Back to Iran: the Trumpian conundrum

The Iranian event horizon is again painted by the prospect of a US or US-Israel war, even if postponed for some time now, thanks to the Riyadh-Islamabad deft diplomacy now and in the past. An understanding of the Iranian state and society is instructive for informed outcomes. Contemporary Iran has a unique, if battered, theocratic-republican system, imposed by a ruling clergy after the 1979 Revolution, over a diverse and complex society, where a sizeable number of people still cherish the secular liberalism under the erstwhile Shah, Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980). The recent history, ethnic mix and ongoing conflict surfacing now and then between the traditional Islamic values and globalised modernity, especially among the young, define Iran's social movements, cultural shifts and political authoritarianism.

The Iranian state is a hybrid mix of elected bodies (President, Parliament) and more powerful unelected clerical institutions, all subservient to the Supreme Leader (Rahbar). Its laws and governance are based upon Ja’fari Shia Islam. Iran’s mixed governance system is based upon the concept of velāyat-e faqīh, developed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s first post-revolutionary leader. Khomeini’s method grants political leadership to the faqīh, or jurist, when there is no divinely inspired imam. Majles-e Khobregān (Assembly of Experts) chooses the Rahbar from among the qualified Shia clergy. The Leader then, using his extensive powers, appoints senior military and Revolutionary Guards (Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb) officers, judiciary and clerical members of the Council of Guardians (Shūrā-ye Negahbān). He sets the general direction of national policy, enjoying no limits on his term in office.

Tehran's centrally planned economy has taken a huge hit in the wake of the Iranian riyal (IRR) crumbling up to 44.7% last year, besides economic sanctions and stagflation. It affects Iran's diverse demography of Persians, Kurds, Azerbaijanis, etc, challenging Iran's monolithic nationalism. Highly urbanised and stratified Iranian society comprises well-to-do working and upper classes (collectively almost 78%), living mostly in cities; and lower middle and lower classes living in the countryside. Tehran's small-merchant class, the influential Bazaari yield immense economic clout, and their support to the Islamists against the Shah during the 1979 Revolution, was crucial.

A strong national identity shaped by pride, history and globalisation influences like pop culture, fashion, etc affects Iranian youth (2020 estimates put male population under 25 at 35.15%), who often clash with official norms. Political activism and social mobilisation have survived from the 1905 Constitutional Revolution, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and the 2009 Green Movement. The 1979 Revolution aimed for a classless society, but persistent income and class disparities intersecting with gender and ethnicity continue to affect opportunities and social standing. Non-Fars women, for example, often bear the brunt.

Absence of strong political parties cause people to centre around personalities, generally belonging to one of three ideological camps — the Principlists or conservatives (usūl-garāyān); the Reformists (eslāh-ṭalabān); and figures outside the above camps, often regarded as “centrists” or “moderates”. Reformists lost out after the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-13), and centrists were sidelined after Hassan Rouhani (2013-21), leaving conservatives with unfettered powers since the 2020s. Within conservatives, the fundamentalist Paydari Front (Jebheh-ye Pāydāri-ye Enqelāb-e Eslāmī) or “Front of Steadfastness of the Islamic Revolution” has manipulated power and weakened the establishment.

Societal rifts due to state's religious and authoritarian control and people's yearning for freedoms, modernity and social change are regime vulnerabilities. The West Plus is expecting to overthrow the clerical regime through these exploitable cleavages. And like elsewhere, the regime is resorting to quell popular dissent, activism and cultural expressions that is aided and abetted mostly by foreign elements particularly Israel's Mossad, with deadly force.

Iran, under monarchy had one of the largest armed forces in the world that dissolved after the Revolution and were reconstituted around war with Iraq (1980-88). Components of the security forces involved in external war or internal armed conflict are commanded or accompanied by the trusted Revolutionary Guards (Pasadaran). A specialised unit within Police force, the ‘Guidance Patrol’ (Gasht-e Ershad), enforces Islamic ḥijāb, and ensures chaste behaviour (ʿifāf) as interpreted by the ruling clergy.

With the above factual situation, the possibilities of a regime change are hard, if not impossible. As far as possibilities go, urban agitation by youth under Western influences and Israeli manipulation is insufficient to dislodge the clerical regime that is well entrenched and in control, even if weakened after its war with US-Israel last year; the ongoing agitation; and the yet to be fixed deteriorating economic situation. Second, the motley crowd of agitators is not inspired by similar ideological reasons. The Bazaaris, for example, have only economic grievances. Third, not all in opposition to the Ayatollahs subscribe to the liberal and secular credentials of the protesters. Four, statements by the son of Shah, himself comfortably ensconced in the US, urging Iranians to overthrow the existing order in collaboration with President Trump, would not go well with the proud Iranian nation, irrespective of their political differences. Nations rally around leadership in crises. And lastly, there is, as of now, no pliable alternative to the regime in charge. Prince Raza is badly out of sync with Iran's changed realities.

A possible regime change would be voluntary change of faces within the clerical order, away from conservative hardliners to reformists or moderates. Any regime change orchestrated through intelligence and military operations would usher in unspeakable instability in Iran, and West Asia as far as Middle East. It will create catastrophic upheaval in the energy market, if Iran interdicts global oil flows through the Persian Gulf. Military action might also result in refugee problem for Iran's neighbours. And none of Iran's neighbours would want Tehran to become another Israeli listening post, or Chabahar reverting to the Indian control, in partnership with Israel. Short visit by the UAE President to India recently provides some context.

Afghanistan, in case of a forcible regime change in Tehran, needs to watch out, as similar template could be applied against Kabul. Pakistan especially would be vulnerable due to added security headaches from Iran, in addition to the already entrenched TTP terrorism from Afghanistan.

So, for Iranian leadership, a voluntary shuffle of the deck is critical to quell disturbances, because economics and public aspirations win in the long-term, not ideology!