Terrorism and the writ of the state

Persistent terrorism in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa has inflicted a heavy toll on human life while devastating the region's economy and social fabric - a trend showing no signs of abating. Why does this violence persist despite various counterterrorism strategies and the immense sacrifices of police, security personnel and civilians? The writ of the state cannot be assessed merely by cleared territory or militants killed. The real test is whether citizens can work, travel, attend school, and seek justice without fear.

Recent acts of terror amplify the scale of the challenge. At Speen Mela in Hassan Khel, militants assaulted a police post, martyring Constable Muhammad Jalal and injuring three others. In another incident, five policemen were injured in an attack on the Gumbati checkpost in Bannu. Additional SHO Meera Khan was also shot dead near Miranshah. On October 22, CTD DSP Imranuddin Khan, SHO Afzal Awan and two fellow policemen were martyred in a Karak ambush, which also left two militants dead.

Civilian life remains equally fraught with danger. In one incident, armed militants abducted 17 project and sugar mill workers who remain missing. Such lawlessness carries consequences far beyond the immediate victims; industry cannot flourish where kidnapping and coercion make travel unsafe. Meanwhile, in South Waziristan, a mortar shell struck a house in Toi Khulla, killing three civilians and injuring five. The origin of the shell has yet to be established.

Moreover, in Bannu, a roadside motorcycle bomb exploded near a police patrol, injuring two civilians. Similarly, unverified social media reports indicated that three children were wounded in a quadcopter attack in Bannu on October 23, while a civilian was shot and killed by unidentified gunmen in Bajaur that same day. Together, these unabated acts have intensified the pervasive sense of insecurity.

These incidents and sacrifices, deeply interlinked with the past, require more than just ceremonial tributes; they demand a rigorous review of intelligence, equipment, tactics and operational reinforcements. Against the backdrop of intensified attacks, Malik Khan Marjan, Vice Chairman of the Area Representative and Development Council (ARDC), has proposed sending a delegation of 15 to 20 authorised tribal elders to Afghanistan to negotiate with the TTP, Hafiz Gul Bahadur's group, and other factions. The urgency behind his appeal is understandable. Communities devastated by decades of violence are desperate to adopt any means necessary to normalise the situation.

However, this proposal is highly questionable and contradicts national counterterrorism policy. Moreover, relying on tribal chiefs to resist organised militant networks - backed by heavy weaponry, funding, territorial networks and ideological command structures - is an exercise in self-deception. The historical record is highly alarming. Data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal reveals that at least 194 tribal elders were killed in 143 separate incidents between 2005 and March 2024. This targeted campaign has severely weakened local resilience and fractured the region's social fabric. Crucially, these figures reflect inherently incomplete media reporting and represent an absolute minimum rather than an exhaustive total.

A significant number of tribal elders who opposed militancy and sided with the government were systematically targeted and killed. For instance, former Senator Malik Faridullah Khan Wazir and two other elders were assassinated in Jandola in 2005. Decades of targeted assassinations, extortion and intimidation have severely eroded traditional authority, silenced local resistance and rendered collective action extremely dangerous. Given this historical pattern, expecting unprotected community representatives to confront highly organised militant groups is an unsound proposition that is unlikely to yield the desired results.

Temporary ceasefires and peace agreements in the past have failed to deliver lasting peace. A government-sponsored tribal jirga helped secure a TTP ceasefire announcement in 2022, but capitulating to their core demands - including the reversal of the former FATA merger - amounted to surrendering the writ of the state, causing the truce to eventually collapse. Any renewed engagement must strictly specify who authorises negotiators, guarantees safety, verifies compliance and ensures that militants cannot exploit pauses to regroup. Crucially, victims, women and affected local communities must not be excluded from decisions that directly shape their security.

Although Malik Marjan's call for dialogue may seem like a personal opinion, given the fact that he is the Vice Chairman of the newly formed ARDC and thus a public face of the government administration, his remarks cannot be easily brushed aside. However, the state policy must remain completely unambiguous and must never abdicate its constitutional responsibilities.

The state's strategy must clearly distinguish between organised militant groups, with their distinct operational patterns, and ordinary criminal gangs. Effective counterterrorism requires integrated intelligence, highly capable Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) units, sound investigations and credible prosecutions. Furthermore, it demands the sustained protection of roads, schools and businesses, alongside - above all - filling the critical gaps in local governance.

Under the 25th Constitutional Amendment, a considerable journey has been undertaken toward administrative, political and judicial integration; however, full financial integration has yet to materialise. Consolidating these reforms requires the provision of finances as mandated by the NFC mechanism under the Constitution of Pakistan.

To properly gauge the security environment, the state must regularly publish verifiable monthly figures on attacks, casualties, kidnappings, extortion cases, investigations and convictions, alongside measurable outcomes for civilian safety. Transparency, accountability and the public welfare - expressed in measurable terms - are indispensable for good governance. While traditional leadership can contribute to localised peace, imagining that vulnerable elders can neutralise sophisticated militant networks misinterprets history and abdicates the core responsibilities of the state. Ultimately, this threat must be tackled directly by the organised force of the state.