook board books
It was not the establishment who refused to accept the people's verdict, but the Great BHutto. SO please correct your facts before writing biased articles.