Afghan policy - resistance and realism

Lt Gen Sami Sadat of the former Afghan National Army (ANA) has recently launched an organised resistance against the Taliban rule from the Afghanistan United Front (AUF) platform, announcing armed uprising by former soldiers of ANA and others, to overthrow the recalcitrant IEA regime and 'reclaim' Afghanistan. In his August 2026 address from an undisclosed location, Sadat, wearing ANA uniform, with the tricolour former flag of Afghan Republic in the background, officially launched 'Operation Muharib', declaring end of dialogue and attempted negotiations with the IEA. He announced phased resistance, claiming active combat operations first along Kandahar-Spin Boldak highway (IEA's political hub), while simultaneously targeting the Taliban in the northeast. Reassuring Afghanistan's neighbours, he sought material assistance without asking for manpower help, to fight IEA, TTP, IS-K, Al-Qaeda, et al.

In a related development, in northeastern Badakhshan province, on July 28, 2026, Zabihullah Amri, heading the local Dept of Information and Culture, was assassinated. Amri was well connected and reportedly the nephew of Amanuddin Mansour, IEA's governor of Helmand. The IS-K claimed responsibility. And on July 17, a newer group, Sipahiyan-e-Mihan (Soldiers of Homeland Front), led by Qayum Malang, a former ANA officer, briefly seized Yaftal-e-Payeen District in Badakhshan. Two more groups, the National Resistance Front (NRF) and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), have also claimed attacks in the province.

Presently, the NRF headed by Ahmad Massoud (son of the slain anti-Soviet resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud) is operating from political headquarters in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The group has diplomatic presence in European capitals, called the Vienna Process. Operationally, NRF operates asymmetrically following guerrilla tactics in Panjshir Valley, Baghlan (Andarab), and some areas of northeastern and central Afghanistan. The AFF, headed by Gen Mohammad Yasinzai (the former Afghan Chief of General Staff and Deputy Defense Minister), operates from command and guerrilla cells in Badakhshan, Panjshir, Parwan, and around Kabul. AFF coordinates with Afghan diaspora abroad. The AUF of Lt Gen Sami Saadat has a distinct Pashtun social base. Whereas, the High Council for National Resistance, comprising former warlords, politicians and Afghan leaders in exile, operates from bases in Turkey (Gen Dostum), Pakistan and Europe.

Amid a broader anti-Taliban wave, there seems to be a growing convergence of resistance and anti-Taliban operations by NRF, AFF, AUF and, by default, the IS-K. This situation cumulatively does not present any mortal danger to the IEA rule now, yet it points to a rapidly deteriorating security environment, and a highly fragmented armed resistance against the Taliban rule in northern Afghanistan. Badakhshan, followed by Panjshir in the north, and Hazara Highlands are the hubs of anti-IEA resistance.

Bordering Tajikistan, China and Pakistan, the predominantly Tajik, mountainous and resource-rich Badakhshan province in particular, has traditionally remained the bastion of anti-Taliban resistance during the 1990s. Simmering ethnic tensions (Pashtun versus Tajik); disputes over control of resources (gold, silver and semiprecious stones); and local grievances such as the sizeable Ismaili Shia community, increasingly feeling marginalized, and the aggrieved farmers in rural districts having lost revenue after IEA banned poppy cultivation, make Badakhshan a potential tinder box this time around too.

The Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) recently concluded a series of highly successful and productive roundtable discussions on Afghan affairs. These Track 1.5 and Track 2-style deliberations offered insights for shaping Pakistan's policy construct. Most speakers aspired for a reformed framework, emphasising Afghan amity, brotherhood and goodwill, cherished values that are sadly out of sync with times and ground realities. In one's reckoning, Pakistan's Afghan policy 'imperatives' like common religion, ethnicity, history, culture, etc are all positive. It is the 'variables' injected into the policy framework – like the TTP, the Durand Line, refugees, trade issues and the border fence – that are all negative and cast a shadow on bilateralism.

The TTP tops the list. When combined with the recurring public animosity on either side, the future does not hold any promise. This remains true despite the P2P and B2B compulsions to normalise, as G2G relations will continue to drive the agenda. For the foreseeable future, geostrategy would continue to trump geoeconomics in Pak-Afghan bilateralism. For policy makers, the TTP issue will remain intractable, because of the will/capacity paradox of the IEA. The Afghan pulse will remain hostile, and the IEA or our erstwhile assets the 'Haqqanis' would not want to be seen as doing Pakistan's bidding, and would hence persist in public hostility, blowing hot and cold. As standing up to Pakistan bestows political legitimacy on the IEA. Kabul wants the TTP issue to resolve itself overtime and seeks muhlat (time), whereas Pakistan faces an existential and increasing terrorist threat from the TTP and wants to resolve this issue with ujlat (hurry). There are cunning catch and trap in the IEA iterations.

Therefore, Pakistan's policy framework should be guided by the ground realities of being 'relevant and possible', rather than chasing dreams of amity. This policy should be based on the factual imperatives that the TTP remains a thorn, Afghan public hostility is enduring, the IEA remains cunningly pro-India and anti-Pakistan, and the insurgency in the north is gaining momentum.

Looking ahead, the policy contours suggested are to: a) use of all leverages to elicit possible pro-Pakistan responses from the IEA; b) continue to aggressively target the TTP based on actionable intelligence, cis or trans-frontier, with or without Afghan collaboration; c) remain engaged – politically and diplomatically and through intelligence – with all segments of the Afghan spectrum, especially the resistance groups according to their weightage; d) try and distance Afghan people from the Afghan Government (IEA), however, difficult it may appear; and e) adopt a regional approach and a joint strategy to combat terrorism emanating from Afghan soil.

It is also important to finally settle the paradox of Pakistan leaving Afghanistan alone versus engaging in a benign interference that is considered meddling by Afghans. Given the intrinsic and unalterable proximity of K-P to Kabul and Balochistan to Qandahar, Pakistan cannot leave Afghanistan alone, as the Afghan situation directly impacts Islamabad. Some reading in history is useful. Also, Islamabad cannot leave its neighbour to an abnormal, emotive, religious coterie with no schooling in statecraft; nor can it remain oblivious to the fact that sovereignty in Afghanistan remains a pipe dream.

And to resolve the conundrum of 'regime change', Islamabad should, as a first step, stop trying to mediate between feuding IEA factions, either now or in the future, and instead pursue leverages, as outlined.