US alliance with Israel - from strategic asset to liability
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Muslims across the world do not necessarily hate America; what they increasingly resent are its policies. Over the years, this resentment has intensified to the extent that it is no longer confined to particular Muslim societies or geographical regions. It has rather spread across the wider Muslim Ummah. Whether it is an impoverished, stateless Palestinian facing an uncertain future or an Arab prince lamenting billions in lost investments in the wake of the Iran War, both have reasons to question the consequences of American policy in the region. This raises a fundamental question: would Washington have treated the Muslim world in the same manner had it not viewed the region through an Israeli lens? The US-Israel strategic partnership has profoundly shaped America's perceptions and policies towards the Muslim world, often at a considerable cost to the US. But how did this partnership evolve? While it undoubtedly strengthened Israeli security, did it also enhance American security, or did it make the US more vulnerable? In light of the strategic and economic costs of the Iran War, has Washington finally begun to recognise that Israel may have become less of a strategic asset and more of a strategic liability, drawing America into a conflict that could ultimately undermine its ambitions of sustaining Pax Americana?
Two prominent American diplomats of an earlier era – George Kennan, the US ambassador to Moscow and author of the famous Long Telegram; and George C Marshall, the US Secretary of State and architect of the Marshall Plan – expressed reservations about extending American support to Israel at the expense of the much larger Arab world. There is a widespread perception that the US-Israel partnership grew primarily under the influence of the Jewish lobby in America. History, however, offers a more complex explanation. The foundations of this strategic partnership were strengthened when Washington began viewing the Middle East through the prism of Cold War geopolitics and found compelling strategic reasons to support Israel. By 1955, Arab countries had made considerable efforts to secure American attention and assistance, but with little success. The Israeli attack on an Egyptian military position in Gaza in February 1955, which killed 37 Egyptian soldiers, became a turning point in the region's history. The attack convinced Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to look towards the Soviet Union for military assistance. From President Kennedy onwards, successive American administrations, particularly the Nixon-Kissinger partnership, increasingly approached the Middle East through the lens of Cold War competition. Supporting, favouring and arming Israel thus became an important instrument of American strategy to counter Soviet influence and diminish Moscow's appeal among regional states.
As Washington pursued its objective of containing Soviet influence in the Middle East, Israel gradually emerged as an indispensable strategic partner, receiving American diplomatic, military and political support that helped consolidate its military superiority over its Arab adversaries. This support became particularly consequential during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israel wars. Interestingly, the growing resentment across the Arab world towards American support for Israel eventually found collective expression in the 1973 oil embargo. Arab oil-producing countries used their most powerful economic instrument to target American interests, demonstrating the potential strength of Arab collective action. However, this unity proved short-lived. One of the first major cracks in the Arab front appeared when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat expelled Soviet military advisers from Egypt in 1972, subsequently recognising Israel and signing the Camp David Accords in 1978, followed by the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979. This land-for-peace arrangement fundamentally altered Middle Eastern politics and effectively removed Egypt, the Arab world's most populous country, from the military confrontation with Israel. For Moscow, the strategic landscape of the Middle East would never be quite the same again.
With Egypt no longer a military adversary, Israel became increasingly emboldened. Its 1982 invasion of Lebanon, followed by American involvement in the Lebanese crisis, further complicated the regional security environment. Washington's perceived one-sided support for Israel contributed to the conditions in which Hezbollah emerged, with Iranian backing, as a powerful force of resistance. The 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 American servicemen, exposed the growing vulnerability of American power to asymmetric warfare. The resentment generated by American policies in the Middle East had acquired a new and increasingly violent dimension. It would not be unreasonable to argue that America's Cold War strategy in the region had itself contributed to perpetuating the Arab-Israel conflict and generating hostility towards Washington. If containing the Soviet Union had provided the original strategic justification for America's close partnership with Israel, that rationale should have lost much of its relevance with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet the partnership not only survived but found a new strategic justification. A series of developments during the 1990s, including Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, reinforced Washington's growing preoccupation with terrorism. The emergence of a new security paradigm, subsequently institutionalised after 9/11 as the War on Terror, provided Washington and Tel Aviv with another compelling rationale for deepening their strategic partnership.
The future of the US-Israel partnership may prove more complicated than its historical resilience suggests. The Iran War has exposed the costs of allowing Israeli security priorities to shape American strategic calculations in the Middle East. Washington may continue to provide Israel with military, diplomatic and intelligence support, but the regional environment in which this partnership once flourished has fundamentally changed. Iran's ability to challenge American and Israeli strategic assumptions, growing doubts among Arab states about American security guarantees, and the mounting economic and political costs of regional instability have all altered the equation. America may eventually have to confront an uncomfortable question: can it sustain its global leadership while allowing the security calculations of one regional ally to dictate its Middle Eastern policy? The partnership may survive, but its strategic terms will increasingly be contested. The future of Pax Americana may depend on Washington learning to distinguish its own national interests from those of Israel.

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