Déjà vu

I am reviewing my writings from the past eighteen years these days to compile them for a forthcoming book on Pakistan's fight against terror and wars in Afghanistan. It pains me to note we haven't progressed at all from where and how we were when these lines were first written and appeared in the press. Just last week, an Apex Committee meeting was held in Quetta under the chairmanship of the country's prime minister, attended by the ministers of the federal and provincial cabinets. The Field Marshal, too, was present, as was the mandate when these committees were first conceived in 2014. The recommendations and directions echoed what has been repeatedly advocated since. I share excerpts from my writings from the time, in italics, with dates next to each.

One, Osama, Mullah Omar and Haqqani, arrived in Pakistan from Afghanistan – they weren't nestled here from the start. Second, the Pakistani military had a war imposed on it, not of its making – Pakistan owned another country's war despite intense domestic opposition to it. Third, the war spawned its own heinous sublets when splinter groups assembled under the banner of the TTP, threatened Pakistan's state and society, and continue to do so. Fourth, Pakistani troops deployed in FATA equal the cumulative force of 48 nations fighting the same extended adversary in Afghanistan. Five, the operations in Swat, South Waziristan and continuing battles in Aurakzai and Khyber agencies of FATA; frequent forays into Pakistan by the TTP fugitives from their Afghan havens; and a sprinkling of unilateral American assaults, all but form the operational environment engaging the Pakistani military without relent. (12 June 2012)

As the Pakistani army clears North Waziristan, it has set into motion a process where full-spectrum counterinsurgency actions will need to be implemented. These will include … accompanying political, social, economic and legal measures that should revert notional and ideological control to the state of Pakistan. Politics and the military will need to interleave appropriately to deliver a wholesome response over the long term. It is politics alone that must deliver abiding solutions to problems that have political roots.… A good model is Swat, both for its omissions and commissions. After the military regained control following a testing operation, the follow-up action remained unattended. Civilian administration returned after much reluctance, fearful of the militants. Political leadership returned with cosmetic visits only, without dealing with the more complex socio-political and socioeconomic domains that would have needed clear-cut policies, including resource allocation and implementation mechanisms to achieve intended objectives. Little was done to convince people of their government's commitment to serve their needs and provide safety. (November 2014).

(The Apex Committee meeting in Quetta on 9 July 2026, twelve years later, reiterated these points with the requisite vehemence.)

Terrorism is akin to softening the battlefield before a full-on assault in the shape of an insurgency. Hence, the compulsion to win the hearts and minds of the people, along with beating terror. When two ideologies are competing to take control of a target group, it remains important for the state to convince the target group that their stakes lie with the state. These must include political, social, and economic integration and, even more importantly, a sense that their safety and security remain the vital responsibility of the state.

Economic support to the FATA region entails a more deliberate study and planning. It will need to strengthen the resident economy, building around what suits the local businessmen. A controlled duty structure specific to the frequently traded items can gradually bring the trade under a legalised framework. It is always useful to build on existing parameters. Infrastructure, schools and hospitals are the most essential and visible avenues of building the communities of FATA, and will give them a sense of integration with the rest of Pakistan. Extension of security and law enforcement to ensure preservation of life and property will be the key to maintaining a social structure with equal opportunity and equal responsibility.

There is a dire need for a policy for the governments in Pakistan to declare a few geographical zones as zones of development. A FATA Fund for both internal and external endowments and aid programmes must be created for a period, perhaps ten years, where the state must be an equal contributor. Similar zones of development could also be considered for Balochistan. Both FATA and Balochistan will need special allocations to realise an accelerated pace of development to bring these regions to the same level as the rest of Pakistan. A Constitutional provision must ensure adherence for a fixed period to such a plan by successive governments.

Pakistan's current travails of a full-blown insurgency in FATA and another in Balochistan, with its national cohesion under serious stress, may be sourced partly because of fallacious policies and partly to external influences that continue to destabilise Pakistan and weaken its potential as a nation. In a competitive regional environment, aggressive insurrection through surreptitious means is the established norm. Each nation in the region thus has always been known to possess strong and active national intelligence outfits. Proxy conflicts are a fact of life.

If India alleges Pakistani intelligence to be involved in Kashmir, as does Afghanistan for its own long years of duress as a nation embroiled in a debilitating war of terror, Pakistan too holds long-standing complaints against Indian Intelligence for its role in supporting an insurgency in Balochistan, and of the Afghan and Indian intelligence together for their joint role in fostering and sustaining the insurgency in FATA. Given Afghanistan's precarious situation on Pakistan's western borders, the need for effective and diverse intelligence capacity for Pakistan becomes an even bigger existential imperative.

India's nexus with Western entities in Afghanistan is a godsend for them, where, after a rather barren period till 2002, they find an opportunity to sustain a formidable footprint. That this enables them to extend their operations into Pakistan, particularly Balochistan, goes without saying. India's ultimate objective is to weaken Pakistani state structures to a point where the shell might stay, but the inside is hollow. (November 2014.)

The army is deep into a war that it can only win – the opposite, calamitous for the state and its people. It's only natural for it to seek and know that the political government stands behind it with (full) support. The police, the civilian intelligence agencies, the administration that continues to have a dominating hold over the urban and rural life in the length and breadth of Pakistan, and the mandarins that sit in control over the various elements of power in Pakistan's governance structures will all have to stand to be counted in this hour of judgment over Pakistan's future. (26 Dec 2014)

Two decades later, remarkably little has changed. It makes it doubly hurtful.