Pakistan turns rivals into negotiators

Experts say it is not the first time country found itself at the centre of a geopolitical breakthrough

KARACHI:

After almost six weeks of conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran, Islamabad brokered a two-week ceasefire, maintaining a careful balancing act throughout, avoiding alignment with either side while quietly working to open channels for de-escalation.

With less than two hours before US President Donald Trump's deadline for Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz—who warned "a whole civilisation will die tonight, never to be brought back again"—Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced that both sides had agreed to an immediate ceasefire.

The praise that followed was swift and global, with world leaders lining up to congratulate Pakistan.

However, for those who have watched Pakistan's diplomatic history closely, it is not the first time Pakistan has found itself at the centre of a geopolitical breakthrough – and that pattern, as much as the ceasefire itself, is worth examining.

The country has a quiet but consequential history of making itself indispensable at moments when the world's great powers cannot, or will not, talk to each other directly.

One such example was in 1971, when Washington and Beijing had not spoken in over two decades.

The first signals were passed through Islamabad—Pakistan's back channels to China gave then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger a secret route to Beijing. His covert flight, routed through Islamabad, made Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China possible.

This led to Nixon's famous handshake with Mao Zedong and the broader detente between the two countries, accompanied by the US' recognition of communist China.

Pakistan hadn't just facilitated a meeting, it had helped rewire the global order.

According to Ambassador Masood Khalid, "In 1971, Pakistan played a seminal role in bringing about a rapprochement between the USA and China, and that changed global politics." "Chinese leaders even today acknowledge our contribution. American leaders like Dr Kissinger also acknowledged our role," he added.

Major General (retired) Inam ul Haque went further: "Pakistan was instrumental in patching up between China and the US in the 1970s. As far as our balancing act between China and the US is concerned, our foreign office and our establishment are very experienced in doing that. We have been walking this tight diplomatic road for a long time and we have been doing it very successfully."

A decade and a half after aiding the US-China rapprochement, Pakistan was again at the centre of history. The 1988 Geneva Accords, which ended the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, were made possible in large part by Pakistan's role as a key conduit for the Afghan Mujahideen and key interlocutor between Washington and the Afghan factions.

The accords, a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, included the US and the Soviet Union as guarantors. It laid out the terms and timeline for the return of refugees and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

Although Afghan unrest continued after the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan, through strategic manoeuvring of its diplomatic relationships, managed to bring together the US and Soviet Union during the tense Cold War period, with both powers remaining guarantors of non-interference and non-intervention.

The cost Pakistan paid for that role was concrete and lasting.

Pakistan's economy was burdened by feeding millions of Afghan refugees for nearly a decade, while the country absorbed the narcotics trade and arms factionalism that the war had seeded across its western border – consequences that would define Pakistani society for a generation.

Then came Doha in 2020, when Pakistan was again quietly instrumental in bringing the Taliban to the table, facilitating the agreement that was celebrated internationally as a landmark diplomatic achievement.

The Doha Accords, known also as the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, saw Pakistan leverage its relationship with Washington and its influence with Taliban leadership to help end the long-running war.

The agreement laid out fighting restrictions for both parties as well as the withdrawal of all NATO forces from Afghanistan in return for counter-terrorism commitments from the Taliban.

"Be it the Geneva Accords or the Doha Accords, Pakistan has shown its commitment to peace and its capacity to deliver," said Ambassador Khalid.

Pakistan's former permanent representative to the United Nations Dr Maleeha Lodhi, in a 2021 interview, also credited Islamabad for its role in the negotiation process.

She stated that Pakistan kept the channel of communication open with the Taliban, adding, "If we hadn't, Pakistan would not have been able to play the constructive role it played in helping in the sequence of events that led to the Doha agreement between the US and the Taliban."

The commitments of the accords, however, did not hold. Part of the Doha pact was an assurance that Afghanistan would not allow any terrorist group to use its soil to attack a foreign country, yet in the years that followed, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan grew stronger, not weaker, operating from Afghan territory with training camps across Kunar, Nangarhar and Khost. Pakistan had helped broker a deal whose blowback landed squarely on itself.

The dividend question

Three moments, three generations, a strikingly consistent pattern – and a question that refuses to go away: what has Pakistan actually walked away with? The Geneva Accords left Pakistan managing millions of Afghan refugees and a narco-arms economy that would haunt it for decades.

Doha produced neither security nor economic reward, only a more emboldened Taliban on its border and a deepening insurgency at home. By 2025, Pakistan was experiencing six times as many terrorist incidents as it did in 2020, the year the Doha Accords were signed.

Nixon's opening to China also reshaped the world, but Pakistan remained on the margins of what followed.

According to Khalid, "Whether Pakistan reaped strategic dividends or not is debatable." "I don't think it can be gauged in net loss or gain, it depended on the obtaining situation and geopolitical dynamics of the time," he said.