Global order in transition

In line with the raging debate on the contours of the Emerging Global Order (EGO), Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) conducted its biennial 'Margalla Dialogue' on the theme of Global Order in Transition on November 10.11, 2026. Like always, the event was well attended in person and online by international luminaries like Professors John Mersheimer, Vali Nasr, Cario Masala (Germany), Dr Timofel (Russia), Dr Daniel Castro, Mr Pravin Sawhney, and Ambassador Robin Raphel (whose husband, the US Ambassador Raphel, died with Gen Zia). Present were also, the who-is-who of Pakistan's think tank community, students and officials, too many to name.

Various fora under the Dialogue dealt with sub-themes including geopolitics and realignment of global power, connectivity and competition in West and South Asia, Pakistan's economic security, technology and the transformation of state and society, non-traditional security and national resilience, and international law. Quite a galaxy from Pakistan attended and participated. Margalla Dialogue is getting enhanced traction as a famous and sought-after international forum.

Margalla Dialogue was hard on the heels of the Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA), NDU Islamabad's annual 'International Programme for Development and Stability (IPDS-26)' on September 14,15, 2026. IPDS deliberations on 'Transformation of the Global Order' under sub-themes included power, governance, strategic autonomy, AI, information and society, redefining national power, the changing character of warfare, strategic stability, managing competition, preventing conflict, the role of middle powers, etc. The ISSRA event was serially covered in this space. For the benefit of readers, this piece will summarise the debate under these fora.

Given the deliberations spanning scholars, practitioners and the discussions during the cited fora, the following key themes and takeaways regarding the flux in the global order can be discerned as widely seen, felt and debated.

First, the nature of EGO. It is largely agreed that the current era is an "age of disruptions," characterised by fragmentation, transactional alliances, and a renewed focus on "hard power" (a combination of military, economic, political, and diplomatic strength). Once again, like always, "geostrategy" outpaces "geoeconomics"; and there is increasing consensus that geoeconomics is actually an extension of geostrategy. And given the recent acknowledgement by the US of having deployed weapons in space, the competition over "Global Commons" (outer space, high seas, Antarctica) and technological dominance (AI, semiconductors, quantum computing) is increasingly going to define the global rivalries.

Second, the great power competition among the US, China, Russia and Europe. Chinese scholars frame Beijing's rise as a return to its historical norm, arguing that US naval and hegemonic power is in decline. They - true to their Confucian ethos - however, advocate mutual deterrence and de-escalation, favouring a harmonious world, where material development should be the human endeavour.

For the US and Europe, President Trump's unilateralism and perceived retreat from traditional alliances have created a leadership vacuum. While some US voices view this as a transient domestic political phenomenon, European and UK perspectives reckon that Washington's shifting focus is forcing Europe to "Europeanise" NATO, and take greater responsibility for its own defence. This, as a consequence, is ultimately unifying the Continent, while still relying on US technological and space-based defence infrastructure. Scholars like John Mersheimer note that for the first time in its history, the US is focusing on East Asia - specifically China - and Europe remains of lesser significance for America, once the war in Ukraine is over. Europe is still under the addiction of the transatlantic alliance and the US security umbrella.

Russia remains a thorn in the European side, as Russians loathe Europe, in particular, the Germans and the British.

Third, the rise of 'Middle Powers (MPs)' and strategic autonomy. While the 'offensive realism' theory of IR considers the US as the only hegemon, China and somewhat Russia as 'great powers', it regards other emerging poles as 'Middle Powers'. Great powers compete to displace the hegemon, who makes the rules. MPs, contrarily, make institutions (ASEAN, SAARC, BRICS, SCO, etc.) and follow the rules. With the old order fading, MPs like India, Pakistan, Brazil, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, etc., champion "hedging" and "strategic autonomy". Rather than joining rigid ideological blocs, Middle Powers are forming issue-based partnerships and utilising multilateral platforms like SCO, BRICS, and a reformed UN to maximise their leverage and prevent conflict.

Fourth, unipolarity versus multipolarity. There is pondering whether the world is still in a unipolar moment, or multipolarity is the writing on the wall. Whereas China, Russia and India, etc., favour a multipolar and polycentric world, the Russian prism is multipolarity with greater Eurasian partnership. Russia views peace and stability as important and considers a 'polycentric' order as unstable.

Fifth, the changing character of warfare and AI. Military theorists are of the view that rapid advancements in AI, cyber, drones, electronic warfare, etc., are outpacing traditional military doctrine, making warfare 'non-contact', where conventional "fire and manoeuvre" by large formations and platforms (tanks, etc.) is becoming obsolete. That AI needs urgent human oversight and country-specific regulations to reinstitute human control and prevent uncontrolled military usage and information warfare.

Sixth, regional dynamics and Pakistan. In South/West Asia, stability depends upon Pakistan-China-India-US relations. The US war with Iran provides Pakistan with a window of opportunity, enabling it to balance ties simultaneously with Washington and Beijing. However, Washington's post-war pivot to East Asia will create navigable challenges for Islamabad. The Makkah and Badr Agreements' framework produces vital collective security mechanisms, strategic deterrence and defence collaboration to ensure regional stability, combining MP capabilities of Pakistan, KSA, Türkiye and Indonesia.

There is internal debate whether Pakistan should act as a regional "security provider" or avoid that label, and leverage its geography, mineral wealth, connectivity and transit potential for geoeconomic stability. With India, despite the positive trade/economic potential, geostrategic compulsions would continue to define relations. TTP will continue to define Pak-Afghan bilateralism.

Seventh, future scenarios. The multipolarity debate and analysis conclude by outlining five scenarios, including (a) lawless multipolarity (every state for itself, no rules or alliances); (b) bipolar spheres (US and China); (c) great power concert (managed peace negotiated among major powers); (d) partial Chinese pre-eminence; and (e) Allied Scale balancing the Chinese scale. Last one being the most plausible outcome.

More from 'Margalla Dialogue' next week.