Iran - boots on the ground

In a jumbled effort to obtain an off-ramp, the US is claiming to have changed the regime in Iran through sustained assassinations of Tehran's top political and military leadership. However, the 'regime change' as a stated war objective, as 'claimed', is not enough to inject behavioural change in Tehran, given Iran's tenacity, tit-for-tat military responses and its holding of the international economy hostage by Hormuz blockage, in this unjust war, imposed on it. The other war objectives (stated and implied) i.e. Iran's de-nuclearisation, de-missilefication, military surrender, opening Hormuz and re-instilling the Arab confidence in the US-led security architecture, are not possible without boots on the ground.

Although Israel would want to settle the Irani question for good, President's Trump plans to exit Iran in coming weeks. And there are signs that Netanyahu, fearing Trump's loss of interest, has scaled back IDF war objectives to 'degradation' of Irani military capability, under Israeli doctrine of 'mowing the grass' that does not rule out revisits, once the grass grows again. The US seems to be on board.

Iran's unwise conflagration of the conflict by targeting civilian infrastructure in the Gulf, in Saudi Arabia and Türkiye has also cemented the notion in the ME, Asia and West Plus that a desperate Irani regime armed with dangerous hypersonic missiles, doubling down to acquire nuclear capability, and able to choke the world's lifeline in Hormuz, needs serious attention and handling.

The IRGC (Pasdaran)'s strategy of expanding the conflict to raise the cost for the US and indeed the entire world has worked thus far but it will backfire. Its consequences for post-war Iran and her relations with the Sunni Gulf, the wider ME, Asia and the West Plus would be grave. Iran has suffered extensive military-economic degradation, causing communication problems among leadership, impeding coherent and timely responses to negotiators. Its decentralisation helps militarily but obstructs unified political responses.

Military rationale – when seen in the backdrop of mayhem in the oil and energy markets, interruptions in the global supply chains causing rise in the food prices and Iran's reckless strikes on Arab neighbours – makes ground offensive a real possibility, if the war drags on. Despite the anti-war noise, powerful stakeholders around the world would want to see Iran defanged, for good. The decider, however, would be the military outcome of the war, especially the 'assessed' neutralisation of Iran's missile capability and Hormuz opening.

Depending upon the emerging intelligence from Iran regarding war damages (Irani Red Crescent announced on March 23 that over 81,000 civilian buildings across Iran have been hit): Iran's residual staying power; changes in the Irani leadership and a host of other factors, the Coalition under Israeli/Jewish prodding may opt for ground offensive, if Iran does not relent and the war continues.

The duration of the war is important. Coalition needs a quick victory as US opinion polls (March 5) are solidly (59%) anti-war. The first 100 hours of combat costed the US a whopping $3.7 billion. Israeli general elections this year and mid-term elections in the US this November compel the Coalition to culminate the war quickly and on positive/victorious note. And that, militarily, seems less likely before a quick and decisive ground war. Other possible scenarios include a deal consequent to Pakistan-led interlocution, Iran's capitulation due to economic, military and demographic degradation, regime change in Israel or Washington, or some other unexpected 'butterfly event'.

Considering the five weeks of combat, the Coalition's urgent objectives now include safe shipping through Hormuz and protection of US allies in the Gulf. To this end, the likely geo-strategic maneuver, after America urged European/other countries including China, to protect their own shipping through Hormuz, is envisaged as follows. First, in a massive operation to 'shaping the environment', the Coalition neglecting Gulf security either willfully or due to inability (likely): a) allows Tehran's to continue raising the cost of war, and suck in the GCC/KSA to respond to Irani strikes; b) allows oil prices to further spike due to rising risk, fare and insurance costs; and c) allows economic, military and societal upheaval in the ME and beyond. Secondly, once the environment is sufficiently 'shaped', the Coalition launches ground offensive, with or without UN authorisation. Thereafter, it either assembles NATO and other nations for an Afghanistan-style invasion; or does it alone (more likely) in different form and format.

Military geography renders Iran a natural fortress, ringed by rugged mountains along its borders, vast deserts in the interior and strategic maritime chokepoints. Zagros Mountains circle 1,600 km along Iraq and Turkey in the West/Southwest, down to the Strait of Hormuz, acting as a buffer. Its jagged peaks and narrow passes channelise mechanised forces into predictable corridors vulnerable to ambushes. Alborz Mountain range in the North protects Iran's Caspian Sea coast. It shields capital Tehran, providing high-altitude terrain for positional defensive. These mountains securely hide, disperse and protect Iran's military assets including nuclear infrastructure in expansive tunnel networks and underground facilities.

On the interior, the 'Great Salt Deserts' of Dasht-e Kavir and Dasht-e Lut, the hottest places on Earth, are formidable logistical obstacles for any invasion from the east. Invasion from Southwest (Iraq) through Khuzestan Plain was attempted during Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). In sum, geography endows Iran with significant strategic depth, making full-scale conventional ground invasion logistically difficult, if not impossible. Past the outlying mountain barriers, the invader faces less ground friction but more demographic resilience. The spectre of urban warfare in Iran's sprawling cities, against Irani forces fighting for a just cause, infused with the will-to-fight, is daunting, if Pasdaran remains operationally viable, and Artesh (Army) survives the air-offensive.

The sheer size of the Iranian Plateau, roughly four times Iraq, ensures Iran's survivability. And even relentless air offensive alone cannot eliminate Iran's military capabilities. Likewise, invasion of the entire country poses significant political and military challenges. So, capturing and holding geo-strategically important terrain in and around the Strait of Hormuz emerges as preferred and less costly option. Capturing Kharq Island – containing Iran's oil and gas export terminals – remains the most likely and lucrative objective. For that American troops are in place for posturing and attempt, if negotiations fail.