Countering terror and proxies

The recent arrest of ISIS-K member Mohammad Goran in a joint operation by Pakistani and Turkish intelligence should raise serious concerns for Pakistan and its neighbours on multiple fronts. Turkish media reported that Goran had pledged to carry out attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey and Europe prior to his arrest.

First, the arrest aligns with the Taliban's narrative insisting on the allegations of existence of terrorist camps in border regions. Goran's arrest was swiftly followed by Taliban's spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid claiming that it resulted from intelligence shared by Afghanistan. He reiterated that the Islamic Emirate had formally objected to the presence of ISIS sanctuaries and called for their immediate dismantling, describing ISIS as a "sinister phenomenon" that must not be exploited against any country.

Second, Goran's arrest must be viewed in the context of clashes that erupted in mid-March between the banned Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) in the Chiltan mountain range between Quetta and Mastung district in Balochistan. Fighting reportedly began around March 18-19, when hundreds of BLA militants, supported by fighters from the outlawed Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), attacked a training camp in the hills near Mastung.

The camp reportedly housed around three dozen militants affiliated with local and foreign jihadist groups, including ISKP and the sectarian Pakistani outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Local officials and private sources said the occupants included ISKP operatives from Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan. BLA forces allegedly surrounded the camp for three days and killed most of those inside after they ran out of ammunition, effectively destroying the facility.

Militant sources disclosed that fighters from the BLA's Majeed Brigade had previously received training at the same camp. The Majeed Brigade is known for preparing operatives for suicide bombings and sniper attacks against Pakistani security forces and Chinese interests. The assault followed the BLA's loss of several senior commanders in military operations across Balochistan between February and March.

Third, the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team's 35th report (2025) highlighted cross-linkages among the Majeed Brigade, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISKP and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), including collaboration at operational bases in Afghanistan. The Afghan, Tajik and Uzbek militants killed in Mastung were reportedly part of ISKP networks in Afghanistan and had been invited to Balochistan to train jihadist fighters.

Mastung's rugged terrain has long rendered it a de facto no-go area, offering militants elevated positions for attacks and easy escape routes. Fighters from multiple militant organisations are believed to operate there. Local journalists largely refrain from reporting on militant activity, citing fear of reprisals from both militants and security forces, as well as undeclared restrictions on coverage of ISKP-related issues.

Fourth, Afghan sources point to the presence of at least two seminaries north of Kabul allegedly established for fighters affiliated with the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), formerly known as ETIM. One of its leaders, Abu Bakr al-Uyghori, and Abdul Salam, who oversees TIP's media operations, are reportedly based at one such seminary in the Pul-e-Khumri area of Kunduz province, along the Salang Highway.

In November 2020, the US Justice Department removed ETIM from its list of designated terrorist organisations, raising eyebrows as to what might be the motive. A year later, the CIA created its China Mission Center with the stated objective of containing China's growing influence. Did ETIM's de-designation have anything to do with the Center too? Unverified reports from Kunduz suggest that Uyghur militants now intend to openly project their campaign against Beijing, portraying their leader, Abdul Haq Turkestani, not as an Al-Qaeda affiliate but as a displaced figure seeking to reclaim Xinjiang through the TIP. Abdul Salam reportedly cited the US decision as validation that the group should not be viewed as terrorist — an assertion China strongly rejects.

Finally, the cross-border affiliations and operational synergies among these militant groups underscore their proxy character. Balochistan's location at the intersection of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan makes it a natural transit and facilitation zone. ISKP operatives moving through or receiving training there highlight networks of mobility, logistics and coordination rather than the presence of large, formal camps. Organised crime networks — particularly drug trafficking, arms smuggling and illicit trade — often act as enablers, creating a mutually reinforcing ecosystem that undermines regional counterterrorism efforts.

ISKP-linked activity in Balochistan thus signals broader regional spillover and illustrates how proxy militant groups and organised crime increasingly function as interconnected components of a wider terror matrix. The threat they pose is transnational and persistent, demanding sustained regional cooperation and a coordinated counterterrorism strategy to deal with groups that ostensibly are driven more by geopolitical realities than by the ideological claims of religion, nationalism or sub-nationalism by these terror groups. These threats also require authorities in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan to demonstrably go after any activity by any of these groups that represents threats to any neighbouring countries. Mere statements and allegations won't impair the deadly work that these groups are involved in.